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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the impact of one particular change in industrial conflict legislation 
in the 1980s: that is, the requirement for trade unions to hold ballots before industrial 
action. It does so by analysing the results of an extensive postal questionnaire survey, 
covering 846 negotiators in 25 unions. This was part of a wider research project on the 
impact of changes in the law, incorporating interviews with employers and senior National 
Officers of trade unions. The conclusions in the thesis also draw on these findings.
The fieldwork was carried out in 1991 and 1992. It took into account a number of 
modifications - notably in 1988 and 1990 - to the original balloting provisions in the 1984 
Trade Union Act. The thesis provides an analysis of the impact of the industrial action 
balloting requirement on trade union practices and the role of balloting in negotiations, 
looking beyond injunctions and high profile court cases. The thesis is primarily 
concerned to examine the impact of ballots on the processes of collective bargaining.
It concludes that the effects of the 1984 balloting laws, including their amendments, were 
far more complex than anticipated or claimed by the Government. Internally industrial 
action ballots were accommodated by trade unions into existing consultation processes. 
The potential for ballots to modify substantive decisions within trade unions, by 
centralising and formalising decision making, was thereby limited. Amendments to the 
balloting laws increased the difficulties for trade union negotiators in accommodating 
ballots in the collective bargaining process. Trade union negotiators, however, sought by 
and large to conduct industrial action in accordance with the balloting laws and, despite 
an increasingly restrictive legal framework, there was a widespread perception among 
trade union negotiators in the early 1990s that this could bring negotiating advantage. 
Generally, it is apparent that industrial action ballots were one aspect of a complex 
process of sometimes radical change in industrial relations throughout the 1980s.
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PREFACE
Research topic
The voluntarist tradition of labour law included those who argued that in the particular 
circumstances of British industrial relations the law could not, as well as should not, be 
used as a tool of reform. This related in particular to the reform of collective bargaining 
or regulation of the use of industrial action. Above all it was argued that the law should 
abstain from attempts to intervene for the purposes of reform in the internal affairs of 
trade unions. The autonomy of trade unions and the absence of legal regulation and 
restriction were key elements of the voluntarist analysis. This was not to argue, of course, 
that the law could not have other auxiliary purposes, including legislation to promote and 
extend collective bargaining and to provide certain individual rights both to those within 
and outside the collective bargaining process.
In 1979 it was still possible to argue that voluntarism reflected the dominant trend within 
labour law. From the perspective of the early 1990s it could be argued that voluntarism 
has in many respects broken down, following more than a decade of legislative 
intervention which has sought - among other objectives - to regulate and restrict not only 
the use of industrial action, but also the internal affairs of trade unions. It is widely 
assumed by proponents of this argument that the view that the law could not be used for 
these purposes was mistaken. On closer examination, however, the experience post 1979 
raises interesting questions of a broader nature about the impact of the law, which warrant 
further investigation of the relationship between labour law and industrial relations 
practice. The thesis will conduct such an investigation in the context of the introduction 
of compulsory ballots before official industrial action by the Trade Union Act of 1984.
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The thesis explores the role of strike ballots1 in regulating the behaviour of trade unions, 
drawing on two main strands of research, which looked firstly at the way in which unions 
have adapted to a more restrictive legal framework and secondly at the ’use’ of the law 
by employers. Employers’ rights of enforcement of the strike ballot provisions of the 
1984 Trade Union Act represented a radical shift from earlier proposals and policies on 
balloting. These had focused on the power of the state to call for a ballot in the context 
of emergency powers legislation and had rejected the wider use of balloting as a policy 
option. In 1984 the introduction of a mandatory requirement on trade unions to hold 
ballots before industrial action, therefore, was to completely change the nature of the 
balloting requirement. After 1984, trade union immunities from the common law of tort 
depended on official industrial action being preceded by a lawful ballot.
The 1980s also saw wide-ranging legislation on secondary action and picketing which 
exposed industrial action outside certain narrowly defined boundaries to economic tort 
liabilities. Part II of the Trade Union Act should be placed within the context of this 
industrial conflict legislation, in terms of its intention to circumscribe trade unions’ 
freedom to organise, and work groups’ freedom to take part in, industrial action. The 
balloting requirement was, however, distinct. For the first time measures were prescribed, 
laying down the way in which trade unions would be expected to consult members over 
taking industrial action. In seeking to regulate the internal affairs of trade unions 
balloting was to strike at one of the key principles of voluntarism.
In many respects it could be argued that the 1984 Trade Union Act failed to fulfil the 
expectations of the 1979 Government. In simple terms, these expectations were to give 
a voice to the ’moderate majority’ within trade unions. Their views were said not to be 
given expression through existing consultation channels, which were seen to be deficient
\  The term strike ballot is commonly used as a shorthand for ballots on any form of 
industrial action. In this thesis reference to strike ballots should be understood as 
referring to any form of industrial action ballot.
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and to allow more ’militant’ leaders to misrepresent the views of members. By giving 
members a voice, balloting legislation was expected to contribute to a decline in the 
incidence of industrial action. This thesis will argue that to claim this, as the Government 
- supported by some commentators - has done repeatedly, is to misunderstand and 
oversimplify the way in which the impact of ballots takes effect. The research on which 
the thesis is based has shown the effect of the legislation on trade unions to be extremely 
complex. The thesis explores the way in which the impact of the balloting laws has been 
influenced not only by external environmental factors, such as the economic climate, but 
also existing procedures and practices within trade unions. This has been explored by 
looking more closely at examples of trade union government in practice.
Over the 1980s ballots before industrial action were required to conform to an 
increasingly prescriptive model, following amendments to sections 10 and 11 of the Trade 
Union Act (1984) in 1988, 1990 and 19932. A draft Code of Practice on industrial action 
balloting was first published in 1988 and took effect in 1990. It has since been amended, 
most recently in 1995. The Code goes beyond the law in making recommendations about 
the way in which ballots should be conducted (Simpson 1995). Nevertheless trade unions 
have sought by and large - after considerable initial hostility - to operate within the terms 
of the legislation. The fact that after 1984, Conservative governments returned to the 
question of strike ballots on three further occasions could be seen to reflect an 
intentionally incremental programme of labour law reform. It could also be seen, 
however, as Conservative governments’ attempts to secure the results anticipated, but not 
realised, in the 1984 Act. As they were incorporated into trade union practice, the 
balloting provisions had led to some quite unexpected - and, from the Government’s 
perspective, unwelcome - results.
2. The balloting provisions are now contained in the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations Consolidation Act 1992 ss.226-235. The 1993 changes in the law came after 
the fieldwork for the research was completed.
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The fieldwork for the research, which was based on a postal questionnaire survey, 
provided new information about the impact of strike ballots in the experience of trade 
union negotiators. The thesis has also been able to draw on wider research, which was 
part of the same project, on employers’ ’use’ of the law3. At one level, the enforcement 
mechanisms of the 1984 Act depended on employers being prepared to seek legal 
remedies. Employers who sought to challenge industrial action on the grounds that a 
proper ballot had not been held needed to proceed by seeking ’interlocutory relief from 
the High Court in the form of a labour injunction. After 1988 individual trade union 
members also had the right to seek an appropriate court order preventing industrial action 
from going ahead where a proper ballot had not been held4. This provision has been little 
used, however, and did not in any way diminish the primary role of employers in 
enforcing the terms of the legislation on balloting. At another level, employers were given 
opportunities to use the balloting laws in other ways to strengthen their bargaining 
position. The relative willingness or reluctance of employers to invoke the legislation, 
in ways beyond injunctions and solicitors’ letters, was an important factor in trade union 
negotiators’ experience. Clearly, for employers to use the law was not a decision that 
could be taken lightly. From an employer’s point of view, the unpredictable consequences 
of resort to the law in the context of a complex dispute could detract from the benefits 
of threatening or actually seeking legal remedies.
Where employers won injunctions, there was no real issue about the effectiveness of the 
enforcement mechanisms of the balloting provisions. After 1984-1985 unions almost
3. The research was carried out as part of the work of the industrial relations group 
of the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics. The results 
are reported in Elgar and Simpson ’The Impact of the Law on Industrial Disputes in the 
1980s’ in Metcalf and Milner (eds) 1993. The research on employers was published in a 
series of CEP Discussion Papers relating to different sectors: see Elgar and Simpson 
1993a, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1994d, 1994e.
4. After 1993 a similar right existed for consumers in defined circumstances.
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invariably complied if they were faced with a court order. It should be noted, however, 
that a number of high profile attempts by employers to have the law interpreted 
restrictively by the courts were on the whole unsuccessful5. What the thesis seeks to 
understand is a wider issue relating to the impact on trade union negotiators of employers’ 
attitudes towards using the balloting laws, which did not necessarily involve legal 
proceedings. A broad political consensus has emerged on the desirability of a legal duty 
on trade unions to consult their members about proposed industrial action by some form 
of ballot. There continues to be a debate about the nature of the detail of that duty. Now 
that strike ballots look likely to remain an integral part of industrial relations practices, 
it is particularly important that these issues are fully discussed.
Outline of chapters
The methodology is described in pages 12-19 of this preface. Chapter 1 provides a 
background analysis of industrial relations in the 1980s, the changing patterns of industrial 
action and the role of industrial conflict legislation. It goes on to outline the approach 
taken in the thesis to understanding the impact of industrial action ballots.
Chapter 2, on the historical development of labour law, places the 1980s legislation into 
the context of the ’voluntarist tradition’ of labour law. It includes an analysis of earlier 
balloting proposals dating back to the 1920s and the role of strike ballots in proposals for 
labour law reform in the 1960s and 1970s. Most notably these proposals were in the 
report of the Donovan Commission (1968), the Labour Government’s In Place of Strife 
(1969) and the Conservative policy document Fair Deal at Work (1968). Balloting 
proposals were implemented by the 1970-4 Conservative Government in its 1971
5. Two of the more important cases in which the Courts refused to be persuaded by 
employers’ arguments were Monsanto v. TGWU [1987] ICR 269 CA, and British Rail v. 
NUR [1989] ICR 678. See Simpson 1993.
10
Industrial Relations Act (IRA).
Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the balloting legislation of the 1980s. It begins by 
outlining the provisions of Part II of the Trade Union Act 1984 and the amendments to 
these provisions made in subsequent legislation of the 1980s and early 1990s. The 
chapter looks more closely at the enforcement mechanisms of the balloting provisions of 
the Trade Union Act 1984. This necessarily raises questions about the role of the courts 
in interpreting the law because of the complex interplay of forces from statute and 
common law.
Chapter 4 traces the development of Government policy on ballots in the 1980s. Other 
literature has marked the change in Conservative governments’ philosophy towards the 
use of the law, reflecting a radical agenda of reform. Chapter four looks specifically at 
the role of industrial action ballots in public policy within the context of broader 
Government objectives which were to give new rights to employers, individual trade 
union members and even ’the community’ in the event of actual or threatened industrial 
action.
Chapter 5 provides an analysis, based on the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire, of the 
impact of the industrial action balloting requirement on trade union practices and 
procedures. The chapter draws on comparable material from the early and mid 1980s, 
updating and adding to this information. It highlights the many different ways in which 
trade unions have accommodated industrial action balloting and, in particular, explores 
any evidence for centralising tendencies within trade union organisation.
Chapter 6 is an analysis of the role of ballots in negotiations. This draws on union 
negotiators’ own experience - beyond injunctions and high profile court cases - of the 
practical effect of the law. The chapter also draws on the wider research with employers, 
which explored the extent to which they were willing to make use of the balloting laws. 
Chapter 6 concerns the impact of ballots on the process of negotiations.
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The conclusions in Chapter 7 focus on the processes whereby the industrial action 
balloting provisions have taken their effect and what this can tell us about the gap 
between intention and outcome relating to the role of the law in industrial relations. 
Chapter 7 also explores the relationship between changes in the process of negotiations, 
involving the greater use of industrial action ballots, and bargaining outcomes. In this 
way it seeks to make a contribution to the debate about the impact of balloting on 
outcomes in collective bargaining. The contribution of this research will, in particular, 
be to provide more information on the experience of trade union officers, enabling 
assumptions previously made about the impact of the law to be tested against this 
experience.
Methodology
Research Design
The objective of the research was to collect systematic information about the role of strike 
ballots in the experience of trade union negotiators. At one level, this could be used to 
challenge assumptions which underpinned Government policy, in particular that trade 
union members would take the opportunity provided by a secret ballot to vote against 
industrial action. The research design was based on the premise that the introduction of 
mandatory industrial action ballots did not have the results anticipated by the Government, 
because these expectations were unrealistic. At another level the information could be 
used to derive broader concepts to explain in a coherent way how trade unions responded 
to the requirement to ballot members before industrial action. From this it was possible 
to draw some general conclusions about the role of the law in industrial relations.
More specifically, the work with trade unions was conceived as a study of trade union 
negotiators and industrial action ballots, which could contribute to an understanding of the 
diverse processes by which different unions accommodated the balloting requirement. Of
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particular interest was any information relating to changes in the degree of centralisation 
in union decision-making. The research used the concept of trade unions adapting to - 
and even adopting - the balloting requirement, to frustrate the Government’s intentions.
The broader research project included interviews with employers, which contributed to the 
overall analysis. It was expected that for their part, employers would be, by and large, 
circumspect about the potential benefits of invoking the law. They would, therefore, 
carefully weigh up the benefits, but might demonstrate some reluctance to invoke legal 
proceedings.
The trade union negotiators’ questionnaire used a range of measures to assess the 
significance of industrial action ballots in the experience of trade union negotiators. 
These were:
(i) number of ballots held in the previous three years, whether they were workplace or 
postal, and the extent of unballoted action that had taken place;
(ii) number of ballots won and lost in the previous three year period. This was used as 
a simple measure of the potential difficulties for trade unions in achieving positive strike 
ballot results;
(iii) whether negotiators were responsible for organising ballots and the sources of 
advice, both internally and from outside the union, that were available to assist them. A 
question also related to how frequently these were used;
(iv) the use of ballots as a means of referring agreements back to members and whether 
these methods of consultation had changed in recent years. This provided information on 
the broader role of ballots in trade union decision making and the extent to which trade 
union negotiators had incorporated balloting into the procedures they used;
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(v) the reasons for using ballots rather than other forms of consultation on industrial 
action6. This enabled a comparison of the extent to which different trade unions had 
come to accept balloting. The greater the prominence given by trade union negotiators 
to factors other than the law, the stronger the argument that trade unions had adapted their 
practices to include the balloting requirement;
(vi) situations in which industrial action had been seriously considered but did not take 
place, whether the dispute was settled in negotiations and whether this had followed a 
ballot on industrial action. This provided information on the use of ballots in trade union 
strategies in negotiations.
The measures chosen reflect that this research is primarily an exploration of bargaining 
processes and the impact of ballots on the underlying power resources available to the 
parties involved. As noted above, however, some of the most prominent debates about 
ballots have related to their impact on bargaining outcomes, in particular collective 
bargaining settlements and the incidence of industrial action. While not offering definitive 
conclusions, in chapter 7 the research draws on the fieldwork to explore the potential 
contribution of ballots to changing bargaining outcomes and strike frequency by imposing 
a new legal dimension on disputes.
The structure chosen for the research was a survey of trade union negotiators carried out 
by postal questionnaire. It covered 846 negotiators in 25 trade unions (see further below). 
The broad spread of trade unions was important both because it ensured that the results 
would have validity and because it enabled comparisons to be drawn, from which 
significant differences emerged. The information contained in the returns about the 
structure of the unions and the nature of their membership provided important background 
information about the variables that could determine these differences. It was possible
6. Responses to this question indicated that ballots were more usually used together 
with, rather than as an alternative to, other forms of consultation.
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to look, for example, at the organisational features of those trade unions in which the 
balloting requirement appeared to have been less easily accommodated. One factor that 
emerged was the dispersed of their membership.
It was intended that some of the information collected would be quantifiable, for example 
negotiators’ experience of the number of ballots held over a three year period and those 
either won or lost. Other information was of a more qualitative nature, seeking, for 
example, to establish the relative importance of different reasons for balloting. On certain 
questions, respondents were asked to give details and were also given the opportunity to 
make comments. This provided a rich source of information, although not of a 
quantifiable nature. One point of considerable importance emerged from the comments. 
This was the significance attributed by respondents to factors other than the law in 
determining their experience of negotiating on behalf of members throughout the 1980s 
and early 1990s. The framework used to give coherence to these observations was the 
extent to which they reflected an ability on the part of trade unions and their officers to 
adapt to and to accommodate the balloting requirement, and to turn it to advantage in 
negotiations.
Methods of data collection
Contact with trade unions was first made by writing to a senior national officer, 
requesting the union’s participation in the research. The letter was usually sent to the 
General Secretary, Deputy General Secretary or a senior national officer with special 
responsibilities for research or legal matters. Contacts at this level were used to obtain 
documentary information, including union rule books and any advice or guidance issued 
on industrial action balloting. Interviews with national officers in some 40 unions 
provided a national officer’s perspective. The interviews were also used as an opportunity 
to gain the union’s co-operation with the next stage of the research which was the postal 
questionnaire.
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The research findings reported in this thesis are based on a postal questionnaire survey 
of 846 union negotiating officers in 25 unions, including 15 of the 23 unions which were 
reported as having more than 100,000 members in 19917. All were affiliated to the TUC. 
The unions represented in the survey covered a broad range of public and private sector, 
manual and non-manual workers. The overall response rate was 58%. The size of the 
original sample group within each union varied considerably. This was more significant 
than the response rate in determining the actual number of respondents from each union. 
The overall findings were, therefore, influenced by the results from a relatively small 
number of large unions. To ensure that this was fully accounted for the results were in 
all cases disaggregated to see how each union compared with the overall findings. To 
assist in the analysis of the results some paired comparisons were carried out between 
larger unions which shared similarities in the nature of their membership or common 
employing bodies in which they represented members.
The unions participating in the research were assured of the absolute confidentiality of the 
information provided by national officers and negotiators. It was agreed that all results 
would be reported anonymously.
In each case relevant officers, who were defined as the unions’ negotiators, were 
identified with the assistance of a national officer of the union. As the breakdown in 
Table 1.1 shows, these were predominantly full time officers. For the most part, 
responses in the larger unions were from district, regional and area officers and reflected 
their own local experiences. In the smaller unions responses were mostly from national 
officers. Responses from lay officials came from three unions; the 37 NEC respondents 
were predominantly in one union, although there were a small number in three others.
Largely for practical reasons, the survey did not seek to include lay officials, except where
1. See Certification Officer Annual Report 1992: Appendix 4.
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they took on principal negotiating functions.
Table 1.1 Respondents to the trade union negotiators questionnaire
Full time officers 727
Lay officials 82
National Executive Committee 37
Total 846
Note
In addition, there were ten responses from non-negotiating officers. These were included 
in the analysis of the general questions in the final section of the questionnaire.
It is important to recognise the limitations of information based on the experience of full 
time officers, because of the role of lay officials in all aspects of branch work, including 
negotiations. The extent of full time officer involvement in negotiations varies 
considerably between unions and bargaining situations. A number of studies have 
explored the respective roles of full time officers and lay representatives and the 
relationship between the different levels in trade union government. In 1981 a survey of 
manufacturing establishments with 50 or more employees, reported that full time officers 
were often integrally involved in negotiations, although assisting rather than dominating 
shop stewards. The survey found that the involvement of full time officers depended to 
some extent on the level at which negotiations were carried out. If negotiations were 
multi employer they were, not surprisingly, more likely to involve a full time officer8.
WIRS3 provided information on the role of full time officers at the end of the 1980s 
(Millward et al. 1992: chapter 4). In establishments where a trade union was recognised,
8. See Brown 1981 69-71.
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there had been a decline in the number at which there were lay representatives, from 82% 
in 1984 to 71% in 1990. It was suggested that this could have led to an increase in the 
influence of full time officers, especially in smaller establishments. The research 
concluded that the demands made on paid union officers were greater in 1990 than they 
had been in 1984, especially in the private sector, involving a much greater involvement 
in workplace level matters9. Other research has confirmed the often close and co­
operative relationship between full time officers and lay representatives10. In the case of 
the current research, it was felt, therefore, that a survey of full time officers could provide 
valid results on the impact of the law.
The trade union negotiators’ questionnaire was in four parts. The first part sought 
background information about the officer’s length of time in post, the geographical area 
that they covered, and the nature and size of their membership constituency. The second 
part asked respondents about their own experience of disputes, industrial action and the 
role of the law (if any) in relation to disputes. In this section specific questions on 
balloting included experience of ballots held where no industrial action followed the 
ballot. In order to look at ballots in the negotiating situation, it was critical to include 
situations in which industrial action had been threatened but did not take place. Whilst 
there are obvious dangers in drawing conclusions of a quantitative nature about the overall 
incidence of threatened industrial action from this information11, in this research it had 
quite a different purpose. This was to explore the influence of ballots on dispute 
settlements and employers’ willingness to make use of the balloting laws in situations in
9. Millward et al., 1992 129-130. It was suggested that the involvement of national 
(as opposed to regional and other) officers may have reflected the influence on the results 
of the shorter working week campaign in the engineering industry.
10. See further Fosh and Heery (eds) 1990; Kelly and Heery 1994.
n. See Brown 1981. In the introduction he referred to his decision not to include 
threats of action in the survey because ’they are always threatening’ industrial action.
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which industrial action was seriously considered.
In part three of the questionnaire, respondents were asked about their union’s practices 
in consulting members. This provided further information on the use of balloting in 
decisions on industrial action and the reference back of agreements. All respondents, 
irrespective of their experience of organising industrial action ballots, were asked to 
respond to these questions. Respondents were asked whether they were responsible for 
organising ballots and whether advice was available to them. In relation to industrial 
action, questions focused on the reasons for balloting, rather than using other forms of 
consultation. In relation to broader membership consultation, respondents were asked 
whether ballots were used and whether there had been changes in methods of membership 
consultation.
The final part of the questionnaire sought to place the information about negotiators’ own 
experience in a broader context of their perceptions of the extent to which the industrial 
relations climate had changed or remained constant in the 1980s and early 1990s. Rating 
scales were used allowing a range of responses - strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly 
disagree, don’t know. There were five separate questions in this format, including one on 
industrial action balloting which asked whether respondents thought that ballots had been 
a good thing for trade unions. Other statements relevant to this study, with which 
respondents were asked to agree or disagree, were that employers were now more 
’hardline’, that members were more reluctant to take industrial action, that the law had 
been the most important factor affecting industrial action in the 1980s and that the law 
had been an important weapon for employers in their own negotiations.
A copy of the questionnaire is included as Annex A.
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CHAPTER 1 THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CONTEXT
1.1 Industrial relations background
The 1980s was a period of, in many respects, contradictory developments in industrial 
relations. On the one hand were those initiatives loosely grouped under the definition of 
’human resource management’ which were highlighted with approval in the introduction 
to Government’s February 1987 Green Paper, Trade Unions And Their Members:
well designed disputes procedures, greatly reducing the likelihood of 
industrial action, together with improved status and security for workers, 
often going hand in hand with full job flexibility. There is the increasing 
recognition by employers of the importance of communications and 
employee involvement (Department of Employment 1987, para 1.5).
This strand of thinking - to promote reform and good practice in industrial relations - had 
a long history within the Conservative Party. It was seen, for example, in Fair Deal at 
Work, the Conservative Party’s policy statement on industrial relations published in 1968:
..in the rapidly changing conditions of industry there is a particular need 
for greater communication and consultation between management and 
employees, management and unions, and between unions and their own 
members (Conservative Party 1968 p. 10).
On the other hand, what is also clear is that in the 1980s for many workers job security 
was undermined by the increasing use of short term and part time contracts. Insecurity 
was underlined by severe recessions at the beginning of the 1980s and early 1990s, 
bringing large-scale redundancies in many sectors of the economy. There were high and 
rapidly rising levels of unemployment in these periods. Workers in some sectors were 
particularly hard hit. In the engineering industry, for example, even the upturn in 
production in the mid/late 1980s did not lead to a reversal of the decline in employment
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in the industry1. In the late 1980s and early 1990s there were an estimated 500,000 job 
losses in construction2. In the financial services sector 100,000 job losses were said to 
have been implemented over the period of the early 1990s.
Workers’ feelings of insecurity may also have derived from the rapid and far-reaching 
changes that were implemented, both in response to new technology and to meet the 
pressures of increasing competition. WIRS3 - based on fieldwork in 1990 - noted a 
dramatic change in workplaces over the ten years since the first WIRS survey. The 
original WIRS study had reported a rapid diffusion of micro-electronics in manufacturing 
in the early 1980s; in 1990 the rate of change continued to be high. Other substantial 
changes, not involving new equipment or machinery, were also common. Managers in 
more than a third of establishments reported that changes to working practices had been 
made (Millward et al. 1992, 334). The theme of ACAS reports over the 1980s3 was that 
there was little opposition from the workforce to changes brought about by new 
technology. There was much more likely to be opposition to straightforward 
organisational changes in the workplace. Often, however, the two issues could not be 
separated. The ACAS Annual Report for 1985 noted that fierce competitive pressures on 
industry and commerce, combined with the opportunities provided by new technology, led
l. See Engineering Employers’ Federation Economic Trends published in the Spring and 
Autumn each year. Figures from the Spring 1991 show that total engineering employment was 
as follows:
Year Emplovment fOOOsl
1979 3,156
1980 3,002
1985 2,196
1988 2,107
1989 2,099
1990 2,070
2. Union of Construction Allied Trades and Technicians (UCATT) Kickstart (n.d.)
3. See, for example, ACAS Annual Report 1986, Chapter 1.
21
management to continue to seek increased flexibility in the use of labour. As a result, a 
significant upturn in the economy was accompanied by a continued rise in unemployment. 
There were many examples of co-operation, but also the potential for conflict over 
technological change and other changes in working practices throughout this period.
Despite the emphasis on communication as part of a human resources strategy, there is 
a considerable amount of evidence that organisations in the public and private sectors 
were involving trade unions less rather than more in decisions. At an extreme this could 
involve trade union derecognition (Gall and McKay 1994). More common than 
derecognition, especially in the early 1980s, was a narrowing of trade union involvement. 
It appears that full time trade union officers were consulted much less frequently than they 
had been in the past (Millward et al. 1992 chapter 2). In the survey of trade union 
officers on which this research is based, there was an overwhelming view that employers’ 
attitudes towards trade unions had changed and that employers had become more 
’hardline’ in their dealings with trade unions (Elgar and Simpson 1993b). Many 
comments reflected this experience, including respondents from areas, such as the public 
services where in the past joint consultation and negotiation with unions had been central 
tenets of employees relations policies:
The [1980s] have meant a toughening up of management, a diminished
role for trade unions in the public sector, with management consulting less.
On the question of trade union recognition, WIRS3 found that workplaces with a 
recognised trade union for manual workers in private manufacturing declined from 65% 
in 1980 to 44% in 1990. This was largely accounted for by a decline in four sectors; 
three in engineering and vehicles, the fourth being printing and publishing. In private 
services there had been a substantial decline in trade union recognition in three sectors, 
including transport. Newer workplaces in the private sector were found to be less likely 
to have a recognised trade union. In the public sector, a decline in workplaces with a
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recognised trade union was largely accounted for by the removal of negotiating rights 
from teachers. Whilst WIRS3 suggested that there had been an increase in derecognition 
in the later 1980s, which had played a more significant part than in the early 1980s in the 
decline in the extent of trade union recognition, it reported that derecognition did not take 
place on a large scale. Similarly the ACAS Annual Report for 1989 concluded that the 
number of recognition issues in collective conciliation cases had increased, but that whilst 
it was difficult for unions to achieve new recognition arrangements, derecognition 
continued to be rare, with the exception of P&O, the Port of London Authority and cases 
in the newspaper industry (ACAS 1990, chapter l)4. The 1989 ACAS Annual Report 
went on to note that industrial action over recognition issues was almost unknown. Based 
on a survey of trade unions in 1992, Gall and McKay found that the rate of derecognition 
increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s. ’Many more’ groups of manual workers were 
affected, but derecognition remained ’marginal and insignificant’ outside a few sectors 
(Gall and McKay 1994)5.
Where trade unions continued to be recognised, there had been far-reaching changes in 
negotiating arrangements. These were linked in many cases to the devolution of some 
decision making within management structures in both public and private sector 
organisations, although this was often combined with tighter central budgetary controls. 
These developments were accompanied by a move away from centralised collective 
bargaining6. In the early 1990s there continued to be sectors in which industry wide 
bargaining remained intact, but these were the exception. The most notable examples 
were shoe manufacturing and general printing. Throughout the 1980s national bargaining
4. Cf. ACAS 1988 chap 2 which reported on the difficulties for trade unions in securing 
recognition and the small percentage of cases referred for collective conciliation - 25% of cases 
in 1987 - which resulted in some form of recognition being granted by employers.
5. Cf. Smith and Morton 1990 on union derecognition in the provincial newspaper industry.
6. See ACAS Annual Reports spanning the early and later 1980s, which reported a 
continuing move to company and establishment level bargaining, especially ACAS 1984, 14 and 
ACAS 1990, 7-8.
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arrangements came to an end in a number of sectors, including water, independent 
television, regional and national newspapers. Employers often expressed a wish to 
simplify bargaining arrangements. WIRS3 found that in manufacturing the continuing 
move away from multi-employer bargaining over pay had been partly offset by an 
increase in plant bargaining. In private services - where bargaining hardly ever took place 
at site level - the result had been a substantial rise in single employer multi-site 
bargaining. In the public sector there had also been a move towards local pay-setting 
arrangements, although there was only limited devolution of bargaining over pay in 
comparison with the private sector (Millward et al. 1992, 233). In their study of pay 
bargaining in the public services, Bach and Winchester concluded that:
During the 1980s Conservative governments achieved only limited success 
in encouraging decentralized pay determination in the public services (Bach 
and Winchester 1994, 278)7.
Towards the end of the 1980s WIRS3 also recorded more fundamental changes in levels 
of bargaining over pay in all sectors, leading to a decline in the coverage of collective 
bargaining. In the public sector, this followed the introduction of pay review bodies in 
the health service and abolition of the teachers’ negotiating machinery. In manufacturing:
the results do not show a movement from multi-employer to enterprise 
bargaining in manufacturing, but rather a change from multi-employer 
bargaining to no formal bargaining over rates of pay (Millward et al. 1992,
224).
Overall there had been a significant decline in the coverage of collective bargaining from 
71% of employees covered by the WIRS survey in 1984 to 54% in 1990. This had taken 
place across both the private and public sectors. By 1990 collective bargaining took place
7. For an analysis of the future prospects for local pay determination in NHS Trusts see 
Corby 1992.
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in fewer than half of establishments in manufacturing; in the public sector the decline in 
collective bargaining was associated with far-reaching organisational changes8.
In other respects, however, trade union influence in the workplace was maintained. The 
results from WIRS on pay negotiations may overstate the decline of trade union influence 
in the workplace. Between 1984 and 1990 WIRS3 recorded little change in the amount 
of reported negotiation over non pay issues (Millward et al. 1992, 253). Trade union 
officials continued to be widely involved in procedures for resolving disputes - over pay 
and conditions, disciplinary matters and grievances. This was true even where there was 
no formal recognition for trade unions9.
The 1980s was also a period of fundamental change in public policy. New policy 
objectives, which were antagonistic to established traditions of industrial relations based 
on collective bargaining and a role for trade unions, increasingly characterised post 1979 
Conservative governments. The full expression of this approach took time to develop, but 
it was clearly not the policy of Conservative governments in the later 1980s to promote 
collective bargaining:
There is every reason to be confident that by the end of the 1990s we will 
have moved decisively away from the collectivist pay arrangements which 
restricted individual choice and damaged employment growth, to a 
situation where the pay of the great majority of employed people will 
reflect their individual contributions at work (Department of Employment 
1992, para 4.16).
8. See, for example, Financial Times 5.7.94, reporting on Government plans for the end of 
centralised collective bargaining and the introduction of personalised contracts for 2,000 civil 
servants at grade 5 and above, whose terms and conditions had previously been the subject of 
collective bargaining.
9. Millward et al. 1992 chapter 6, especially 194. A decline in the influence of full time 
officers was recorded, however, in relation to loss of recognition.
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The culmination of this change was seen in 1993 when the remit of ACAS was changed 
to remove the promotion of collective bargaining from its terms of reference. The new 
approach provided a strong contrast with the widely-endorsed approach of the Donovan 
Commission (Donovan Commission 1968, para 224). In its role as employer the 
Government reflected this change: WIRS3 reported that the proportion of workplaces in 
central government where managers said that management strongly recommended trade 
union membership for all employees halved between 1984 and 1990 (Millward et al. 
1992, 361).
The role of trade unions, therefore, had to evolve in response to the challenges that they 
faced. There was a steady decline in trade union membership in the 1980s, which 
accelerated into the early 1990s. Some commentators argued that much of this could be 
attributed to the decline in areas of employment in which membership of unions had 
traditionally been strongest. Information from the WIRS3 study, however, suggested that 
there was also a substantial drift away from trade union membership among workplaces 
that continued to have recognised trade unions, especially those where trade union 
membership density was low. WIRS3 concluded that while the overall decline in trade 
union membership and recognition was largely accounted for by major shift away from 
employment in manufacturing and the widespread closure of large manufacturing plants, 
especially in the early 1980s, the drift away from trade union membership was becoming 
an increasingly important factor10. A study by Freeman and Pelletier argued that 
structural changes in the economy in the 1980s could not be used to explain the decline 
in trade union membership, which had continued to grow in the 1970s despite similar 
structural changes11.
The way in which trade unions responded to the difficulties experienced in the 1980s
10. Millward et al. 1992, see especially chapter 3 and concluding chapter.
n . Freeman and Pelletier 1990 attributed ’the vast bulk’ of the decline in trade union 
membership to the 1980s legislation. For a criticism see Disney 1990.
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depended on a variety of factors. These included the sectors in which they operated; the 
size and nature of their membership; union structures, policies and the composition of 
their executive committees; and their financial stability. Some trade unions successfully 
penetrated new areas of potential membership growth, but others failed in a number of 
high profile attempts. All unions, however, found their resources stretched. At the same 
time as membership was declining, many faced the need to respond to more decentralised 
management structures in the public and private sector, with the emphasis on line 
managers taking responsibility for day to day industrial relations decisions. The 
negotiating structures within which trade unions had traditionally worked were often 
becoming fragmented. Trade unions increasingly needed to be able to equip their officials 
for local level negotiations, which was a new challenge, especially in the public sector12. 
A recent threat to the resources of all unions has been posed by the requirement for 
unions to obtain members’ written authorisation of the ’check-off of subscriptions by 
employers every three years, following the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights 
Act 1993. A common response in the face of these challenges was for unions to seek to 
pool their resources and running costs, leading to a number of notable union 
amalgamations, as well as closer working arrangements (Willman et al. 1993).
1.2 Changing Patterns of Industrial Action
These developments were reflected in the changing patterns of industrial action in the 
economy. The response of trade union negotiators to the balloting legislation needs to be 
seen against this background. A reduction in the overall extent of industrial action was 
seen to have been brought about by workers’ fears for their job security in an uncertain 
economic climate. Job losses and redundancies were major issues in the early 1980s, but
12. See Corby 1992, who refers to restrictions on the role of trade union full time officers 
in NHS trust agreements.
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industrial action was not necessarily an appropriate response13. In 1985 ACAS Annual 
Report highlighted the lowest recorded incidence of industrial action since the 1930s in 
manufacturing and private services (ACAS 1986). In the public sector, compulsory 
competitive tendering for the provision of services led to major job losses among manual 
workers and undermined any realistic expectations of job security. This was not reflected, 
however, in high levels of industrial action over these issues among these groups of 
workers. While ACAS figures on collective conciliation cases confirm that job losses and 
redundancies were an important issues in dispute, especially in the early 1980s, 
comparative WIRS data spanning the decade showed a substantial increase in the relative 
importance of pay as a strike issue for both manual and non-manual workers14.
The survey of trade union negotiators in 1991-2, on which this thesis is based, showed 
that where industrial action had been seriously considered in the previous three years, 
nearly three quarters of negotiators (73%) said that pay had been an issue in the dispute(s) 
concerned. Issues relating to changes in working practices were referred to by 44% of 
respondents. Job losses and redundancies were reported as issues in dispute by just one 
third of respondents15.
Official statistics published by the Department for Education and Employment use three
13. See, by contrast, Brown 1981. The 1976-77 Warwick survey found that those plants 
reporting a cut in the labour force, short time working or other measures to reduce hours and any 
fall in market demand were more likely to report industrial action.
14. Millward et al. 1992, chapter 8. It should be noted, however, that manning and work 
allocation issues had led to increasing action short of a strike, largely in the public sector (see 
WIRS3 Tables 8.3 and 8.4), which could reflect disputes arising from compulsory competitive 
tendering.
15. Elgar and Simpson 1993b. There was little significant difference between the issues 
reported in relation to strike action and action short of a strike. Strike action was more likely 
to be considered over pay and action short of a strike over changes in working practices, but the 
differences were not generally large.
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main measures of the patterns of industrial action: number of strikes, number of workers 
involved and working days lost16. It is well-established that official strike statistics 
provide an inadequate measure of actual industrial action not least because of the under­
recording of eligible strikes (Kelly and Nicholson)17. Moreover, official statistics measure 
strikes only above a minimum size and duration. They exclude short stoppages. Whilst 
it may be argued that any under-recording is likely to be consistent over time and, 
therefore, that patterns will be an accurate reflection of how the size and frequency of 
strikes have changed, the magnitude of under-recording could be very significant. Some 
comparisons have been made between official statistics and other survey material. Paul 
Edwards compared official statistics for 1978 with the Warwick survey of manufacturing 
industry which covered a similar period. Whereas official statistics suggested that over 
a three year period 5% of manufacturing plants had experienced stoppages, the Warwick 
survey recorded at least one strike over the previous two years in 33% of plants. They 
were overwhelmingly strikes of very short duration18.
Official data also masks differences between industrial sectors. WIRS1 reported that there 
was a wide variation between broad industry groups as to whether strikes of one day were 
a good indicator of all types of industrial action (Daniel and Millward 1983, 228). 
Official statistics were found to be a particularly inadequate measure in the case of local 
and national government, food and chemicals, textiles and clothing, miscellaneous 
manufacturing, and health and education services. The omission of action short of a strike 
from the statistics concealed, in particular, the considerable use by non-manual workers 
of non-strike sanctions. These findings have important implications for the application
16. For the most recent annual figures for 1995 see Labour Market Trends June 1996.
17. See also Brown 1981, chapter 5. In this survey of manufacturing establishments carried 
out in the late 1970s it was estimated that official figures recorded 62% of eligible strikes and 
96% of working days lost.
18. See Edwards in Bain (ed) 1983, 226-7. 29% of plants reported action short of a strike 
in the same two year period, bringing the total of plants that had experienced some form of 
industrial action to 46%.
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of the law to industrial disputes. Moreover doubts have related to the limitations of 
information based exclusively on management reporting. The WIRS studies found that 
there was a notable discrepancy between the information provided by management and 
trade union respondents relating to cases of industrial action19. An important question in 
the study of industrial conflict is how certain workplace activities come to be defined as 
strikes. This is a problem not just with official statistics, but with all survey material 
which seeks to quantify features of industrial action, without drawing on a case study 
approach20.
Whilst these criticisms need to be borne in mind, official statistics provide an important 
starting point for understanding Government claims about the impact of changes in the 
law on the incidence of industrial action (see Table 1.3).
19. Daniel and Millward 1983, 13. It is interesting that reliance on management reports was 
seen in particular to underestimate the extent of non-strike action by non-manual workers, chapter 
9.
20. For a discussion of this point see Edwards and Scullion 1982, 226, 237.
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Table 1.3 Official strike statistics 1976-1995
YEAR WORKING 
DAYS LOST 
(MILLION)
NUMBER OF 
STOPPAGES
WORKERS
INVOLVED
(000s)
DAYS LOST 
PER 1,000 
EMPLOYEES
1995 0.41 235 174 19
1994 0.28 205 107 13
1993 0.65 211 385 30
1992 0.53 253 148 24
1991 0.76 369 176 34
1990 1.9 630 298 83
1989 4.1 701 727 182
1988 3.7 781 790 166
1987 3.5 1,061 887 164
1986 1.9 1,074 720 90
1985 6.4 903 791 299
1984 27.1 1,221 1,464 1,278
1983 3.8 1,364 574 178
1982 5.3 1,538 2,103 248
1981 4.3 1,344 1,513 195
1980 12 1,348 834 521
1979 29.4 2,125 4,608 1,273
1978 9.4 2,498 1,041 413
1977 10.1 2,737 1,166 448
1976 3.3 2,034 668 146
Source: Employment Gazette/Labour Market Trends
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Notes:
Average WDL 1979-88 = 9.7m; 1969-88 = 10.2m. 
b Average number of stoppages 1979-88 = 1,271; nearly all lasted less than 4
working days. In 1989 it was reported that 701 was the lowest figures recorded 
for stoppages since 1935; nearly half (49%) lasted less than 1 day. 
c Average number of workers involved 1972-81 = 1.6m; 1979 - 1988 = 1.43m.
There were a rising number of disputes and working days lost in the 1960s. The table 
shows a high and fluctuating number of disputes and days lost in the 1970s, which have 
been associated with rising unemployment, high inflation and the impact of incomes 
policies21. The 1980s as a whole saw a return to the pre-1979 levels of strike activity, 
with the exception of 1984 during the miners’ strike. International comparisons indicated 
that the relative strike incidence of the UK changed little throughout this period22. The 
early 1990s brought historically low levels of industrial action, which have been 
maintained to date.
The WIRS studies complement official statistics, using a different measure of industrial 
action. Whilst official statistics measure the frequency of strikes, without attention to the 
number of establishments, the WIRS studies measure the extent of industrial action, 
according to the number of workplaces affected. Thus between 1980 and 1984 WIRS 
recorded a slight increase overall in the number of establishments affected by industrial 
action from 22% to 25%, when official statistics showed a significant decline in the 
frequency of strikes (Millward and Stevens 1986, Chapter 10). WIRS3 reported that 
between 1984 and 1990 there was a significant decline in the extent of industrial action. 
The overall number of establishments affected by industrial action by manual and non- 
manual workers was 12% in 1990, compared to 25% in 1984. The study reported that
21. See Metcalf and Milner 1991. This analysis showed the 1970s to be out of line in terms 
of the incidence of strikes over the hundred year period 1890s to 1990s.
22. See the annual article ’International comparisons of industrial disputes’ in Labour Market 
Trends/Emplovment Gazette. International comparisons need to be treated with a considerable 
amount of caution.
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whereas in 1979-1980 almost one third of manufacturing establishments had been affected 
by industrial action this had declined to one in ten by 1989-1990 (Millward et al. 1992, 
278).
A significant feature of the 1980s was a shift in the incidence of industrial action away 
from areas of the economy which previously had high levels of disputes, such as motor 
manufacturing and mining, to those areas, in particular white collar public services, 
where industrial action in the 1970s was a rarity23. There is evidence that as their 
traditional bargaining strength was undermined, trade unions in manufacturing sought to 
build more co-operative relations with employers. By contrast in the public sector 
expressions of conflict increased. The Government was determined to reduce the size of 
the public sector and to bring about fundamental structural changes to ’commercialise’ its 
operation. One early manifestation of the Government’s attitude towards industrial 
relations in the Civil Service was the abolition of pay research with effect from 1981, to 
be replaced by an emphasis on ability to pay and market forces criteria (Blackwell and 
Lloyd 1989). Unprecedented industrial action in the Civil Service was borne by the 
government in 1981. A 1981 TUC report on the Health Service commented that whilst 
the level of industrial action should not be exaggerated and that there continued to be 
fewer working days lost per worker than in any other industry:
industrial action has been taken in recent years, in one form or another, by 
virtually every major group of staff in the National Health Service from 
ancillaries to consultants. Staff who, not many years ago, would have never 
considered industrial action have been directly engaged in major disputes 
in recent years (TUC 1981, paras 1.17-1.18).
23. Donovan 1968, para 399, highlighted four main strike-prone industries - coalmining, 
docks, shipbuilding and ship repairing, and motors. Cf. the chapter by Edwards in Edwards (ed) 
1996 in which he explores explanations for the decline in industrial action in three of these 
sectors: coal, the docks and the car industry.
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The Government’s perception of the ’strike problem’ was deeply affected by these sectoral 
changes in industrial action. The WIRS studies confirmed the shift in the locus of 
industrial action from manual to white collar workers and from the private to the public 
sector24. Towards the end of the 1980s, the incidence of industrial action in the public 
sector fell in common with the private sector, but it continued to remain at a higher level 
than in 1980 (Millward et al. 1992, chapter 8).
There were also changes in the relative importance of strike action and action short of a 
strike. This in part reflected sectoral shifts in patterns of industrial action, although other 
factors were also significant25. The first WIRS study found that in 1980 strikes and action 
short of a strike were equally common among manual workers. WIRS2 reported that, 
during the period 1980-1984, short, local strikes seemed to be replacing action short of 
strike action for manual workers:
This is consistent with the view that trade unionists may be resorting to a 
form of ’cut price’ strike action in the mid-1980s as being the most 
efficient sanction rather than longer strikes, which may be effective but 
costly to organise, and non-strike sanctions, which are less costly but less 
effective (Millward and Stevens 1986, 273).
By 1990 action short of a strike was predominant in manufacturing establishments. These 
findings were supported by research using the CBI databank, which found that trends were 
driven by one form of action short of a strike, the overtime ban (Milner 1993). In the 
public sector, however, the WIRS studies reported that whereas in 1979-80 there was a 
preference for action short of a strike - especially overtime bans and work to rule - by
24. Sectoral shifts in industrial action and the changing balance between manual and white 
collar workers also affected the extent of official and unofficial action. See Millward and Stevens 
1986, 278-80.
25. The 1978-1979 Warwick survey of manufacturing establishments concluded that action 
short of a strike became a less powerful weapon in the 1970s because of relatively high and rising 
levels of unemployment. See Brown 1981, 83.
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1990 strike action was more common. This was especially true of local government, 
central government and transport. By the late 1980s, the concentration of industrial action 
in the public sector meant that longer strikes accounted for a larger share of industrial 
action than previously.
Overall, however, WIRS3 concluded that there had been a widespread and substantial 
decline in industrial action over the 1980s, which affected both strikes and action short 
of a strike:
Contrary to what has sometimes been assumed, non-strike forms of action 
were not being substituted for strikes (Millward et al. 1992, 309).
By way of concluding this section on the changing patterns of industrial action, it should 
be noted that the 1991-1992 questionnaire survey of trade union negotiators, on which this 
thesis is based, suggested that trade union members across a broad range of sectors had 
taken part in industrial action in the years 1989 to 1991. Almost two thirds of all 
respondents said that some of their members had taken industrial action during this period. 
87% of negotiators concerned said that industrial action had been seriously considered, 
at least on occasion, in disputes during the previous three years. For a significant number 
of negotiators, therefore, industrial action continued to be a live issue in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, even if its overall extent had declined (Elgar and Simpson 1993b).
1.3 The ’strike problem’ and the role of industrial conflict legislation
The nature of the perceived ’strike problem’, therefore, changed over time and with it, 
successive governments’ objectives for legislation in the area of industrial conflict. At 
the time of Donovan, there was little mention of industrial action in the public services, 
which came to be of central concern to legislators by the end of the 1970s. In the 1960s 
and early 1970s short-lived, unofficial industrial action in the private sector, often without
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notice to the employer - and ’unconstitutional’ in terms of being in breach of negotiated 
procedure agreements - was identified as the ’British problem’. This was given its 
clearest expression in the report of the Donovan Commission in 1968. The context had 
been a rapid growth in shop steward organisation, especially in the engineering industry:
This was a period in which the public perception intensified of an 
industrial relations problem consisting of the inability of trade unions to 
control or channel into constructive form the shop-floor militancy which 
was causing more and more unofficial wild-cat strikes, and hence delay in 
delivery of orders which was fundamentally weakening the manufacturing 
economy and destroying foreign confidence in British exports (Davies and 
Freedland 1993, 241).
It was estimated that 95% of stoppages were unofficial. They were also showing an 
upward trend in the years immediately preceding the establishment of the Royal 
Commission, which was of concern26. This was an analysis which was supported by the 
two major policy documents of this period: Fair Deal at Work, the Conservative party’s 
policy document, published in 1968 and In Place of Strife, the Labour Government’s 
White Paper, published in 1969. Fair Deal at Work argued that:
Britain is in a unique position in that over 90% of our strikes are in breach 
of agreements; and that many of these occur suddenly with little or no 
prior warning...in some industries, the constant day-to-day threat of 
[strikes] can do far more damage to our economy than the strikes 
themselves (Conservative Party 1968, 29).
Similarly, In Place of Strife argued:
95 per cent of all strikes are unofficial (and of these the vast majority are 
unconstitutional); they are responsible for three quarters of the working 
days lost because of strikes...Most unions are not prepared to recognise or 
support strikes in breach of procedure. Yet strikes of this sort are
26. Donovan 1968, paras. 370, 377. See especially the reference to McCarthy and Parker 
1968, Donovan Commission Research Paper No. 10.
increasing in many industries and their effect can be very serious 
(Department of Employment and Productivity 1969, paras 90-91).
There was thus no disagreement at a political level about the nature of the problem, 
although the proposals aimed at resolving it and the extent to which they involved legal 
intervention differed greatly. In the view of the Donovan Commission, the preponderance 
of unofficial action meant that the effective use of the law was of necessity limited. The 
Labour Government’s proposals reflected these arguments to a very great degree, but 
included so-called penal clauses - one of which involved giving the government powers 
to order a strike ballot to be held - which appeared to be out of step with the overall 
analysis. The Conservative Opposition rejected the Donovan analysis and saw a much 
greater role for the law.
There was a wide measure of agreement between the two main political parties, however, 
that industrial action balloting did not provide the answers to the ’British strike problem’ 
of unofficial and unconstitutional industrial action. The Industrial Relations Act of 1971, 
for all the new Conservative Government’s radical intentions to overhaul and modernise 
the whole framework of industrial relations law, was closely based on Fair Deal at Work. 
Both were rooted in a traditional analysis of the ’strike problem’ and did not reflect the 
changing nature of the debate about industrial action which was already beginning to shift 
to a concern over large scale official public sector stoppages (Davies and Freedland 1993, 
284).
Later proponents of legal intervention could argue that the Donovan analysis was flawed 
because reform of collective bargaining did not lead to a decline in industrial action as 
predicted. Official figures showed that the 1970s was characterised by high levels of 
conflict, despite the fact that throughout this period formal procedures were widely put 
in place. By the end of the 1970s disputes procedures had become almost universal in 
large manufacturing plants and shop stewards had been brought into formal negotiating 
arrangements:
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While hesitating to place a magnitude on it, we can say with confidence 
that the 1970s saw a very substantial increase in all forms of disputes 
procedures (Brown 1981, 447).
The WIRS1 and WIRS2 studies found that establishments with agreed disputes procedures 
were not less likely to be prone to industrial action (Millward and Stevens 1986, chapter 
10). As one commentator argued:
reform was a complex and often contradictory process: the introduction of 
new procedures could be a source of conflict, and in the longer term the 
centralisation of bargaining could encourage lengthy plant-wide strikes in 
place of short and relatively painless shopfloor stoppages (Edwards 1983,
214).
More significantly, however, Donovan’s prescription for reform was intended to have its 
main impact on short unofficial strikes and other forms of action short of a strike, but at 
the end of the 1970s public policy underwent a transformation, involving a redefinition 
of the nature of the perceived ’strike problem’. The great majority of strikes continued 
to be short and unofficial (Edwards 1982) and it was nothing new for large stoppages to 
have the greatest impact in terms of the number of workers involved and working days 
lost27. However, following the ’winter of discontent’ of 1978/79 the new Conservative 
Government’s particular concern was with official strikes in the public sector in which 
trade unions were seen to be holding the government and community to ransom. The 
’winter of discontent’ involved groups (amongst others) who had little previous history 
of industrial action, such as in the Civil Service and Health Service, whose new 
willingness to take part in industrial action reflected changes in public sector industrial 
relations. The 1978/79 dispute was also associated with carefully targeted use of action 
short of strike action. Public service sector strikes were at the forefront in the public and
2 7 Edwards in Bain (ed) 1983 reported that between 1960 and 1979, 46% of all days lost 
were in 64 large disputes. See p.219.
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political consciousness in the early 1980s. As a corollary of this change of emphasis, 
legislating for industrial action ballots came to have a greater role in the development of 
public policy in relation to industrial conflict.
By the end of the 1980s the Government could congratulate itself on the contribution of 
its programme of labour law reform, and in particular strike ballots, to ’dealing with’ the 
strike problem (Department of Employment 1991). This reflected the return to the lower 
levels of conflict which had preceded the 1970s. There are, however, two important 
provisos to this interpretation of the evidence. Firstly, the ACAS Annual Report for 1990 
noted that, whilst the number of officially recorded stoppages was at its lowest since 
1935, the number of cases referred to collective conciliation was rising. This trend 
continued into the early 1990s. ACAS also noted some evidence of increasing levels of 
industrial conflict in the economy. At the end of the 1980s, despite a more restrictive 
legal framework, the 1989 ACAS Annual Report suggested that as a result of growing 
labour shortages,:
The balance of bargaining power began to shift, with some trade unions
exhibiting restored confidence (ACAS 1990, 5).
Secondly, incidents of industrial action are not always clearly defined and easily 
measurable. Although workers’ ability to take large scale strike action was undermined, 
there were many workplaces with experience of different forms of industrial conflict and 
protest. Research showed that these forms of collective action were not adequately 
measured by a narrow focus on strikes, a formal overtime ban or work to rule (Elgar and 
Simpson 1993a). This suggests that no there has been no fundamental change of attitudes 
on the shopfloor or in the workplace.
Brown and Wadwhani concluded that:
In times of rising expectations governments may come to regret that the
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Trade Union Act was bom of the politics of recession (Brown and 
Wadwhani 1990)28.
The late 1980s and early 1990s brought another recession with further severe job losses, 
business failures and intensified competition. This contributed to a reversal of any 
upward trend in manifestations of industrial conflict. The evidence suggested, however, 
that it would be pmdent for the Government to be cautious before arguing that the British 
economy was now free from strikes.
1.4 An approach to understanding the impact of industrial action ballots
Explanations of changes in strike activity over time have been one of the major issues in
strike literature. WIRS3 argued that the widespread decline in industrial action across a
number of sectors and workplaces pointed to the influence of factors outside the
immediate working environment (Millward et al. 1992, 282). At a global level, two of
the most influential theories have been those based on macro economic analyses - which
have seen unemployment and inflation as the key variables - and explanations based on
the law. Whilst not unreasonable to argue that the law has had some impact, it is difficult
at this global level to measure the impact of legal intervention or to determine the balance
of influence to be attributed to industrial relations law and to wider economic factors29.
In their study of ballots in 1980, Undy and Martin concluded that - although some union
♦
officials believed that industrial action ballots were less likely to produce votes in favour 
of strikes than other forms of consultation - other factors were more important -
28. See also Dunn and Metcalf 1994, a study which throws further doubt on the impact of 
changes in the law on the level of strikes in the economy.
29. See Ingram et al. 1991. Based on an analysis of economic data, their conclusions are 
cautious: ’the evidence is consistent with the idea that changes in the law have reduced strike 
incidence, but we are not asserting that this has definitely occurred’.
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especially the economic climate - than the methods of consultation used (Undy and Martin 
1984, 167).
Other explanatory theories of variations in strike activity have focused on the processes 
at work within different industrial sectors, trade unions and employing organisations. 
They seek to understand the influence of a number of factors, such as industrial relations 
procedures and bargaining structures, different labour processes and the composition of 
the workforce, payment methods, trade union density and organisation in the workplace. 
It has been possible to refine these theories in recent years with the availability of more 
information relating both to establishment level industrial action and to action short of a 
strike (Beaumont 1990). The current research owes more to this approach and, in 
particular, builds on two earlier studies of balloting. The first was Undy and Martin’s 
study, Ballots and Trade Union Democracy (1984). In 1991 Martin et al. published a 
subsequent study of ballots in collective bargaining in the mid 1980s. Together these 
studies have provided a rich source of comparative information for the current research. 
Their results are reported in more detail in Chapter Five and Six, with the results of the 
trade union negotiators’ questionnaire.
There are two important preliminary points about the current research. Firstly, that the 
thesis is not primarily concerned with the impact of strike ballots on the incidence of 
industrial action in any quantitative sense. A quantitative approach runs quickly into the 
difficulty of determining causal relations and effects30. This research seeks to use the rich 
source of information provided by the 1991-1992 questionnaire survey of trade union 
negotiators to build up a picture of the different ways in which trade unions responded 
to the industrial action balloting requirements. Comparisons have been drawn between 
unions, based on the nature of their different structures, the nature of their membership 
and the sectors of the economy in which they operate. The second point is that the key 
to this approach is exploring how trade union negotiators have adapted to the more
30. See Dunn and Metcalf 1994 for a discussion of this point.
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restrictive legal framework within which they now have to operate. Understanding these 
processes in relation to industrial action ballots is essential to an overall assessment of the 
impact of ballots both on trade union government and on negotiations.
For some commentators the ideology underlying Conservative governments’ programme 
of labour law reform not only shaped the nature of the legislation on industrial action 
ballots, but also raised unrealistic expectations of what the balloting laws could be 
expected to achieve31. Based on an analysis of fieldwork results from the trade union 
negotiators’ questionnaire, the conclusions of this thesis will explore the following themes. 
Did ballots have an effect on the internal government of trade unions, in particular 
highlighting any centralising tendencies in decision making? In the experience of trade 
union negotiators did ballots affect the outcomes of collective bargaining? Is there any 
evidence that ballots reduced the incidence of industrial action and if so what processes 
were involved in this result? The findings of the questionnaire survey provide the basis 
for testing claims and challenging assumptions that have been made by the Government 
and other proponents of the balloting laws. More broadly, they may help to answer 
questions about the relationship between changes in labour law and industrial relations 
practice.
1.5 Conclusions
The question of the overall impact of industrial action balloting on trade unions and their 
negotiating strategies is complex. This is not least because the 1980s also brought a 
major downturn in the economic climate, leading to a greater emphasis on competitiveness 
and an interest in new management approaches across the economy. The Conservative 
Government of 1979 not only embarked on a reform of labour law, but also undertook
31. For a general discussion see further below, chapter 4. See also Auerbach 1990;
Wedderbum 1991; Fredman 1992; Hendy 1993.
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to bring about radical organisational change in the public sector. All of these 
developments may also have affected a union’s ability to call upon members to take part 
in industrial action. The research will seek to reflect the complex mix of often divergent 
factors which made up the industrial relations environment of the 1980s and early 1990s.
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CHAPTER 2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 
ON INDUSTRIAL ACTION BALLOTING
2.1 Introduction
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s a wide variety of proposals were made for the reform 
of industrial relations, distinguished in one respect by the extent to which the law was 
seen to have a role to play in the process of reform in general and, more particularly 
in the regulation or restriction of industrial action. This chapter places industrial 
action balloting within this framework of the historical development of labour law. 
Firstly, the chapter analyses the principles underlying the voluntarist tradition of labour 
law, in particular those relating to the key areas of industrial conflict and trade union 
government. Secondly, it reviews policies and proposals on strike ballots dating back 
to the 1920s, including some which were enacted - most not - and identifies the main 
arguments prior to the 1980s in favour of mandatory strike ballots backed by legal 
sanctions. The third theme of this chapter relates to the anticipated constraints on the 
effectiveness of models for the enforcement of balloting legislation and some problems 
that were experienced in practice.
Whilst it would not be true to say that proposals for industrial action balloting played 
a central part in the development of labour law prior to the 1980s, the historical 
perspective is an important one, not least because of Government claims that the 
thinking underlying its policies had antecedents in the influential Donovan analysis 
(Department of Employment 1983, para. 1). The Report of the Donovan Commission 
in 1968 was a restatement of the voluntarist approach to labour law. In order to 
understand in what respects and how far 1980s policies on industrial action balloting 
represented a move away from the voluntarist tradition of labour law, it is important 
to start with an analysis of the defining principles of voluntarism.
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2.2 The voluntarist tradition
In the post Second World War period, voluntarism not only described a stage in the 
development of labour law, but was also a prescription for its future role. The 
argument was not that there was no role for the law in the field of collective labour 
relations. Indeed because common law doctrines were inherently hostile to collective 
organisations of workers, legislation had been required both to establish the legitimacy 
of trade union organisation and to allow workers freedom to take part in industrial 
action carried out peacefully. This was legislation of a particular kind, however, to 
provide a statutory framework to support the system of collective bargaining. It was 
anticipated that the processes and outcomes of collective bargaining would be largely 
free from legal regulation (Davies and Freedland 1993).
The framework of law as it had developed from the nineteenth century and was firmly 
in place by the 1950s was a series of ’statutory immunities to judge made liabilities’ 
(Wedderbum 1986, chapter 1). Protection for the organisers of industrial action from 
criminal and civil liabilities was based on actions taken ’in contemplation or 
furtherance of a trade dispute’, the ’golden formula’ of British labour law1. Trade 
unions as such could not be sued in tort after 1906 (with minor exceptions).
By the early twentieth century, therefore, a number of important principles had been 
established which were increasingly seen to characterise British collective labour law: 
that it would provide a broad framework to allow the parties themselves to determine 
their relations and that it did not create a legally determined system of collective 
bargaining. An important consequence of this was that, if they could not reach 
agreement, the parties to collective bargaining would be free to impose sanctions 
against each other and, in particular, that trade unions would be free to organise 
industrial action without fear of interference from the courts. In particular, concern
K The term ’golden formula’ was coined by Lord Wedderbum. See The Worker and the 
Law first edition 1965, 222. In 1875 section 3 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property 
Act effectively excluded the law of criminal conspiracy from the area of industrial conflict. 
This was the first use of the formulation ’in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute’.
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was expressed that the courts should not be called upon to adjudicate over the merits 
of contentious issues arising from industrial conflict. The seminal expression of this 
approach to the law was in the works of Kahn-Freund. Kahn-Freund characterised the 
limited role of the law as ’collective laissez-faire’. He commented that:
it is in connection with trade disputes that the retreat of the courts from 
the scene of industrial relations can be most clearly seen2.
There had been periods when the law took a much more interventionist stance3. 
Kahn-Freund believed, however, that in the post-war period an equilibrium had been 
reached, in which the ’abstentionist’ nature of collective labour law was widely 
accepted. He argued that ’the main object of [the] law has always been and, I venture 
to say, will always be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining 
power which is inherent in the employment relationship’4.
By the 1970s voluntarism faced twin challenges. Firstly, some commentators argued 
that it became increasingly difficult to maintain the principle of voluntarism in 
collective labour relations, when individual employment rights were multiplying and 
inevitably had an impact at the collective level. The enactment of anti-discrimination 
legislation was seen to pose a direct challenge to voluntary collective machinery which
2. O. Kahn-Freund ’Labour Law’ in Ginsberg (ed) Law and Opinion in England in the 
Twentieth Century (1959) reproduced in Kahn-Freund Selected Writings 1978.
3. See the Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act (1927), which followed the national strike 
of 1926. Immunities from tort liabilities did not apply, for example, in strikes aimed at 
coercing the government or inflicting hardship on the community. See also the Conditions 
of Employment and National Arbitration Order 1940 (Order 1305) which made strikes illegal 
in most cases. A National Arbitration Tribunal was established to resolve disputes and its 
awards were legally binding.
4. See Kahn-Freund 1977, chapter 1. In his later years Kahn-Freund became increasingly 
concerned about trade union power in the economy in circumstances of full employment and 
trade union power vis a vis their own members, but was even more reluctant to offer 
legislative solutions. See Kahn-Freund 1979.
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might itself need regulation under the law5.
Secondly, from the 1960s onwards governments’ commitment to collective bargaining 
which was free from legal regulation was increasingly challenged by concern over the 
bargaining power of trade unions in conditions of full employment. This power was 
potentially damaging to the economy and threatened to undermine economic policies. 
The voluntarist approach also began to be questioned because of a rapid growth of 
industrial action - in particular unofficial action - ’and an even faster growth in the 
perception that this was a problem over which the government had to assert control’ 
(Davies and Freedland 1993, 240).
The role of collective labour law was central to the debate which gave rise to the 
establishment of a Royal Commission in 1965. The legal context was a period of 
renewed judicial interventionism, which led to new and uncertain liabilities for the 
organisers of industrial action6. In its report, the Donovan Commission gave strong 
support to the voluntarist approach and rejected arguments in favour of collective legal 
sanctions7.
5. Davies and Freedland 1993, 3. They argue that the fact that abstentionism was an 
accurate description of the law in the 1950s disguised the extent to which British labour law 
even then ’contained impulses of a more interventionist kind and the difficulty of placing 
those impulses in an exact theoretical framework’. For a contrary view see Wedderbum 1986, 
where he argues that individual employment rights legislation did not threaten collective 
laissez-faire.
6. See House of Lords decision in Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129. The decision 
opened up liability for a tort of intimidation not protected by section 3 of the 1906 Act. In 
1965 the Trade Disputes Act was enacted to provide the organisers of industrial action with 
immunity from this tort which had not previously been applied to labour disputes. In a 
subsequent decision in Stratford v. Lindlev [1965] AC 209, the development of the doctrine 
of interference with business by unlawful means created further possibilities of economic tort 
liabilities outside the immunities.
7. The majority report rejected the case for legally enforceable collective agreements, 
which had been advocated as a way of reducing unofficial industrial action. See, however, 
paras 512-17. In exceptional cases it was argued that the Secretary of State for Employment 
and Productivity should have the discretion to initiate a process for making a procedure
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This was a period, however, in which there were a succession of proposals for the 
reform of the law on collective labour relations, which reflected an ending of the 
consensus on the role of the law. Different views emerged about the appropriate legal 
regime for trade union government and industrial action. Whilst largely supporting 
the Donovan analysis, the Labour Government’s White Paper, In Place of Strife, which 
was published in January 1969, also included proposals for so-called ’penal’ clauses. 
This was based on the argument that:
Demands have been made by employers for new laws to discourage 
strikes; requests have been put forward on behalf of trade unions for 
minimum wage legislation and Government action to force employers 
to recognise trade unions. In short the doctrine of non-intervention is 
not, and never has been, consistently preached. The need for State 
intervention and involvement, in association with both sides of industry, 
is now admitted by almost everyone. The question that remains is, what 
form should it take at the present time? (Department of Employment 
and Productivity 1969, para. 9).
In Place of Strife made three proposals for new government powers to be backed by 
legal sanctions: two related to industrial action. These were firstly to enable the 
government to secure a ’conciliation pause’ in relation to unconstitutional strikes or 
those not preceded by adequate joint discussions and secondly to require unions to 
hold a ballot on major industrial action when the support of those involved might be 
in doubt (paras. 78-9, 93-6).
In April 1968, prior to the publication of the Donovan Commission report, the 
Conservative Opposition had published its policy document Fair Deal at Work. The 
starting point was not dissimilar from In Place of Strife. In the preface Edward Heath 
MP, the leader of the Conservatives, talked of:
..the difficulties of reconciling the concepts of full employment and free 
collective bargaining (Conservative Party 1968).
agreement in an enterprise or establishment legally binding.
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The proposals represented, however, the most radical attempt prior to the 1980s to 
change the legal framework of industrial relations. Fair Deal at Work took a positive 
view of the law as an instrument of reform. Whilst it was said that ’no government 
action can, in itself, create good industrial relations’ (Conservative Party 1968, 9), it 
was argued that a new framework of law was needed because existing trade union law 
had tended to ’handicap, rather than help industry in tackling the human problems 
which inevitably stem from industrial change’ (Conservative Party 1968, 10). Fair 
Deal at Work was characterised by a radical intention to break the mould of industrial 
relations law in relation to the overall legitimacy, parameters and methods of 
legislative intervention in the internal affairs of trade unions. A key proposal was to 
make the most important trade dispute immunities dependent upon trade union 
registration. As a condition of registration the Registrar had to be satisfied that trade 
union rules were fair, reasonable and in the public interest8. This would impose a 
much greater degree of legal regulation on trade union rule books than had previously 
existed.
The role of the law had been brought to the fore of the public policy debate. In April 
1969 the Labour Government decided to bring forward interim industrial relations 
legislation to implement five core proposals of In Place of Strife, including two that 
could involve penal sanctions against unions, although not the strike ballot proposal. 
TUC opposition was intense and by June 1969 the government had accepted a ’solemn 
and binding undertaking’ by the TUC that it would strengthen its own capacity to 
intervene in cases of unconstitutional industrial action and inter-union disputes.
The change of administration in 1970 brought in a Conservative government strongly 
committed to a policy of labour law reform. The Industrial Relations Act (1971) 
sought to establish a new framework of law in relation to industrial disputes - 
involving the creation of ’unfair industrial practices’ and a new court, the National 
Industrial Relations Court (NIRC). The Commission on Industrial Relations (CIR),
8. Conservative Party 1968, 21-22. Advantages for registered unions would include a 
new legal right for trade unions to be recognised and to negotiate with employers.
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which had been established by the Labour Government in 1969 to carry out advisory 
and conciliation functions, was given an enlarged role in relation to various new 
procedures under the Industrial Relations Act. The Industrial Relations Act also laid 
down emergency procedures in the event of major industrial action, which included 
strike ballot provisions (see further below).
In an important break with the voluntarist tradition, the 1971 Act took a detailed 
interest in the internal affairs of trade unions. The provisions of the Act set out to 
regulate the content of trade union rule books and laid down certain guiding principles, 
which included that no-one should be ’arbitrarily’ or ’unreasonably’ excluded or 
subjected to any ’unfair or unreasonable disciplinary action’9. The Industrial Relations 
Act also returned to the question of legally enforceable collective agreements and a 
key feature of the Act was the presumption that, unless otherwise indicated by the 
parties, collective agreements were legally enforceable contracts. This reversed the 
previous legal position.
As proposed in Fair Deal at Work, section 96 of the Industrial Relations Act made the 
most important trade dispute immunities for the organisers of industrial action 
dependent upon unions registering under the Act. It was an unfair industrial practice 
to induce or threaten to induce a breach of any contract unless this was in 
contemplation and furtherance of an industrial dispute with the authority of a 
registered union.
Most trade unions refused to register and this rendered many of the core provisions 
of the 1971 Act ineffective. Proponents of voluntarism saw this as confirmation of 
their argument that the law could not be used effectively to intervene in collective 
labour relations and, more specifically, should not be used to subject the internal 
government of trade unions to detailed regulation and scrutiny. Allan Flanders, who
9. The two sets of provisions were in Schedule 4 to and s.65 of the Industrial Relations 
Act. Under s.65 an individual could complain to an industrial tribunal or to the NIRC that 
a union had acted unreasonably or arbitrarily. In fact individual members’ rights were not 
widely used. See Weekes et al. 1975, 69.
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- together with Kahn-Freund - had a great influence on the report of the Donovan 
Commission, argued that the attempt to use legislation to impose changes on trade 
union government was based on a fundamental misconception of the way in which 
trade unions operated. Their leaders’ authority depended on their qualities of 
leadership and ability to persuade members - in a ’positive process’ - to support their 
’line’ (Flanders 1974). Thus a policy based on forcing trade union leaders to restrain 
and frustrate the demands of the shop floor was bound to fail. The Industrial 
Relations Act was also seen to have had contradictory objectives, seeking both to 
restrict trade unions’ freedom and to carry forward the reform of industrial relations 
started by the Donovan Commission 
(Weekes et al. 1975).
With the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act, it appeared at first as if there was a 
return to a non-interventionist consensus. The Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 
(TULRA) of 1974, brought forward by the incoming Labour government, restored the 
framework of law that had existed before 1971. There was no question of retaining 
the penal sanctions of the Industrial Relations Act. Debate centred on drawing the 
boundaries of the definition of a lawful trade dispute10.
From an historical perspective, though, Davies and Freedland reached quite different 
conclusions. They argued that following the trade unions’ successful opposition to the 
1971 Industrial Relations Act, all political parties were committed to the need for 
labour law reform and used the experience of the Industrial Relations Act as their 
benchmark of how to proceed:
So far from securing the future of collective laissez-faire, it marked an
important stage on the road away from it (Davies and Freedland 1993,
273).
10. The amendment of the law in 1976 - TULR(C)A - to include breach of commercial 
contract within the scope of the golden formula immunities represented the end of a short­
lived compromise on this point. See Auerbach 1990, chapter 2.
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Rather than being a temporary, transitory episode, therefore, the Act was seen to have 
had a profound effect on the future development of labour law and was seen in many 
respects to pave the way for legislation in the 1980s. One thing was clear: the 
Conservative Government of 1979 had learned the dangers of embarking on a 
’comprehensive’ reform of industrial relations11. The 1984 balloting legislation could 
be seen to have emerged, therefore, from an end to the consensus over the role of the 
law in collective labour relations in general and, in particular, in relation to trade 
union government and industrial action. More specifically the industrial action 
balloting provisions of the Trade Union Act 1984 could be linked both to traditional 
Conservative concerns over the rights of individual members vis a vis their unions12 
and to earlier proposals and policies on industrial action balloting.
2.3 Compulsory strike ballot policies and proposals
Irrespective of the broader debates over the ’end of voluntarism’ and arguments about 
the need to regulate trade union government, there had been a large degree of 
consensus at a political level about the drawbacks inherent in legislating for 
compulsory strike ballots. Whilst proposals for the introduction of compulsory secret 
ballots before industrial action were not new in 1984, they had previously centred on 
emergency powers for governments to intervene in major disputes. There had also 
been some interest in ballots ’triggered’ by trade union members.
n. See Robert Carr MP, then Opposition front bench spokesperson on labour and 
subsequently Secretary of State for Employment in the foreword to Fair Deal at Work. He 
wrote of the need for ’comprehensive modernisation’ of the laws governing industrial 
relations. The Conservative Government of 1979 was well known for its step by step 
approach to collective labour law reform. On whether this was purely pragmatic, see further 
below chapter 4.
12. There was particular emphasis in the Industrial Relations Act (1971), on protecting 
individuals in the event of industrial action. Section 65(7), for example, prohibited a union 
from disciplining any member who refused to take part in industrial action which was an 
unfair industrial practice.
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In the 1920s Conservative Party backbenchers made what appears to have been the 
first sustained effort to persuade a government to introduce strike ballots. These did 
not make any headway13. The general strike revived interest in industrial action 
balloting and the Legislation Committee of the Cabinet claimed that there was:
a strong public demand for legislation providing that the protection of 
the Trade Disputes Act shall not apply to a strike not sanctioned by a 
secret ballot... (Ewing 1986, 21).
By the time the Trade Disputes and Trade Union Bill was enacted in 1927, however, 
all balloting proposals had been dropped. This was in large part because of the 
opposition of employers’ organisations and, in particular, the strong objections of the 
National Confederation of Employers’ Organisations14. The next significant policy 
document on labour law reform was A Giant’s Strength published by the Inns of Court 
Conservative and Unionist Society in 1958. The requirement for strike ballots was 
considered, to complement proposals for limiting trade union immunities to official 
industrial action by registered unions, but was rejected. It was argued that ballots 
could lead to a greater, rather than lower incidence of unofficial industrial action. In 
relation to official industrial action, proposals for strike ballots were seen to be 
misconceived. If, as anticipated, trade union officers held ballots prior to negotiations 
in order to strengthen their hand in the bargaining process, trade union members were 
unlikely to deny their leaders support. Once a ballot had been held, leaders would be 
unable to settle on less favourable terms than those demanded at the outset of 
negotiations and thus would be at the mercy of ’extremists’. Strike ballots also raised 
a number of practical difficulties, including drafting the wording of the ballot paper 
and preventing dishonest balloting practices. As in the 1920s, such arguments 
rehearsed some of the later reservations about strike balloting proposals.
13. See Ewing 1986, especially 20-21.
14. Reflecting later concerns, employers argued that ballots would be an ’automatic vote 
of confidence’ in trade union leaders. Furthermore ballot decisions could tie the hands of 
negotiators, increasing the difficulties of resolving disputes. See Ewing 1986, 21.
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Ten years later, in evidence to the Donovan Royal Commission on Trade Unions and 
Employers’ Associations of 1965-1968, proposals for strike ballots were notably 
absent, compared to the extensive consideration of the legal enforcement of collective 
agreements. There was just one detailed submission on ballots from an employer, 
which was from Unilever. The Institute of Personnel Management (IPM) also gave 
evidence on strike ballots, which broadly rejected the case for them.
In its written evidence to Donovan the IPM identified a range of practical difficulties 
with strike ballots. These included defining the issues in dispute and wording the 
question to be asked on the ballot paper. Ballots were seen to run the risk of 
introducing an undesirable degree of rigidity into negotiations and the settlement of 
disputes. The IPM argued that there was a danger of reducing the trade union 
officials’ role from that of representative to delegate, thus hindering constructive 
negotiation which depended essentially on flexibility and compromise15. In its oral 
evidence16, the IPM reiterated its rejection of strike ballots. It expressed two further 
points of concern: firstly, that if ballots were to precede industrial action, trade unions 
would probably need to ballot for a return to work; but more fundamentally, that the 
proposals were only applicable to official industrial action.
By contrast Unilever believed that the introduction of ballots would be of value both 
to management and to trade union officers. The company’s evidence referred in some 
detail to both the advantages and disadvantages of compulsory strike ballots17. Ballots 
were seen as a way of strengthening the influence of trade union officials against the 
considerable power of ’disruptive elements’ within trade unions. The company put 
forward an argument that ’extremists’ were able to overawe colleagues at meetings 
where decisions were taken by a show of hands. Strike ballots could mean pause for
15. Donovan Commission 1968. Written evidence of the Institute of Personnel 
Management, para. 45.
16. Donovan Commission 1968. Oral evidence of the Institute of Personnel Management 
paras 6471-6482.
17. Donovan Commission 1968. Written evidence of Unilever WE 246, paras. 29-32. For 
Unilever’s oral evidence see Minutes of Evidence Ref no. 46.
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thought and more representative and, therefore, more responsible decisions. Unilever, 
however, also argued that assumptions underlying balloting proposals had not been 
clearly thought through. An important proviso, for example, was whether the issues 
in dispute could be clearly defined and would remain unaltered during the course of 
a dispute. Supporters of industrial action balloting also assumed, Unilever argued, that 
once a ballot result was known it would necessarily facilitate an agreement.
From its discussion of ballots, it was clear that Unilever believed that employers as 
well as trade unions would be given the right to hold industrial action ballots. This 
raised potential difficulties about the right of employers or trade unions to hold a 
ballot even if the other party objected. There could also be disagreements over 
decisions about the timing of ballots and the conditions under which they would be 
held. Nevertheless the company concluded that balloting represented a democratic 
process of decision making and, providing these difficulties could be overcome, 
balloting legislation should be welcomed.
This was not a view widely shared at the time. The dominant thinking among 
academic commentators, which shaped the outcome of the Donovan Commission’s 
Report, was that proposals for compulsory strike ballots should be rejected. In his 
evidence to the Commission, a leading academic, Cyril Grunfeld, described strike 
ballot proposals as one of several legal short cuts [to better industrial relations] which 
would be fruitless18.
The Donovan Commission Report in 1968 did not support proposals for strike ballots, 
which it believed were based on ’the belief that workers are likely to be less militant 
than their leaders and that, given the opportunity of such a ballot, they would often 
be likely to vote against strike action’ (Para 426). Donovan rejected this assumption, 
drawing on evidence from its own workshop relations survey as well as experience in 
USA and Canada. Moreover, echoing the concerns of the IPM, the Commission 
suggested that any legislation, if it were to be effective, would necessarily be confined
18. Donovan Commission 1968. Minutes of evidence Ref no. 12.
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to major official strikes:
A law forbidding strike action before the holding of a secret ballot 
could not be enforced in the case of small-scale unofficial stoppages, 
which make up the overwhelming majority of the total number of 
strikes (para 427).
Two other particular objections were raised: that a ballot in favour of strike action 
could delay a dispute settlement by restricting union negotiators’ freedom of action; 
and that there were difficulties relating to the way in which the question on the ballot 
paper was framed. The example given was of a ballot over an employer’s ’final offer’ 
which was then slightly improved (para. 429). In rejecting proposals for strike ballots, 
the Commission argued that the responsibility for deciding to call a strike and call it 
off should be with - and be seen to be with - trade union leaders. The decision about 
whether this should include a strike ballot should continue to be with the unions 
themselves (para. 430).
The Commission considered whether strike ballots should be held in certain defined 
’emergency’ circumstances. Evidence was drawn from the United States and the 
national emergency provisions of the federal Taft Hartley Act (1947). The Donovan 
Commission did not see a role for compulsory cooling off periods and strike ballots 
on the model of United States legislation. Firstly because they did not fit easily with 
the Donovan Commission’s analysis of the UK ’strike problem’ as small scale 
unofficial action. Emergency provisions, and the use of ballots in them, were rejected 
on two other grounds. The first was the record of the legislation in the US:
there has not been a single case in which a vote has gone in favour of 
acceptance of the employer’s latest offer (para. 421).
Secondly, such provisions were seen to be rigid and inflexible in comparison with the 
range of powers already available to a British government, including conciliation,
56
arbitration and appointed inquiries19.
Fair Deal at Work, the Conservative Party policy document which was published 
shortly before the Donovan report, supported strike ballots as part of wider legal 
provisions to deal with national emergencies, to be invoked in exceptional 
circumstances where all other voluntary methods to resolve a major dispute had failed 
(Conservative Party 1968). Its proposals were closely modelled on the Taft Hartley 
Act, without appearing to answer the objections raised in the Donovan Commission’s 
report. Indeed, Fair Deal at Work argued that Taft Hartley had a ’record of success’ 
because in 17 out of the 24 occasions on which an injunction had been granted 
between 1947 and 1967 a settlement was reached within the 80 day ’cooling o ff 
period and no industrial action had taken place. The Industrial Relations Act of 1971 
was to show that strike ballots as part of the Government’s response to ’national 
emergencies’ was now accepted within Conservative Party thinking.
By contrast, In Place of Strife, the Labour Government’s White Paper of January 
1969, broadly endorsed the Donovan Commission’s conclusions that the idea of 
imposing obligatory ballots before official strike should be rejected (Department of 
Employment and Productivity 1969). It was argued that trade union members were 
very often much more ’militant’ than leaders in major disputes and that they were 
likely to be less closely in touch with the progress and prospects of negotiations. 
Trade union leaders might well find their hands tied by a vote in favour of a strike 
intended only as a bargaining move at an early stage of negotiations. Nor was there 
anything to be gained from a ballot where leaders were ready to call a strike and there 
was no doubt about the support of members (para 97).
The White Paper argued, however, that there did seem to be a role for ballots when 
there was a possibility of a major official strike being called but the support of those
19. Donovan Commission 1968, para. 422. See also para 431 onwards which detailed the 
powers available.
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involved was in doubt20. In Place of Strife proposed, therefore, that where a major 
strike was threatened, the Secretary of State would discuss the desirability of holding 
a ballot with trade union leaders. Where no agreement was reached the Secretary of 
State would have the power to require the union(s) involved to hold a ballot. This 
power was to be used where the Secretary of State believed that the strike would 
involve a serious threat to the economy or public interest and doubted whether it had 
the support of those involved (para 98).
The White Paper argued that the object was not to ban such strikes, but to ensure that 
before they took place trade union members were convinced of the need to strike. 
There was no reference, however, to how the ’doubt* about members’ support could 
be determined. It was noted that trade unions had a wide variety of rules relating to 
industrial action balloting. Some required ballots be held, some made provision for 
discretionary ballots and other union rule books did not mention balloting in respect 
of industrial action. The White Paper proposed that trade unions should in future be 
required to include a provision on strike ballots in their rules which were to be 
approved by the Registrar of Trade Union and Employers’ Associations21.
It was proposed that the Secretary of State should not intervene in the conduct of the 
ballot except in relation to approving the question to be put to vote. Any questions 
raised by members about balloting procedures and entitlement to vote were to be 
resolved in the same way as for a ballot called by the union itself. The powers of a 
union under its rules to decide whether or not to strike and end a strike would also 
remain unaltered. Like the other penal clauses in In Place of Strife this proposal was
20. See Jenkins 1970, 33-34. Harold Wilson, then Prime Minister, was particularly 
concerned that during an engineering dispute Hugh Scanlon, General Secretary of the AEFWU 
had refused to conduct a ballot of members. Other unions involved in the dispute had 
balloted members who had rejected industrial action. Wilson believed that, as a result, in 
October 1968 the country had come to the verge of a national engineering strike.
21. Department of Employment and Productivity 1969, para 109. Refusal to have these 
rules would leave a union open to a financial penalty imposed by the proposed new Industrial 
Board. The alternative sanction recommended in the Donovan report of confining the 
protection of s.3 of the Trade Disputes Act 1906 to registered unions was rejected.
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dropped by the Labour Government later in 1969.
The Conservative Government elected in 1970 enacted a variant of the Fair Deal at 
Work proposals as part of the Industrial Relations Act (IRA) 1971. The emergency 
procedures in sections 138-145 came into effect by way of an application from the 
Secretary of State to the National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC). In reality, 
however, the NIRC had a limited role in reviewing the Secretary of State’s decisions. 
Like the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, on which they were based, the IRA 
emergency procedures included provisions for a ’cooling off period’ and a strike 
ballot. Unlike the American law the cooling off period and strike ballots were 
separate procedures, but on the only occasion on which they were used, during a 1972 
pay dispute in British Rail, the Government successfully applied first for a cooling off 
period and then for a strike ballot22. No industrial action occurred during the balloting 
period. The result of the ballot, however, was an overwhelming majority in favour 
of industrial action. Many political, legal and industrial relations lessons were drawn 
from this experience.
The 1968 and 1969 labour law proposals and the strike balloting provisions of the 
Industrial Relations Act (1971) need, therefore, to be located within the special body 
of law relating to emergency situations. This was an important period when 
Governments were searching for an appropriate legal framework for trade union 
government and industrial action. They clearly articulated a possible role for strike 
ballots. The experience of the Industrial Relations Act affected Conservative opinion 
and made it unlikely that future Conservative governments would favour the inclusion 
of industrial action ballots in emergency provisions. It is notable that the Government 
did not invoke the emergency procedures during coal disputes in 1972 (before the rail 
dispute) and in 1974 (after the rail dispute) possibly because it had been advised that 
the ballot results would demonstrate strong membership support for the union’s 
position.
22. See Secretary of State for Employment v. ASLEF [1972] ICR 7 NIRC and Secretary 
of State for Employment v. ASLEF (No 2t [1972] ICR 19, NIRC and CA reporting the rail 
unions’ unsuccessful appeal against the Order for a strike ballot.
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After the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act in 1974, during five years of a Labour 
administration, strike ballots did not seem to be high on the agenda for labour law 
reform. Indeed there was a widely held view that the strike ballot provisions had been 
one of the most demonstrable failures of the IRA. Ballots in general, however, were 
prominent in the Conservative Party’s rethinking of its policies in Opposition. Whilst 
the focus was on ballots for the election of trade union leaders, Conservative support 
for strike ballots gained greater prominence during the 1978-1979 ’winter of 
discontent’23. Prior to 1984, therefore, the 1979 Government introduced legislation to 
encourage use of postal ballots by unions in disputes by providing state funding 
(section 1, Employment Act 1980). Section 1 provided for the Government to 
establish a scheme under which some of the costs of postal ballots, on among other 
things industrial action, could be refunded by the Certification Officer24.
2.4 Enforcement mechanisms
Any legal provision for mandatory balloting on industrial action necessarily confronted 
complex issues about enforcement of the law, in particular the vicarious liability of 
trade unions for the actions of officials and members. These difficulties were 
minimised by an approach, as in the Industrial Relations Act (1971) which placed 
balloting within the context of emergency procedures. If, in exceptional 
circumstances, emergency procedures were invoked by the Government and a Court 
Order was granted, the question became one of whether trade union(s) would comply 
with the Order. A more general provision, such as emerged in 1984, raised more 
complicated issues in relation to defining trade union liability. A new dimension was 
added in 1982, which repealed the TULRA section 14 immunity for trade unions as 
such (previously in section 4 of the 1906 Trade Disputes Act), which had protected 
unions from actions in tort. Whilst Kahn-Freund had argued that the repeal of section
23. See Lewis and Simpson 1981, 126.
24. See Lewis and Simpson 1981, chapter 6 on sections 1 and 2 of the 1980 Employment 
Act. On the repeal of Section 1 see further below.
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14 would make little difference in practice, this was in the context of trade dispute 
immunities which were much broader in the 1970s than they were to become in the 
1980s (Kahn-Freund 1977, 275). Moreover the repeal of section 14 was of 
considerable symbolic importance.
In the 1960s and 1970s the extent to which trade unions should be held liable for the 
actions of officials and groups of members was an issue of central concern to policy 
makers. A number of different approaches emerged. The Donovan Commission 
report recommended by a majority that the trade dispute immunities in section 3 of 
the Trade Disputes Act 1906 (and the corresponding provision in the 1965 Act) should 
be limited to those acting on behalf of a registered trade union25. The Labour 
Government’s In Place of Strife rejected this proposal, arguing that ’the great majority 
of employers would probably not be prepared to sue unofficial strike leaders’. 
Moreover, unions could simply declare strikes by their members to be official, thus 
bringing the leaders of such strikes once more under the protection of section 3, but 
that, in other circumstances, strike leaders might have no defence against legal action 
by employers even if their unofficial action was justified (para 88).
The Conservative Party’s Fair Deal at Work proposed repeal of immunity from tort 
liability for trade unions as such and basing immunities on a system of trade union 
registration. Registered unions would not be held liable for breach of agreements if 
they could satisfy the court that ’they had done all in their power to prevent the 
breach’ (Conservative Party 1968, 33). Following closely the proposals in Fair Deal 
at Work, the Industrial Relations Act (1971) removed immunity from trade union 
funds. Its failure to define the boundaries of trade union liability, and in what 
circumstances a union would be held responsible for the actions of officials, created 
confusion which was never fully resolved. Officials of registered trade unions were 
to be protected when ’acting within the scope of their authority from the trade union’
25. Donovan 1968 para 800. Section 3 provided immunity for a person who in 
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute induced another person to break a contract of 
employment.
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(section 167(9)). Most unions, however, were not registered and therefore did not 
qualify for the immunity against liability for inducing breach of contract under section 
96 of the Industrial Relations Act. In the cases that came before them, the Courts 
made use of a common law test of trade union liability. One of the leading cases, 
Heatons Transport v TGWU26. went to the House of Lords where it was held that the 
TGWU was responsible for the acts of shop stewards who had ’general implied 
authority’ to act on behalf of the union.
In its review of the Industrial Relations Act, Trade Union Immunities (1981) noted:
the operation of the Act was overshadowed by the fact that it led fairly 
swiftly to the imprisonment of individual workers and a growing 
anxiety about the extent to which its provisions could be operated in 
practice (Department of Employment 1981, para 79).
The experience of the Industrial Relations Act suggested a number of lessons about 
the enforcement of the law. Firstly, trade union liability needed to be defined to avoid 
some of the difficulties that had arisen in the courts between 1972 and 1974, including 
the danger of creating individual martyrs. Secondly, employers showed little interest 
in making damages claims against unions, following the removal of immunity from 
trade unions as such27. Thirdly, trade unions could not always be expected to comply 
with injunctions28.
26. Heatons Transport v TGWU [1973] AC 15,HL. See also Midland Cold Storage v 
Steer [1972] ICR 435, [1972] All ER 773; Midland Cold Storage v Turner [1972] ICR 230. 
Con Mech Engineers Ltd v AUEW Engineering Section (no. 2) [1974] ICR 332; (no. 3) ICR 
464.
27. The biggest claim was brought by General Aviation Services. See General Aviation 
Services v. TGWU [1976] IRLR 224. The action was finally dismissed in 1976.
28. See Auerbach 1990, 92. Evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on 
Employment 1981, showing that some trade unions were now prepared to defy the law, led 
to a majority recommendation that TULRA section 14 should be repealed despite the limited 
use by employers of their rights to sue unions for damages between 1971 and 1974.
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At the end of the 1970s, the legislative approach with regard to the trade union 
government was briefly restored to the pre 1971 situation. In the 1982 Employment 
Act, however, the 1979 Conservative government enacted legislation to limit immunity 
for trade union as such in the context of industrial action. Section 15 (subsequently 
amended) added to the law a statutory code of vicarious liability. The changes were 
made despite reservations recently expressed in Trade Union Immunities, the Green 
Paper preceding the Employment Act 1982, based on a concern that removal of 
immunity would increase unofficial action (paras 123-129). The CBI was among 
employers’ organisations pressing strongly for this change in the law. Evidence of 
injunction applications in relation to industrial action balloting was to show that 
employers took the opportunity to seek orders against trade unions rather than named 
officials.
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed the voluntarist tradition of labour law from which, it has 
been argued, the 1984 balloting legislation marked an important departure. Detailed 
proposals and policies on strike ballots arose in the period of the late 1960s onwards. 
They were part of a changing approach which represented the beginnings of an end 
to the consensus about the abstentionist role of the law in collective labour relations, 
especially in relation to trade union government and industrial disputes.
Perceived practical difficulties with regard to implementing strike ballot proposals and 
the effects of enforcing the law under the 1971 Industrial Relations Act initially made 
the 1979 Conservative Government approach strike balloting proposals with some 
caution. Whilst by 1979 there was a growing belief among influential sections of the 
Conservative Party that ballots should be held before industrial action because they 
could reduce its extent, there was equally a strongly held view that a legal requirement 
to ballot could be unenforceable. There were perceived problems both in leaving it 
up to trade union members to enforce ballots or in depending on employers to enforce 
the balloting requirements, if neither trade union members nor employers wanted to 
become involved with the law. It was recognised that the legal issues themselves
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would be complex if the question of trade union vicarious liability was raised, as it 
almost certainly would be if the enforcement mechanism was linked to the trade 
dispute immunities.
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CHAPTER 3 THE LAW
This chapter provides a legal framework for the analysis of the fieldwork. This includes
(i) an outline of the balloting legislation of the 1980s; (ii) a review of labour injunction 
procedures; and (iii) judicial interpretation of the balloting requirement in some of the 
main cases that have come before the courts in the 1980s and early 1990s.
3.1 Legislation
The first legislative provisions relating to strike ballots enacted in the 1980s were in the 
Employment Act 1980 sections 1 and 2. Conservative Party support for ballots (Ewing 
1986) was given effect in a scheme, under section 1, to provide state funding for postal 
ballots on certain issues. This was complemented by a legal right for trade unions to hold 
workplace ballots as an alternative. The ballots covered included those for ’obtaining a 
decision or ascertaining the views of members of a trade union as to the calling or ending 
of a strike or other industrial action’. This apparently excluded reference back balloting, 
even though this was often closely allied to the question of whether or not industrial 
action should be taken. In 1982 the provisions were amended to include ballots on 
acceptance or rejection of employers’ offers1.
These provisions did little to encourage the holding of strike ballots up to 1984 because 
TUC policy was that affiliated unions should not take advantage of the availability of state 
funds2. In fact after 1985, when TUC policy changed, the funds began to be used by a
*. Sections 1 and 2 of the Employment Act were consolidated as sections 115 and 
116 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.
2. The Certification Officer’s Annual Reports show that only four applications were 
made for financial support in relation to industrial action ballots in the period 1981-83.
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number of TUC affiliates, especially the AEU and EETPU3. But since the assistance was 
restricted to postal ballots, and most unions that held strike ballots used workplace rather 
than postal ballots, the provisions continued not to be of central importance to the practice 
of most unions in relation to holding strike ballots4. These provisions remained in place 
throughout the 1980s, but were prospectively repealed by section 7 of the Trade Union 
Reform and Employment Rights Act (TURERA) 1993 with effect from 1 April 1996’Wlth
financial support for postal ballots being phased out over the period 1993 to 1996 j n  j  G o v e r n m e n t  a d o p t e d
another, quite different approach and legislative attention turned to mandatory industrial 
action ballots.
Trade Union Act 1984 ss.10-115
Broadly speaking the Trade Union Act 1984 (s. 10(3)) imposed three requirements on the 
organisers of industrial action if industrial action was to retain immunity under section 
13(l)(a) of TULRA 19746 from tort liability for, or dependent on, inducing breach of or 
interference with contracts of employment7. These three requirements were that:
3. In 1989 the AEU and EETPU merged to form the AEEU.
4. Though there were important exceptions in addition to the EETPU. Unions, such 
as the AUT, had always used postal ballots.
5. The provisions originally enacted in ss.10-11 TUA 1984 were consolidated in 
ss.226-235 TULRCA (1992). The original provisions came into force on September 26 
1984.
6. This provision was consolidated as section 219(l)(a) of the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act (TULRCA) 1992.
1. These were the direct tort of inducing breach or interference with contracts of 
employment, or indirectly inducing breaches of or interference with commercial contracts 
by the unlawful means of inducing breach of or interference with the performance of 
contracts of employment. See Hadmor Productions v Hamilton [1983] 1 AC 191 which 
confirmed that this included interference with commercial contracts as well as breach of 
them.
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(i) a ballot must have been held in respect of the strike or other industrial 
action and there must have been majority support for the action among 
those voting;
(ii) the ballot must have complied with the provisions of section 11 of the 
Act; and
(iii) authorisation or endorsement - and in the case of authorisation the 
industrial action itself - must have taken place after the ballot but within 
a period of four weeks from that date.
Where, therefore, acts were done by a trade union without a ballot which satisfied these 
requirements, the basic immunity from civil lability in the economic torts was lost.
(i) The need for a ballot
One feature of the provisions in the Trade Union Act was that immunities were withdrawn 
from unballoted action which involved a breach of contracts of employment, but not 
necessarily all industrial action8. A second feature of the provisions was that section 10 
of the Act only affected ’acts done by a trade union’, although where no ballot had been 
held immunity was removed not only from the union itself but also the individual 
organisers of industrial action. The limitation of trade union liability to ’official’ action 
was generally assumed to be coterminous with the statutory code of vicarious liability for 
the economic torts originally enacted in Employment Act 1982 section 15. Action not 
’authorised or endorsed by a responsible person’ (EA 1982 ss.15(2) and (3)) would not 
expose the union or the organisers of the action to liability in tort on the grounds that it
8. Trade Union Act 1984 section 10(l)-(2).
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was taken without reference to a ballot9. These two features of section 10 served to 
preserve some discretion for trade unions in decisions about ballots before industrial 
action. The law was tightened up in both respects in 1990, following case law in relation 
to these two issues which highlighted uncertainties in the original 1984 provisions (see 
further below).
(ii) Requirements for a valid ballot
On the timing of the ballot the 1984 Act envisaged two situations. First, where the ballot 
was held before the industrial action started and second where a ballot would be held to 
endorse industrial action that was already underway. Where the ballot preceded 
authorisation and the start of industrial action, industrial action had to be implemented 
within four weeks of the ballot if immunity was not to be lost. Where the industrial 
action had already begun, action could be endorsed, but the immunities would not cover 
any period before a ballot was held. It is notable that under the 1984 Act the question 
of whether there had been a breach of the balloting provisions could only be raised by an 
employer in a tort action against the union - there was no provision in 1984 to give 
individual members of a union the right to secure the calling of a strike ballot10.
A number of requirements had to be satisfied if the immunities were to remain operative. 
Section 11(1 )(a) provided that entitlement to vote in the ballot must be given equally to:
all those members of the trade union who it is reasonable at the time of the
9. For the other criteria that could be applied see Heaton’s Transport v TGWU [1973] 
AC 15, HL, which set out the criteria for the purposes of unfair industrial practices under 
the Industrial Relations Act 1971 or the common law. The difficulties experienced in 
relation to the responsibility of trade unions for the acts of officials under the Industrial 
Relations Act are referred to above in chapter 2.
10. This was changed in the 1988 Employment Act, which gave members a right to 
challenge unballoted (or ’improperly’ balloted) action. See further below.
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ballot for the union to believe will be called upon in the strike or other 
industrial action in question to act in breach of or to interfere with the 
performance of their contracts of employment.
No other persons were to be allowed to vote in the ballot (s.l l(l)(b)). Industrial action 
would not retain immunity where any member of the trade union at the time of the ballot 
’was denied entitlement to vote in the ballot’(s.ll(2)(a)) and was then ’induced by the 
union’ in the course of the action in respect of which the ballot was held to break or 
interfere with the performance of his/her contract of employment.
The conduct of the ballot was covered by section ll(3)-(8). Section 11(3) required the 
person voting to mark a ballot paper, so that a ’show of hands’ would not be sufficient 
to meet the Act’s requirements. Section ll(4)(a) and (b) related to the wording of the 
ballot paper itself, which was to include a question requiring members to indicate whether 
they were prepared to take part in industrial action involving a breach of their 
employment contracts. Subject to this requirement, the union had the freedom to frame 
the question(s) on strike action and action short of a strike11.
Section ll(5)(a) invalidated a ballot if voters were subject to any ’interference or 
constraint’ imposed by the ’union or any of its members, officials or employees’. Section 
ll(5)(b) required that voters should be given the opportunity to vote ’so far as is 
reasonably practicable’, without incurring any direct cost. Section 11(6) related to the 
timing and location of the ballot and imposed an obligation on trade unions ’as far as is 
reasonably practicable’ to make available or supply ballot papers to every person entitled 
to vote. Essentially the requirement was to use workplace ballots, if postal ballots were 
not held. Ballot papers were to be distributed immediately before or after or during 
’working hours’ - at the workplace or at a more convenient place. Similar provisions 
related to arrangements for votes to be cast. Section 11(7) covered the secrecy of the
n . This freedom was removed by the Employment Act 1988.
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ballot and counting of votes - to be carried out ’fairly and accurately’, although with a 
proviso that an accidental inaccuracy could be disregarded if it had not affected the result 
of the ballot. Section 11(8) laid down requirements for the union to inform voters of the 
outcome12.
Once enacted the 1984 balloting provisions were amended and added to by Conservative 
governments, up to 1995, on three subsequent occasions: 1988, 1990 and 1993.
Employment Act 1988
In broad terms the Employment Act 1988 made three relevant changes in the law on 
industrial action balloting. Firstly, it introduced a right for members to seek appropriate 
court orders where they were called upon by their union to take industrial action without 
a ballot in which members voted in favour of taking action and which satisfied the 
requirements of section 11. Industrial action was deemed to be taken without the support 
of a ballot unless the union had held a ballot in respect of the industrial action and the 
applicant had been accorded entitlement to vote in the ballot13. Prior to 1988 members 
did have rights at common law, but these were limited to a right to enforce the rules. If 
union rules contained a positive obligation to hold a ballot, a member could apply to the 
High Court for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the union from acting in breach of 
its rules. This was seen, however, to be a ’very exceptional form of relief14.
12. Further requirements were added in this respect in future Acts.
13. This implemented proposals in the Green Paper Trade Unions and their Members 
Cm. 95 (London: HMSO) February 1987, although in an important respect the 1988 
provisions were different from the 1987 proposals which were dependent on a breach of 
contract (see para 2.4). What section 1 did not do was to give members an independent 
right to require a ballot to be held. It was a right to challenge a union’s decision to go 
ahead with unballoted action.
14. See Tavlor v. NUM (Yorkshire Areal H9841 IRLR 445.
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Section 1(1) of the Employment Act 1988 provided that:
A member of a trade union who claims that the union has, without the 
support of a ballot, authorised or endorsed any industrial action in which 
members of the union (including that member) are likely to be, or have 
been, induced by the union to take part or to continue to take part may 
apply to the court for an order under this section.
A member’s right to demand a ballot was not linked to industrial action which involved 
the member in breaking, or interfering with the performance of his/her contract of 
employment; it was much broader than that. Any unballoted action could be restrained 
by a member15.
This gave rise to a potentially wide, but indeterminate, balloting obligation. Uncertainties 
were inherent in the meaning of ’inducement’ where this was not linked to breach of 
contract, as well as situations in which members were ’likely to be, or have been, induced 
by the union’. One question raised was whether this would cover a recommendation to 
members to refrain from voluntary overtime pending the outcome of a ballot. Moreover, 
it was argued that:
The uncertainty is compounded by the fact that a member may obtain a 
section 1 order on showing that it is ’likely’ that he will be induced to take 
part in industrial action; thus the industrial action need not yet have taken 
place (McKendrick 1988).
What the Act did make clear was that an inducement did not have to be effective for the
15. This had been the result of a Government amendment introduced in the House of 
Lords. The change had the effect of enlarging trade unions’ loss of immunity for 
unballoted action from s.l3(l)(a) to the other s. 13 torts of intimidation and conspiracy, 
but this could only take effect if a member initiated proceedings.
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balloting requirement to arise16. Further uncertainty was created because no definition of 
industrial action was provided beyond section 1(7) which referred to ’any strike or other 
industrial action by persons employed under contracts of employment’17. Wedderbum has 
argued that any and all forms of collective action would be caught by this definition:
Under section 1 of the Act wherever a group of workers make a demand 
supported by their union with an implied threat to take action (and that is 
not difficult to prove) a dissident member can obtain a court order whether 
or not there is evidence that the action threatened itself would be by any 
rule of the general law unlawful. Breach of the employment contract is no 
longer the boundary of illegality. Now it is not the unlawful act but the 
group pressure, the collective organisation i t s e l f  [italics in original] that is 
the target (Wedderbum 1991, 217).
The 1988 Act also created the post of Commissioner for the Rights of Trade Union 
Members (CROTUM). Her powers included a discretion to assist members who want to 
restrain their union from proceeding with a call for unballoted, or ’improperly’ balloted 
action. The ballot itself had to comply with the requirements of section 11 of the 1984 
Act.
Section 1(2) empowered the Court where it found that the balloting provisions had not 
been complied with to make an order requiring the union to ensure that no further 
inducement of the members took place. In addition the union was required to ensure that
16. Employment Act 1988 s. 1(6).
17. For interpretation lawyers and practitioners were left to look at other legislation. 
In the context of section 62 Employment Protection Consolidation Act a concerted refusal 
to work overtime might constitute industrial action, at least where the purpose was to 
apply pressure on the employer or dismpt the business Power Packing Casemakers v. 
Faust [1983] QB 471, although a threat to take industrial action Midland Plastics Ltd. v. 
Till [1983] ICR 118 or attendance at a mass meeting held in working time without the 
consent of the employer might not Rasool v. Henworth Pipe Co. Ltd. (No.l) [1980] ICR 
494. The guidance, though, could not be certain. See Navlor v. Orton & Smith Ltd.
[1983] IRLR 233.
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’no such member engages in any conduct after the making of the order by virtue of 
having been induced before the making of the order to take part or to continue to take 
part in the action’, thus entitling the court to issue an order requiring the union to put 
pressure on its members not to continue with industrial action.
The second area of change in the balloting legislation in 1988 was the introduction of 
more detailed regulation of the form and content of the ballot paper. This involved an 
amendment to section 11 of the 1984 Act. The ballot paper was now required to include 
a statement that could not be qualified or commented on by anything else appearing on 
the ballot paper. It had to read:
if you take part in a strike or other industrial action, you may be in breach 
of your contract of employment18.
Thirdly section 17 of the 1988 Act amended the provisions relating to the balloting 
constituency in section 11(1) of the 1984 Trade Union Act19. The new general principle 
introduced in 1988 was that separate ballots must be held for each workplace and that 
immunity would only be enjoyed in respect of a strike at any place of work where the 
workers at that workplace had voted by a majority to take industrial action. Ballot results 
could be aggregated in certain cases if they fell within one of the three exceptions to the 
general principle, which were that:
(i) at the time of the ballot it was reasonable for the union to believe and 
it did believe that all the members accorded entitlement to vote had the
18. Section 11(3) of the Trade Union Act 1984 as amended in Schedule 3 to the 
Employment Act 1988.
19. Now TULR(C)A section 228.
73
same place of work;
(ii) all the members who worked for a particular employer were balloted;
(iii) all the union members balloted had a factor or factors in common 
which was a factor relating to their terms and conditions of employment 
or occupational description and all members with the factor in common 
were balloted.
The Act therefore created the presumption of a separate ballot at each place of work 
except where workers were linked by a ’common factor’. These were complex 
provisions. The Code of Practice on Industrial Action Balloting (1990) in sections 15-18 
only served to compound the uncertainties:
In stating that separate place of work ballots are not required when a union 
ballots all its members, paragraph 15 provides a questionable interpretation 
of TUA 1984 s.ll(lB ) (Simpson 1990, 29).
A further change in the law of a rather different nature increased the perception within 
the trade union movement that the legislation was increasingly weighted against the 
collective interests of trade union members. In addition to introducing a right for trade 
unions members to restrain unballoted industrial action, the Government also enacted, in 
section 3 of the 1988 Employment Act, protection for individual members who refused 
to participate in industrial action. Section 3 made it unlawful for trade unions to 
discipline members - which might take the form of fines or, in exceptional cases, 
expulsion - ’unjustifiably’. This included situations in which members had failed to take 
part in or support industrial action which had been given majority support in a ballot held 
in accordance with the Trade Union Act 1984. The Government argued that this special 
protection was necessary for individuals because a ballot provided a union and the 
organisers of industrial action with immunity, but did not protect members from dismissal
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by an employer20.
Code of Practice
Section 18 of the Employment Act 1988 amended the Employment Act 1980, section 3, 
to empower the Secretary of State to issue Codes of Practice concerning ’the conduct by 
trade unions of ballots and elections’. Codes do not in themselves give rise to legal 
obligations, but can be taken into account in proceedings before any court where they 
appear to be relevant (Simpson 1990)21. The normally accepted function of a code of 
practice is to provide clarification of the law. A draft code of practice was issued in 
November 1988, which many felt went much further than this. Its proposals for good 
practice included suggestions that a ballot should only be held after the union had assessed 
whether there was sufficient support among members for holding one (para 14), that 
industrial action should not follow a successful ballot unless the majority voting for 
industrial action was substantially more than a simple majority (para 97) on at least a 70% 
turnout (para 98). The format of model ballot papers in the draft code placed the box for 
a no vote above that for a yes vote. In the event the code which came into effect in 
Spring 1990 was a substantially modified version of this draft22, but it continued to 
contain a large amount of highly prescriptive detail and was:
a highly controversial document, which calls into question both the
function of codes of practice and the role of ballots in the law on industrial
20. See Trade Unions And Their Members (1987) chap 2, especially para 2.11. It 
should be noted that the Commissioner for the Rights of Trade Union Members was only 
empowered to provide assistance in cases before the High Court, not those issues that 
were dealt with by industrial tribunals, such as section 3 of the 1988 Act.
21. See also Mcllroy 1991, 159-161, 180.
22. The code was revised in February 1991. A draft revised code was issued in 1994
to take account of the changes in the law in the Trade Union Reform and Employment
Rights Act 1993. This came into effect in November 1995.
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conflict (Simpson 1990).
Wide-ranging requirements relating to the information that unions were to give members 
imposed greater obligations than were contained in sections 11(3) and 11(4) of the Trade 
Union Act. The amount and nature of the detail could seriously restrict trade unions’ 
freedom of manoeuvre in disputes23. Paragraph 8 of the code advised that industrial 
action should not take place until any agreed disputes procedures had been exhausted, a 
proposal that did not command widespread support. ACAS expressed concern that this 
might provide the basis of judicial determination on whether or not agreed procedures had 
been observed, despite the fact that the collective agreements containing those procedures 
were not intended to be legally binding. Its inclusion reflected the influence of the views 
of the Engineering Employers’ Federation (EEF 1987). The EEF’s concern to protect 
procedure agreements had informed its response to the balloting proposals in the Green 
Paper, Democracy in Trade Unions (Department of Employment 1983). The EEF 
commented then that:
the...obligation to hold a ballot could be misused to ’legitimise’ 
unconstitutional strike action and to pressure employers during the course 
of negotiations’ (EEF 1983).
The 1988 code on balloting also aroused criticism because by anticipating future changes 
in the law, it went well beyond providing an interpretation of existing legislation. The
23. See below London Underground Ltd v NUR [1989] IRLR 341 and Blue Circle 
v TGWU 7 July 1989 (unreported) on the significance of the wording of the ballot paper 
and accompanying information. The 1988 code on balloting required that the union 
’should’ give to members relevant information, including the background to the ballot and 
issues to which the dispute related, the nature and timing of industrial action that the 
union might be prepared to authorise and any considerations in relation to turnout or size 
of majority that would be relevant to a decision about whether the industrial action would 
go ahead (para 33).
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code expressed a preference for postal ballots and the use of independent scrutineers 
(Department of Employment 1990, paras 20 and 23), practices which were not part of the 
then current balloting laws. They were incorporated into later balloting legislation.
Employment Act 1990
In 1990 a number of changes were made to the balloting legislation, both to extend the 
circumstances in which industrial action had to be preceded by a ballot and to tighten the 
requirements for a lawful ballot.
(i) The need for a ballot
Firstly, the 1990 Act redrafted section 10 of the 1984 Trade Union Act to remove 
immunity from acts done by trade unions to induce members to take industrial action. 
In other words, the balloting requirement was no longer expressed by reference to the tort 
of inducing breach of contract24:
Contrary, perhaps, to the popular perception of the law, it is not the case 
that all industrial action has to be preceded by a ballot. After the 
amendments in EA 1990, however, the law has come as close as possible 
to that position without making the obligation to ballot completely 
independent of the immunities (Simpson 1993).
The balloting obligation was also extended under section 5(1) to workers who were not 
employees, such as many of those working in the construction industry, who were 
classified as self-employed. The amendment to section 10 had in effect already done this,
24. Employment Act 1990 schedule 2 paras 2-3, now section 226(1) TULRCA 1992. 
The effect was to bring the basis for actions by employers into line with those for 
individual members.
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so the change had little independent significance.
Secondly, section 625 widened the area of vicarious liability, which made a union legally 
responsible for the acts of any groups which included an official of the union, even 
though these groups might be wholly unofficial. Under section 15 of the 1982 Act, a 
union had been liable for the actions of full time officers and the committees to which 
they reported, unless they had no power to act as they did under the rules, or the acts had 
been repudiated by the President, General Secretary or Principal Executive Committee of 
the union. In 1990 liability was extended to responsibility for the acts of all officials, 
including lay officials and any committee even if not constituted under the rules, unless 
the union repudiated the actions in accordance with a complex procedure. This raised the 
possibility that industrial action organised by a group acting outside the constitution of the 
union, but including an official of the union, could be held to be the actions of the union.
The Employment Act 1990 section 6(4) imposed additional requirements on trade unions 
if they sought to ’repudiate’ unofficial action. The President, General Secretary or 
Principal Executive Committee of the union had to act ’as soon as is reasonably 
practicable’ to give written notice to the committee or official ’without delay’. The union 
was also required to ’do its best’ to give written notice to every member whom it had 
reason to believe was taking part or might be called on to take part in industrial action 
and to give notice to employers. The wording of the statement to members had to be as 
follows:
Your union has repudiated the call (or calls) for industrial action to which 
this notice relates and will give no support to unofficial action taken in 
response to it (or them). If you are dismissed while taking part in 
unofficial industrial action, you will have no right to complain of unfair 
dismissal (EA 1982 s. 15 (5A)).
25. These provisions were consolidated as sections 20 and 21 TULRCA 1992.
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Moreover, if a request was received within three months of repudiation from a party to 
a commercial contract the trade union had to confirm the repudiation, otherwise the 
repudiation would be ineffective (s.6(7)). A related change in section 9(1) provided that 
workers dismissed whilst taking part in unofficial industrial action would not be able to 
bring a claim for unfair dismissal to an industrial tribunal26. Section 9(2) removed all the 
golden formula immunities for industrial action related to a dismissal in these 
circumstances.
(ii) Requirements for a valid ballot
In a third important change in the law, section 7(1) of the 1990 Employment Act required 
that the ballot paper should specify the person or description of persons ’who is or are 
authorised to call for industrial action in the event of a yes vote’27. A problem had been 
identified during a dispute at the Ford Motor Company, in which shop stewards allegedly 
called workers out after a ballot without waiting for the TGWU National Executive 
Committee to consider its response.
Section 7(3)(a) required that:
there must have been no call by the trade union to take part or continue to 
take part in industrial action to which the ballot relates, or any other 
authorisation or endorsement by the union of any such industrial action, 
before the date of the ballot28.
26. This provision inserted S.62A Employment Protection Consolidation Act. Section 
62 had previously been narrowed by Employment Act 1982 s.9. See Simpson 1991, 436.
27. This was consolidated as section 233(1) TULRCA 1992.
28. This was consolidated as section 233(3) TULRCA 1992.
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It was clear that this posed a potential threat to the freedom of unions to campaign for a 
’yes’ vote. One further small, though significant, change in section 8, was of potential 
benefit to unions in protracted disputes. This allowed the four week time limit on the call 
for industrial action to be extended where legal proceedings otherwise meant that a further 
ballot would have to be held. Section 8(6)29 provided that where a court order which had 
restrained a trade union from calling industrial action was set aside, a union could apply 
to the court for an order that the period during which it was prohibited from calling 
industrial action should not count towards the four week time limit30.
Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993
TURERA came into effect after the fieldwork for the research was completed. This 
section will outline the changes made, some of which had already been flagged up in the 
1990 and 1991 strike ballot codes of practice.
Requirements for a valid ballot
1993 TURERA imposed changes in the law to require all industrial action ballots to be 
fully postal, rather than workplace. Since the 1993 Act also provided for the phasing out 
of the Scheme under which unions could apply to the Certification Officer for the costs 
of certain postal ballots to be reimbursed, this change had serious implications for all
29. This was consolidated as section 234(2)-(6) TULRCA 1992.
30. This would avoid the situation which arose in Associated British Ports Ltd v 
TGWU [1989] ICR 557, where an injunction restraining the union from proceeding with 
its call for a strike was lifted by the House of Lords after the four week period had 
elapsed, so that the union had to hold a fresh ballot.
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unions and not just those which had hitherto relied wholly or in part on workplace 
ballots31. The 1993 Act made it mandatory for industrial action ballots to be subject to 
oversight by an independent scrutineer where the numbers entitled to vote exceeded 5032.
The 1993 Act introduced obligations on a union to give four written notices to each 
employer of members being balloted. This was possibly the most important of all the 
changes made to the law since 1984 (Elgar and Simpson 1996). The four notices were 
seven days notice of the union’s intention to hold a ballot, to provide the employer with 
a sample ballot paper at least three days before the start of the ballot, to give the 
employer notice of the ballot result and, what is technically an obligation independent of 
the balloting requirement, to give seven days notice of the start of industrial action. The 
1995 Code of Practice effectively extended the period of the notice requirements by 
suggesting that time should be allowed by the union to check that the employer received 
all the relevant details (paras 20, 24, 56(d), 64). Where the action was to be 
discontinuous, the seven days notice of industrial action was required to include details 
of the dates on which action would be taken33. Where, as in the Monsanto case (see 
below for further details), industrial action was called off to assist negotiations, seven days 
notice to the employer would be required before its resumption. The section 234A notice 
obligations contained one particularly contentious requirement. The notice of intention 
to hold a ballot and notice of industrial action was required to ’describe so that [the 
employer] can readily ascertain them’ the members to be balloted or called on to take
31. Section 115 TUR(C)A 1992 repealed by TURERA section 7.
32. TURERA 1993 section 20, [now TULRCA sections 226B and 23IB]. This 
brought industrial action ballots into line with the requirements for trade union elections 
of national officers and national executive committees.
33. TURERA 1993 section 21 [now TULRCA 1992 section 234A]. This imposes a 
potentially impossible obligation on organisers of industrial action if the apparent 
requirement to notify employers of all the dates in advance is interpreted literally.
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industrial action.
In October 1994 a draft revised Code of Practice, entitled Industrial Action Ballots and 
Notice to Employers, was issued to take account of changes in the TURERA 1993. This 
came into effect in November 1995. The Code suggested that:
it will always be up to the union to satisfy the requirement to provide a 
notice which will enable an employer readily to ascertain which of his 
employees are likely to be given entitlement to vote (para 21. See also 
paras 65-66).
Whilst in some cases the union could meet its obligations by providing general 
information, in other cases ’if the employer would otherwise be left in doubt, more 
specific information (possibly including names and workplace locations) may be needed’ 
(para 22). The requirement on unions to provide employers with the names of members 
who were to be balloted or called on to take industrial action was confirmed in case law34.
3.2 Enforcement provisions
(i) Legal mechanisms
The 1984 Trade Union Act completely changed the nature of the balloting requirement 
from that which had previously been canvassed as a workable option (as well as from the 
legislative precedents in the Industrial Relations Act of 1971). It provided for mandatory 
ballots in defined circumstances, rather than discretionary ballots, and the 1984 Act placed 
enforcement mechanisms in the hands of employers, rather than individual trade union
34. Blackpool and the Fvlde College v. NATFHE r19941 ICR 648.
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members or the state35. Employers were given new rights to make an application for a 
court order requiring industrial action, which did not have the support of a lawful ballot, 
not to go ahead or to cease36. Orders were enforced through the labour injunction 
procedure, which has been a considerable hurdle for trade unions seeking to defend their 
freedom to take industrial action.
(ii) The labour injunction
Labour injunctions are ultimately enforceable by contempt of court proceedings, but most 
cases in labour disputes do not go to a full hearing. Interlocutory proceedings, in which 
the courts make an interim order pending a full hearing of the case - which invariably 
does not take place - have usually been adequate to prevent or stop industrial action. 
More often than not, courts have required unions not to proceed with industrial action, on 
the basis of the interlocutory evidence before the court. Even if applications have not 
been granted, however, the union will certainly have been involved in considerable 
expense and diversion of resources away from the industrial dispute at issue37.
Following American Cvanamid v Ethicon38 in 1975 interlocutory proceedings have been 
determined by reference to whether there was a serious issue to be tried on points of 
substantive law. If there was, the application was then decided on the ’balance of
35. Davies and Freedland 1993 comment on the terminology in the Green Paper, 
Democracy in Trade Unions (Department of Employment 1983) which refers to ’employer 
triggered ballots’ (para 67). This did not actually propose to give employers powers to 
trigger ballots; employers were to deploy sanctions if trade unions failed to hold a ballot.
36. Between 1984 and 1990 this right existed only if the industrial action amounted 
to inducing employees to break their contracts of employment. It still does not exist if 
organising the industrial action does not amount to a tort.
37. See, for example, the sequence of events in Monsanto v TGWU [1989] ICR 269 
and Tanks and Drums v TGWU [1992] ICR 1.
38. American Cvanamid v Ethicon [1975] AC 396.
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convenience’. This has generally weighed against the union. One factor favouring 
employers was the perceived adequacy of damages for both the plaintiff and defendant 
if ultimately they should be successful in the case. In general the courts have not been 
prepared to take into account trade unions’ need to take industrial action without undue 
delay, although this had been recognised by the House of Lords in NWL v. Woods in 
197939.
Section 17(2), which was inserted into the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 
(TULRA) 1974 by the Employment Protection Act (1975), required the court to take into 
account the likelihood of the defendant being able to establish that the act was ’in 
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute’ (17(2)). Since 1984 section 17(2) had 
the potential to be of particular relevance in relation to the balloting requirement because 
of the complexity of the legislation and the potential ease with which an employer could 
establish ’a serious issue to be tried’40. Auerbach comments:
[a]s is well known, the practical impact of [s. 17(2)] in trade dispute cases 
has been minimal. Yet if it has any life left in it at all, it may well be 
found in cases where the technicalities of the ballot are attacked (Auerbach 
1990, 122).
However, in a significant new development, which had the potential to override the 
protection of section 17(2), the courts gave emphasis to the public interest as a factor to
39. [1979] ICR 867, 886. It was given less weight in Dimblebv and Sons v. NUJ
[1984] 1 WLR 427, 432. In this case Lord Diplock ruled that repeal of section 14 made 
it easier for a judge to exercise discretion in interlocutory hearings and grant an injunction 
to an employer who had an arguable case because the case was now more likely to 
proceed to trial and final judgement where the defendant was the trade union itself and 
not a mere office holder in it. Cf. Wedderbum 1986, 687-93.
40. Monsanto v TGWU [1987] ICR 269; Post Office v UCW [1990] ICR 258.
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be weighed in the balance of convenience41. If the balance of convenience did not weigh 
decisively one way or the other, the judge was required to have regard to the desirability 
of preserving the status quo. Where industrial action had not started, the status quo 
argument could be used to prevent industrial action taking place.
During the seafarers’ dispute of 1988 an injunction was granted to P&O restraining the 
NUS from holding a ballot on the grounds that if the action went ahead, it would be 
unprotected secondary or sympathetic action under section 17 of the Employment Act 
1980. Although the ballot was not in itself unlawful, the union was denied the 
opportunity of holding a ballot which could have been of strategic advantage in the 
dispute42.
For trade unions, a series of procedural hurdles were also associated with labour 
injunctions. One of the most significant was the ability of employers to use the timing 
of applications to tactical advantage in disputes. In a number of balloting cases, 
injunctions were sought by employers only immediately before the proposed action was 
due to take place, although it is likely that the application was based on facts which were 
known considerably earlier. This applied to three of the high profile balloting cases of
41. Associated British Ports Ltd v TGWU [1989] ICR 557. This decision was 
overturned in the House of Lords, but not on this point. See Simpson 1989, 239. The 
courts have taken the view - see for example, NWL V Woods [1979] ICR 867, 886 - that 
even where there was no case in the law of tort against the organisers of industrial action, 
they retained a residual power to award an injunction in the public interest. In the 
Associated British Ports case, the employers relied on the argument that all strikes were 
in breach of the National Dock Labour Scheme. The Court of Appeal decision to grant 
an injunction both accepted that this was arguable and referred to the court’s right to take 
account of the public interest.
42. Auerbach 1988, 227, 229. See in particular P&O European Ferries (Portsmouth) 
Ltd v NUS The Independent March 28 1988. There were other cases involving P&O. 
Sealink also subsequently obtained an injunction on similar grounds.
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1989 involving major employers43. It should be noted, however, that the tactical use of 
the injunction procedure was not a guarantee for employers of a successful outcome to 
the dispute. The way in which senior managers within British Rail handled the 1989 
dispute and, in particular the application for a labour injunction, was seen to have 
undermined management’s position and contributed to an increase in support for industrial 
action among NUR members (Elgar and Simpson 1994e). In the 1989 docks dispute the 
timing of the labour injunction application proved decisive in undermining industrial 
action44.
A further difficulty for unions was that injunctions could be sought by employers ex parte, 
often with little or no notice being given to the union45. Section 17(1) provided that 
where a trade dispute defence could be raised, the court ’shall not’ grant the order unless 
satisfied that all reasonable steps were taken to give proper notice so as to enable the 
other party to be heard. The protection that this gave to unions has been severely limited 
in practice46.
(iii) Complying with an injunction
43. British Railways Board v NUR \19891 ICR 678: London Underground Ltd v NUR 
[1989] IRLR 341; (No.2) 343; Blue Circle v TGWU 7 July 1989 (unreported). See 
Simpson 1989, 234, 235-236.
44. The employers delayed their legal challenge until after the ballot on industrial 
action had been held and in the course of the legal proceedings the four week time limit 
was exceeded. This case subsequently led to the amendment in the law in 1990 noted 
above p.80. On the implications for the industrial action see Simpson 1989, 240.
45. See Barretts and Baird Ltd v IPCS [1987] IRLR 3, where notice was given on the 
union’s answering machine after 5pm on Friday and the application for an injunction was 
granted on the following Sunday. In London Underground Ltd v ASLEF 1995 the 
application led to a hearing in the judge’s house on a Friday evening! See the Finanacial 
Times 26.7.95
46. However see Auerbach 1990, 121. This was one of the grounds on which the 
employers were refused an injunction in the case of Post Office v UCW [1990] ICR 258.
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Most often, trade unions have sought to comply with labour injunctions, but on occasion, 
compliance to the satisfaction of the courts has proved to be difficult. One reason has 
been the time necessarily taken by trade union in consulting and reporting back to 
members. There were more intransigent problems where unions were required to instruct 
members to call off (or to conduct) action in accordance with the terms of a court order 
(Auerbach 1988). In a number of cases unions have been held to be ’tacitly condoning’ 
unlawful action47.
Cases of contempt of court have been rare in labour disputes. It has been suggested, 
however, that where the issue of contempt has arisen, there has been a tendency for the 
courts to define the parameters of a court order widely48. Contempt proceedings could 
mean that not only unions but also employers found the conduct of disputes taken out of 
their hands. In the seafarers dispute, the attempt by Sealink to both use the courts and 
to seek a negotiated settlement in parallel led the judge, Michael Davies J, in ordering 
sequestration of the assets of the NUS to say:
I acknowledge that Sealink has never sought to say it really wants the NUS 
put out of business by a writ of sequestration. But if that is their view, 
perhaps they should wonder to what extent they ought, in future, to use 
that as a threat and then not wish to pursue it (Auerbach 1988, 234).
Judges have wide discretionary power in contempt proceedings in relation to the sanction 
to be imposed. In eleven of the twelve contempt cases arising from labour injunctions
47. See Express & Star v NGA [1985] IRLR 222 (CA). See also P&O European 
Ferries fDoverl Ltd v NUS July 6 1988 cited in Auerbach 1988, 236. Similar issues had 
arisen during the Wapping dispute. See Messenger Group Newspapers v NGA 14 
October, 17 and 25 November 1983 [1984] ICR 345. The company successfully pursued 
a claim for damages in Messenger Group Newspapers Ltd v NGA [1984] IRLR 397.
48. See O’Regan 1991, 385. This is a complex area of law and this section relies 
heavily on the work of O’Regan. See also Wedderbum on the Ready Mixed Concrete 
case in ’Contempt of Court: vicarious liability of companies and unions’ Industrial Law 
Journal 1992, 21(1) 51.
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since 1974, fines were the initial sanction. The highest fine against an individual 
defendant was £110,00049, against a union it was £525,OOO50. Sequestration is a remedy 
of last resort in contempt cases. This took place in four disputes51. The evidence was 
that sequestration could impose particularly draconian restrictions on trade union (as well 
as third party) freedom of action in disputes. The costs to the unions concerned were 
considerable: an estimated £2 million in the case of the NGA in the 1983 Stockport 
Messenger dispute. It also proved difficult for trade unions to have sequestration orders 
lifted. In the case of the NUM this took well over a year after the coal dispute of 1985- 
85 ended. In this dispute, the full range of legal sanctions was invoked against the union 
and some of the area unions (Ewing 1985).
3.3 Judicial interpretation of the balloting requirement
Research on the recorded labour injunction cases over two periods in the 1980s showed 
that after 1984 the majority related to balloting52. There was a change in emphasis from 
the early 1980s when more applications from employers related to unballoted action and 
later cases in which the technicalities of the ballot held were under scrutiny. These cases 
amply demonstrated that the 1984 Act had not established precise limits to (i) the need 
for a ballot and (ii) the requirements for a valid ballot in disputes. Based on the case law 
of the 1980s and early 1990s, this section explores the role of the courts in setting the
49. Mirror Group Newspapers v Harrison 7 November 1986.
50. Messenger Group Newspapers v NGA [1984] IRLR 397. The total fines levied 
in this dispute amounted to £675,000.
51. NGA in a dispute with the Stockport Messenger 1983; NUM and South Wales 
Area NUM in 1984 in the coal dispute of 1984-1985; SOGAT as a result of the Wapping 
dispute in 1986; and the NUS in 1988. See O’Regan 1991, especially 402-403.
52. See Evans 1985, 133-137; and Evans 1987, 419-435.
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limits of lawful conduct in relation to industrial action balloting.
(i) The need for a ballot
The balloting requirement in the Trade Union Act of 1984 established a wide but 
circumscribed area of liability for trade unions. Interpretation by the courts of the 
parameters of the balloting requirement centred on two main issues. Firstly whether the 
action was in breach of workers’ contracts of employment. In Solihull MBC v NUT53, 
the NUT unsuccessfully argued that its call for members to refuse to cover for absent 
teachers and not to take part in lunchtime or after school activities was not in breach of 
their contracts of employment. These were interlocutory proceedings and it was sufficient 
for the judge to hold that there was a serious issue to be tried that some of these duties 
were contractual for the NUT to lose its case54.
The second limitation on the balloting requirement in 1984 was that it applied only to 
’official’ industrial action. Interpretation centred, therefore on the definition of ’an act 
done by a union’ without the support of a ballot. Much was made in debate at the time 
of the 1984 Bill, for example in the House of Commons second reading, that unofficial 
action was outside the scope of the provisions. This was true of unofficial action not 
’done by a union’, but as the Heaton’s Transport case showed, the popular label 
’unofficial’ was not necessarily reflected in what the law would regard as acts for which 
a union was not responsible. Litigation arising from a dispute at Austin Rover in late 
1984 raised the issue of when a union could be liable for the acts of joint union
53. Solihull MBC v NUT U9851 IRLR 211.214.
54. The Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Act (1987) would make this argument 
impossible now in the case of teachers. More broadly, the law was changed in 1990 to 
include industrial action which did not involve a breach of contract. See above p.77.
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committees without resolving it55.
It was in response to widespread unofficial industrial action on the London Underground 
in 1989 that the Government extended the range of circumstances in which a union would 
be legally responsible for industrial action. There was evidence that LUL had taken 
extensive legal advice relating to the liability of ASLEF for unofficial action by drivers, 
although this did not become an issue in the courts. The 1990 Act restricted the scope 
for trade unions to dissociate themselves from unballoted industrial action by making them 
responsible, inter alia, for the acts of wholly unofficial groups which included an official 
of the union. As a result of this change in the law and the uncertainty surrounding the 
issue of who was (and when they were) acting on the authority of the union, unions were 
encouraged to look very carefully at, and to tighten up, their practices for authorising 
industrial action (see further below).
(ii) Requirements for a valid ballot
Whilst it is clear that since 1984 unions have generally undertaken to ballot members 
before industrial action, what is not clear is that the ballots held have necessarily complied 
with legal requirements, which have become more complex with each new piece of 
legislation. Issues in the courts have related to four main areas: the wording on the ballot 
paper, the balloting constituency, time limits on the start of industrial action following a 
successful ballot, and those bodies and individuals with the authority to call for industrial 
action.
Ballot paper wording: the wording that was required to appear on the ballot paper gave 
rise to some litigation. In 1984 it appeared to be sufficient for unions to ask a single
55. Injunctions were obtained against six of the eight unions. Proceedings against the 
EETPU were dropped after it announced it would hold a ballot, while the AUEW(E) 
successfully argued that it had done nothing unlawful. See Hutton 1985.
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question covering both strike action and action short of a strike so long as this invited a 
simple yes or no answer from members on the question of whether they were prepared 
to participate in a strike or other industrial action which would involve them in breach of 
their employment contracts. In 1988, as part of the process of tightening up the balloting 
requirements, the law introduced separate questions to be asked. A UCW ballot held in 
August 1988 inadvertently breached these requirements which had come into effect in 
July. More intractable issues about the precise wording on the ballot paper - what should 
and should not be included - and the content of accompanying information came before 
the courts in the Blue Circle v. TGWU case56 and arose again in 1995 in a case involving 
a ballot of ASLEF members in London Underground57. In the Blue Circle case the judge 
held that the extent of immunity conferred by a ballot was limited by reference both to 
what was stated on the ballot paper and in the accompanying literature - in this instance 
one 24 hour strike per week. In the same year, the wording on circulars accompanying 
the ballot paper was an issue in the case of London Underground v. NUR/LUL")58. An 
injunction was granted to the company restraining strike action on the grounds that only 
one of the issues identified in the circulars sent out by the union with ballot papers clearly 
fell within the definition of a trade dispute59. By contrast in Associated British Ports v.
56. 7 July 1989 (unreported). See Simpson 1989, 234, 235.
57. It was reported that LUL succeeded in obtaining an injunction which restrained 
ASLEF from proceeding with a call for a 24 hour strike on the grounds that the ballot, 
in which a majority of ASLEF members had voted for industrial action, sought support 
for strike action to secure an improved pay offer from LUL, and that before the strike was 
called, LUL had made a small improvement in the offer.
58. [1989] IRLR 341.
59. This was held not to satisfy section 10(3)(a), thus the validity of the ballot was 
linked to the requirement for the union to show that it was acting in contemplation or 
furtherance (ICFTD) of a trade dispute. Arguably, however, these were two separate 
issues.
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T G W U 60 the j udg e  held  tha t  the only ev idence  r equ i r e d  
for a valid ballot was that the strike called was the strike voted for.
Further potential difficulties were posed for trade unions in relation to the wording of the 
ballot paper - especially in the case of protracted or complex disputes - by the decision 
in Newham LBC v. NALGO61. The Court of Appeal accepted the argument that if the 
situation arose in which there ceased to be a dispute over the issues identified on the 
ballot paper, but the industrial action continued, this could not be action supported by a 
valid ballot; although on the facts of this case the dispute was considered to be still ’live’. 
Woolf LJ. argued that the approach adopted by the court should in general be that so long 
as one party honestly and genuinely believed that the dispute continued, this was 
sufficient. Woolf LJ stated clearly, however, that:
The legislation requires the appropriate questions to be identified in the 
ballot paper: section 11 of the Act of 1984. If there has ceased to be a 
dispute over those questions but the industrial action continues, then the 
subsequent industrial action cannot be action that is supported by the 
ballot.
This, it has been argued, was ’misleading to the extent that it suggests that a ballot paper 
necessarily identifies the issues in dispute’ (Simpson 1993). There is evidence that 
following the Blue Circle case, unions have often confined the wording on ballot papers 
to the minimum required by legislation. They have either sent no accompanying 
information or phrased this in very broad terms62.
Balloting constituencies: this has been a particularly complex area of the law. In case law
60. Associated British Ports Ltd v TGWU [1989] IRLR 29.
61. Newham LBC v NALGO [1993] ICR 189,198.
62. The judge in the Blue Circle case agreed that other statements by the union would 
not similarly restrict the immunity conferred by the ballot.
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there were two main avenues for employers to challenge the validity of a union’s decision 
over the balloting constituency. The first was whether there should be separate place of 
work ballots. Following the 1988 Act there was a presumption in the law that separate 
place of work ballots would be held. In 1989 during the engineering hours dispute, BAe 
failed in its challenge to an MSF ballot at its Preston factory. Interestingly, the company 
sought to argue that the union could not disaggregate the votes for different occupational 
groups, which separately gave a majority for industrial action in one group, but overall 
represented a vote against63.
Following the change in the law in 1988 the normal requirement was for unions to 
conduct separate ballots at each place of work and to treat each of the results 
independently. A ballot might, however, cover more than one place of work where all 
the members balloted were linked by a ’common factor’ (section 228). In University of 
Central England v NALGO64 it was held that this common factor exception permitted a 
union to hold a single ballot of members covered by the same bargaining arrangements 
but employed by different employers. The University of Central England failed in its 
argument that NALGO could not lawfully hold a single ballot of members who were 
employed by colleges affiliated to the Polytechnics and Colleges Employers’ Forum which 
negotiated terms and conditions for administrative staff with NALGO.
Secondly, employers have challenged the validity of balloting constituencies on the 
grounds of changes in union membership between the date of the ballot and industrial 
action. In the Post Office v UCW case (1990) before the Court of Appeal, which related 
to a programme of industrial action following a ballot in August 1988, the employers 
sought to argue that a change in the workforce of some 30% by January 1990 meant that
63. See Financial Times 27, 28 and 31 October 1989.
64. University of Central England v NALGO \19931 IRLR 81. The Polytechnics and 
Colleges Employers’ Forum (PCEF) was arguing, in effect, that disaggregation of the 
results was always required.
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the ballot was no longer valid. This was rejected by the court, on the basis that section 
11(1) only required that those members at the time of the ballot whom the union 
reasonably believed would be called upon to take industrial action should be accorded 
entitlement to vote. Lord Donaldson did suggest, however, that it would seem to follow 
that only those employed by the employer and given an opportunity of voting at the time 
of the ballot should be called upon to take action, subject to de minimis changes in the 
workforce65. This was to argue that a union could not claim immunity for calling 
industrial action by members who at the time of the ballot were not employees of the 
employer party to the dispute. The key issue related to entitlement to vote in section 11 
of the 1984 Act, which invalidated a ballot if a person was denied entitlement to vote and 
was a member of the union at the time of the ballot (s. 11 (2)). It has been argued that 
Lord Donaldson’s obiter dicta, therefore, misconstrued the provisions of section 11. The 
question of whether individuals had been given an opportunity to vote was a separate 
matter covered by s. 11 (6) (Auerbach 1990, 122). A decision of the Court of Appeal in 
1995 in the London Underground case66 confirmed that a union was not required to 
restrict its call for industrial action to those members who were members at the time of 
the ballot and given an opportunity to vote in it.
The distinction in law between the entitlement of members to vote which is unqualified 
(section 11(1) Trade Union Act 1984) and the qualified obligation on a union (section 
ll(6)(a)) to ’so far as is reasonably practicable’ make available or supply ballot papers 
to those entitled to vote was central to the case of British Railways Board v NUR (BR)67 
(1989). British Rail failed in its attempt to challenge a ballot on the grounds that a 
number of members had not received ballot papers. It was held that there was a 
’profound difference’ between the situation in which a small number of members (said
65. Post Office v UCW [1990] ICR 258. This was technically obiter.
66. London Underground Ltd v National Union of Rail. Maritime and Transport 
Workers [1996] ICR 170 CA.
67. British Railways Board v NUR [1989] ICR 678.
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to be 200 in a ballot in which some 64,000 ballot papers were issued) inadvertently did 
not have ballot papers supplied or made available to them, and denying someone the 
entitlement to vote. The small numbers involved were said to be insufficient to amount 
to a breach of either section 11(1) or section 11(6). The union, therefore, won this case:
But the case still points up the existence of an avenue for challenge to 
ballots through the labour injunction proceedings. Because of the 
imprecise nature of the obligations imposed, s. 11 provides others...Legal 
challenges to the validity of strike ballots are therefore likely to continue 
(Simpson 1989, 234).
Time limitations: a further balloting issue which was subject to judicial interpretation was 
the maximum time allowed to lapse between the ballot and industrial action taking place. 
In 1984 a four week time limit was imposed on the validity of a ballot68. Up to 1990 this 
meant that the act of inducing workers to break their contracts of employment had to take 
place within this four week period. The Scottish prison service sought to argue that this 
condition was not satisfied where, in order to keep the ballot mandate alive, the POA 
instructed branches to take action short of a strike in the form of holding meetings without 
permission, but not all branches followed this instruction. In Secretary of State v Scottish 
Prison Officers Association69 the court rejected the employers’ submission. In the judge’s 
view the legislation did not require the relevant act of inducement to be successful.
The courts have also drawn a distinction between negotiating situations in which industrial 
action was suspended and was subsequently resumed without the need for a further ballot 
and, on the other hand, the cessation of industrial action and its reintroduction at a later 
date, albeit in the same campaign of action, when a second ballot would be needed. In 
Monsanto v TGWU70 the Court held that no further ballot was required where industrial
68. For the limited exceptions introduced in the 1990 Act see above p.80.
69. Secretary of State v Scottish POA [1991] IRLR 371.
70. Monsanto v TGWU [1987] ICR 269 CA.
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action was suspended for 14 days to enable negotiations to take place. In the Post Office 
v UCW71. by contrast, although the dispute referred to in the ballot was still continuing, 
action resumed in autumn 1989 after a gap since December 1988 was held not to be 
protected by the original ballot in August 1988 and a fresh ballot was required. One 
reason for the distinction drawn between the two cases was the difference in the time that 
had elapsed in the respective cases between the cessation and resumption of industrial 
action. In the Post Office case, Lord Donaldson suggested that, in line with section 
10(3)(c) which imposed a four week time limit on calling industrial action, to be protected 
by a valid ballot, action once started ’shall continue without substantial interruption’. The 
second distinction drawn by the Court of Appeal in the Post Office case was between 
resumed industrial action anticipated at the time it was suspended and a new programme 
of industrial action not previously contemplated. Section 10(3) of the 1984 Act provided 
that a ballot must have been held ’in respect of the strike or other industrial action’. This 
requirement was held not to have been fulfilled in the Post Office case, even though the 
dispute was continuing, a decision which could raise particular difficulties for unions in 
disputes involving action short of an all-out strike of an intermittent nature. The Post 
Office case indicated that for a ballot to be valid, the union would need to have balloted 
on specific action and that it might not be lawful for a union to envisage this developing 
in the course of a campaign on the basis of a single ballot72.
Call for industrial action: the conduct of disputes was further complicated by section 7 of 
the 1990 Act, which required that there must have been no call for industrial action by 
the union before the ballot. This raised the issue of the freedom of a union to campaign 
for a yes vote in a ballot, which came before the Court of Appeal for consideration in
71. [1990] ICR 258 CA.
72. Auerbach 1990,124. Following the 1993 Act unions are required to give advance 
notice of the days of discontinuous industrial action. It is not yet clear whether this 
requires all days to be notified before the first of them. This would be the most 
restrictive interpretation of the law.
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Newham LBC v NALGO73. NALGO balloted its members in a dispute over redundancies 
affecting members in all departments and the council’s threat to dismiss members in the 
poll tax section who were already taking industrial action in protest over three officers in 
the section being made redundant. Before the ballot a letter was sent to all members 
emphasising the importance of a ’yes’ vote. This was challenged by the employer, but 
was found not to be in breach of the requirement that there must have been no call by the 
union for industrial action before the ballot. The Council also failed in its further 
argument that because NALGO included in the ballot members who were already on 
strike, the ballot was by definition in breach of this requirement. In the judgement of 
Woolf LJ, it was said that to accept the argument made on behalf of the council would 
mean that ’in a situation such as this the union would be required to call off all existing 
action before it held a ballot as to its proposed action’. The judge accepted the argument 
on behalf of NALGO that this was not what was intended by section 7 of the 1990 Act.
The 1990 Act required that, following a ballot showing a majority for industrial action, 
the action was called by a specified person, who was the person specified on the ballot 
paper as authorised to call on union members to take part or to continue to take part in 
industrial action. In Tanks and Drums v TGWU74 the TGWU successfully argued that this 
allowed negotiators to go into a negotiating meeting with the prior authorisation of the 
General Secretary to call for industrial action if they were unable to negotiate a successful 
agreement. In the Court of Appeal, on refusing the employer’s appeal against the 
discharge of an interlocutory injunction, Neill LJ said:
It seems to me that in the field of industrial relations it would be 
impracticable to leave matters in such a way that there was no possibility 
for the exercise of judgement on the ground. Some matters must be left for 
the judgement of those on the ground who have to decide how and when
73. Newham LBC v NALGO [1993] ICR 189, 198.
74. Tanks and Drums v TGWU [1992]ICR 1.
97
as a matter of common sense the call for action is to be put into operation.
Uncertainty has continued to surround the concept of ’calling for’ a strike (Wynne-Evans 
1991). It has been argued that whilst an unspecified official could be given limited 
discretion governed by the decision in principle of the specified official, this would shade 
into the situation where the specified official was actually deemed not to be calling for 
the industrial action. The Government argued that the 1990 Act would create greater 
certainty by broadening the definition of ’official’ industrial action and encouraging 
unions to tighten up their control over this action. The uncertainty over when a specified 
official has ’called’ for industrial action, however:
detracts from the certainty of the Act by providing generalized principles 
and individualized decisions and may reinforce the feeling that the Act’s 
technicality can only be a spur to litigation and legalistic obstruction of 
unions (Wynne-Evans 1991, 296).
It has also been suggested that one practical effect of the provisions in the 1993 Act, 
which required unions to give employers seven days notice of industrial action, could be 
that employers would insist that union officials referred back to the specified person on 
the ballot paper, although this is not in fact required in law, before the seven days notice 
of industrial action was given (Simpson 1993).
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter has provided an account of developments in the laws relating to balloting in 
the 1980s. This has shown the increasing technical complexity of the legislative 
requirements, relating both to the need to ballot in defined circumstances and the 
requirements for a valid ballot. The legal mechanisms for enforcing the balloting 
provisions have relied on the labour injunction procedures. Where they have been 
invoked by employers, these have imposed considerable restrictions on trade unions’
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ability to continue to conduct a dispute effectively.
Case law has reflected the increasingly complex and restrictive nature of the balloting 
laws, in relation to the wording on the ballot paper, balloting constituencies, time 
limitations, and the call for industrial action, which now includes a series of notice 
requirements. The courts, however, have in general displayed a limited willingness, in 
response to some highly technical applications from employers, to add further to the 
already extensive requirements placed on the organisers of industrial action by the 1980s 
balloting legislation.
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CHAPTER 4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT POLICY 
ON BALLOTS IN THE 1980s
4.1 Introduction
This chapter looks at the development of Government policy on industrial action ballots 
in the 1980s. It briefly reviews the debate about the ideological origins of the legislation, 
provides an analysis of policy documents relating to ballots and the encouragement given 
by Government to employers to make use of the law.
There is no doubt that the 1980s saw a fundamental change in industrial relations law. 
Balloting was a key element of Government thinking on changes in the law and, as such, 
a central part of the broader programme of reform. One debate about the legislation of 
the 1980s has been whether it was essentially a pragmatic response to industrial relations 
problems - this is not to say that it was without strategic objectives - or one part of a 
broader ideological approach to restructuring the labour market and the economy, which 
included the vision of a labour market freed from the constraints of trade union power. 
On the one hand Wedderbum has argued that Conservative governments had a number 
of key objectives which could be achieved in part through legislation. These included 
inhibiting collective organisation of workers - what Wedderbum refers to as ’destabilising 
collectivism’ - and more specifically restricting trade union activity to individual 
workplaces. Both objectives could be seen to have informed the balloting legislation and, 
in particular, to have characterised the 1988 provisions. Writing in 1989, Wedderbum 
commented:
This insistence that so-called individual rights must always prevail, and be 
made by the state to prevail, against the association or group - and in 
particular against the union - is the latest marker clearly to characterise the
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new British labour law1.
This argument was given weight by Government assertions that changes in the law had 
been necessary to achieve rises in productivity and greater labour market competition 
(Department of Employment 1989a, para 1.1). Such assertions, which had a clear 
ideological bias, were criticised by some commentators for the absence of a factual 
justification2.
Others, including Auerbach (Auerbach 1990; Hendy 1993), have argued that the 
legislative programme had more pragmatic origins and purposes as it gradually unfolded, 
although accepting that the Government was acting within a broad ideological framework. 
The balloting legislation could not be seen to reflect in any simple way the thinking of 
the ’New Right’. In Striking Out Strikes. Hanson and Mather argued that ballots only 
served to give a spurious legitimacy to industrial action (Hanson and Mather 1988). The 
development of Government policy was clearly a complex process. Unlike in 1970, the 
Government did not come to power in 1979 with a predetermined policy and programme 
of legislation. This evolved more gradually as a result of internal debates within the party 
(Fosh et al. 1993). The replacement in 1982 of James Prior by Norman Tebbit as 
Secretary of State for Employment was widely seen as a significant turning point. It 
could also be argued that in adopting a step by step approach, the Government was 
reacting to the decline in trade union power as well as contributing to it (Disney 1990).
Whilst the debate about Conservative Party ideology could overstate the anti-thesis
\  Wedderbum 1991, 218. See also Mcllroy 1991.
2. See Brown 1989 on the misguided Government belief that fragmentation of 
bargaining was a means to greater labour market competition. See also Brown and 
Wadwhani 1990; Dunn and Metcalf 1994.
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between acting pragmatically and ideologically, it highlights the range of possible 
objectives attached to balloting as an instrument of wider economic and social policy. 
There were some apparent contradictions in the thinking behind Government policy on 
ballots, which seemed to aim to give additional powers both to members and leaders of 
trade unions. Was the Government, in fact seeking to empower national leaders and 
members over shop stewards? Dunn and Metcalf have argued:
If legal responsibilities make the national leadership more cautious at the 
same time as its authority is strengthened by popular support, then the 
active minority, the stewards and other lay volunteers, who have 
traditionally given British trade unionism some radical energy, are likely 
to find themselves sandwiched and sandbagged (Dunn and Metcalf 1994).
If this Government intentions in 1984, did balloting policy change over time in 
recognition of the difficulties of achieving these policy goals?
4.2 Balloting legislation: ideology or pragmatism
The policy goals that have informed the various strike ballot proposals up to and including 
those of the 1980s have not always been clearly articulated. It is apparent, however, that 
historically one of the expectations of those who favoured strike ballots was that they 
would reduce the incidence of industrial action. In broad terms, it was anticipated that 
this would be achieved by restraining the influence of ’militant’ leaders by improving 
trade union ’democracy’ and making decisions more representative of members’ views 
(Department of Employment and Productivity 1969). Strike ballots could, however, also 
be seen to reinforce the position of trade union officers over unofficial leaders and 
workgroups. The desire to restrain ’militant’ trade union leaderships while at the same 
time requiring the same leaders to exert greater control over unofficial industrial action 
were not necessarily compatible, but both were consistent with a general concern to 
maximise individual members’ rights. Not surprisingly, given unprecedented levels of
102
industrial action in the 1970s, Conservative governments of the 1980s shared the 
overriding policy goal of seeking to reduce industrial action. The ’militant 
leadership/moderate membership’ argument appeared to be most influential in 
Conservative thinking leading up to the 1984 Act.
A feature of earlier policy proposals on strike ballots was that they formed part of 
emergency provisions to deal with industrial action in circumstances of a national 
emergency. This gave strike ballots a specific and limited purpose as in the Industrial 
Relations Act of 1971. Conservative governments of the 1980s were to shy away from 
any form of emergency procedures, including strike ballots, for two main reasons. Firstly, 
there was doubt that the emergency procedures, including strike ballots, could achieve 
their objectives. On the only occasion that a ballot was held under the emergency 
procedures of the Industrial Relations Act, it resulted in an overwhelming majority in 
favour of industrial action3.
Secondly, Conservative governments were reluctant to become directly involved in the 
enforcement mechanisms of the legislation. This approach meant that Conservative 
governments were also reluctant to legislate on strikes in essential services. Whilst strikes 
in essential services - and in the public sector more broadly - were of central concern to 
the 1979 Government, it resisted pressure to legislate directly on this issue4. Trade Union 
Immunities (Department of Employment 1981) raised the possibility of proposals for 
legislating to restrict strikes in essential services, but without ever appearing to have the 
conviction that this was an effective approach in practice (paras 333,337). This reflected, 
in part, a reluctance to establish pay review mechanisms. Debates leading up to the 1984
3. On the Industrial Relations Act see Weekes et al. 1975.
4. The Conservatives had undertaken to consult on legislating on strikes in essential 
services in the 1979 election manifesto and regularly made a similar commitment on other 
occasions up to and including 1996.
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Act confirmed that industrial action balloting legislation was seen as one way of way of 
dealing with threat of the strike weapon in major public sector disputes5. This was always 
with the proviso that enforcement would be in the hands of employers. A reluctance to 
become directly involved was characteristic of the Government’s approach to the 
legislative programme in general and strike ballots in particular6. In 1984 the decision 
to introduce mandatory ballots before all official industrial action and to place the 
enforcement mechanisms in the hands of employers was implemented, despite the serious 
reservations expressed by some employers’ organisations (Ewing 1986).
In many respects the 1984 Trade Union Act represented a new departure in policies on 
industrial action balloting. As noted above, both Conservative and Labour governments 
since the 1960s had begun to look for measures to control the disruptive potential of 
industrial action by imposing a tighter framework of regulation on trade union practices 
and procedures. There had not been widespread support, however, for using industrial 
action ballots to achieve this. After 1984 the principle of requiring trade unions to hold 
a secret ballot of members before industrial action, appeared to be fairly quickly accepted, 
not only by employers but also trade unions. Debate was fuelled, however, by the 
development of an increasingly restrictive legal framework for ballots throughout the 
1980s. Critics argued that whilst the law could legitimately have a role in contributing 
to the reform of industrial relations, the balloting legislation increasingly overstepped the 
parameters of reform and became a vehicle for restricting and controlling the legitimate 
activities of trade unions in the sphere of industrial action (Fredman 1992). While both 
strands of policy were apparent in balloting legislation since 1980, the emphasis on reform
5. See the House of Lords debate on the Green Paper Democracy in Trade Unions 
(Department of Employment 1983) House of Lords Debates Volume 4, cols 727-797 16 
March 1983, especially 730.
6. See Auerbach 1990, chapter 5. The Government came under pressure in particular 
from the small business lobby to assist employers in enforcing the law. This was resisted.
104
was steadily replaced later in the 1980s by a policy which was more overtly restrictive 
in intent. The commitment of Conservative governments to promote individual rights was 
particularly controversial7, because it appeared to be at the expense of collective rights and 
was seen to reflect the development and growing influence on Government policies of a 
traditional Conservative ideology. The Government’s rationale for strike ballots often 
placed more emphasis on the need to protect individuals who took part in industrial 
action, rather than the intrinsic value of ballots per se.
In taking a more positive view of the benefits of strike ballots than previous 
administrations, Conservative governments, therefore, imported into the arguments more 
of an ideological element. It was in part as a result of this ideological perspective that 
Conservative proposals for strike ballots have often seemed to take it for granted that the 
reasons for introducing ballots, both for trade union elections and industrial action, were 
too obvious to require stating let alone arguing in any detailed way. From the perspective 
of the Right of the political spectrum strike ballots were seen as a quid pro quo for trade 
union ’privileges’. The influence of this approach was clearly reflected in Government 
publications and policy statements such as Democracy in Trade Unions (Department of 
Employment 1983). The existence of TULRA section 13 immunities, the absence of any 
tight regulation of the internal affairs of trade unions and even the non-enforceability of 
collective agreements were seen to place trade unions in a position which was ’above the 
law’ and required special regulation. This was repeatedly stressed in parliament in 
debates8 even though trade unions had recently lost complete immunity from civil liability
7. Although it should be noted that the Government’s decision in 1984 to place the 
enforcement mechanisms for the balloting requirement in the hands of employers appeared 
to be at odds with this policy objective.
8. See the House of Lords debate on the Green Paper Democracy in Trade Unions 
(Department of Employment 1983) House of Lords Debates Volume 4, cols 727-797 16 
March 1983, especially 765.
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in tort and the narrowing of the application of the immunities for organising industrial 
action had excluded most forms of secondary action, secondary picketing and action in 
support of union only and recognition only practices. The special privileges argument 
characterised the thinking of Hayek which, it has been argued, had an increasing influence 
on government policy during the Thatcher administrations (Wedderbum 1991).
Conservative governments’ policies on industrial action balloting could be seen to have 
a significant ideological element in another important respect. As balloting policy 
developed over the 1980s, it could be argued that an underlying (and not entirely 
unspoken) goal of mandatory strike ballots was that they formed one plank - or one step - 
of a policy of undermining rather than reinforcing the authority of trade unions in the 
workplace and hence further reducing trade union power. The introduction of ballots 
could, therefore, be seen to dovetail with wider policy objectives which consistently led 
to an attack on industrial relations policies based on joint regulation, in order to free the 
labour market from unnecessary restrictions. The key to the success of this policy 
objective was for ballots to produce votes against industrial action. The gradual 
tightening up of the legislation, in response to evidence that by and large members were 
voting in favour of industrial action, was consistent with this view of a broader 
ideological element to Government policy.
The evolution of Government thinking on industrial action ballots had taken place 
alongside a development in its approach to changes in industrial conflict law more 
generally. This at first focused on dealing with so-called abuses of union power rather 
than on pursuing broader policy objectives. While the 1979 Government,therefore, initially 
approached the idea of mandatory ballots before industrial action with some caution and 
recognised the dangers inherent in its balloting policy, concern to encourage unions to use 
ballots, and specifically postal ballots, was already at the top of the Government’s agenda 
for reform. In July 1979 the Government published three working papers. These covered 
picketing, the closed shop and funding for ballots (Lewis and Simpson 1981). A scheme 
to provide public funding for certain postal ballots was introduced in the Employment Act
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1980. Subsequent developments in the policy on balloting can be traced through a series 
of Green Papers during the 1980s.
4.3 Development of policy on industrial action ballots in the 1980s
In the introduction to Trade Union Immunities, which was the first of the Green Papers 
on labour law reform of the 1980s, the Government set out a broad agenda for reform:
For at least a generation now our industrial relations have failed us because 
they have inhibited improvements in productivity, acted as a disincentive 
to investment and discouraged innovation. The results are apparent in our 
poor industrial performance and lower standard of living compared with 
our major competitors overseas (para 1).
And, more specifically, it was argued that:
The readiness to threaten industrial action has imposed serious obstacles to 
necessary change, greater efficiency and improved performance in many 
of our industries. As a result our ability to compete in home and overseas 
markets has seriously declined (para 4).
By the 1980s the debate had moved away from some of the proposals for reforming 
industrial relations which had been prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s (Donovan 1968). 
This was particularly true of proposals for the legal enforceability of collective 
agreements. As Trade Union Immunities commented:
If both employers and trade union negotiators had accepted that it was in 
their interests to conclude legally binding agreements they could have done 
so at any time in the last 100 years. They have hardly ever done so (para 
239).
It was not immediately apparent, however, that an important shift had taken place. Trade
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Union Immunities was a discursive, wide ranging document in which many options for 
the role of the law in the reform of industrial relations were considered. Whilst industrial 
action balloting was considered, Trade Union Immunities did not promote the idea of 
strike ballots. Some of the more general themes, however, which later underlay the 
balloting legislation were already apparent.
The first of these themes was that unions’ ’freedom’ to strike should be used ’responsibly’ 
and that measures needed to be taken to prevent unofficial and unconstitutional industrial 
action:
Many strikes effectively repudiate agreements made by those organising 
them or by their representatives and the vast majority are called without 
reference to senior trade union officials and without their endorsement 
(para 4)9.
The Green Paper went on to argue that ’trade unions have too few obligations and too 
much power’ and that there was a growing public concern over the impact of ’unregulated 
industrial action’:
It has brought into focus the issue of the role of the law in restraining 
excesses and abuses of industrial power and it has led to renewed 
questioning of the legal framework within which employers and unions 
operate (para 12).
Whilst Trade Union Immunities expressed concern about ’trade union power’ without ever 
clearly defining this, it did recognise that any proposals for legislation would need to 
address the reality of shopfloor bargaining and ’current propensity for unofficial action’ 
(para 13). Trade Union Immunities went on to argue that an increase in formal plant 
level bargaining had not led to improved procedures and a decline in industrial conflict
9. Para 15 reported that some 90% of strikes were unofficial.
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in the way that Donovan had envisaged (para 16). As such, the Green Paper was setting 
the scene for a wider debate about the role of the law in shifting the locus of power 
within trade unions: between national officers, executive committees, shop stewards and 
members.
A second theme of Trade Union Immunities, which was to become key to legislative 
developments in the 1980s, was the protection of individual trade union members:
If trade unions are to restore their authority and regain or sustain the 
confidence of their members they must be fully democratic both in the way 
they take critical decisions and in the method of electing their officials 
(para 20).
Trade Union Immunities argued that the practice within unions of holding secret ballots 
on industrial action (and elections and pay offers) was still very far from being general 
and that progress in extending the use of balloting had been slow (para 245). It was 
suggested that ’too often in recent years’ strikes had been called ’without proper 
consultation’ with union members and sometimes against their express wishes (para 246).
A number of questions remained unanswered, including the potential conflict between 
concerns to address the issue of unofficial action on the one hand and, on the other, to 
enhance the rights of individual members (Hutton 1985). Proposals founded on a concept 
of enhancing trade union democracy also raised a priori questions about the appropriate 
standards and criteria for judging trade union democracy. At what level would decisions 
be taken? Would a ’democratic’ trade union in fact best serve the needs of its members? 
Industrial action ballots were seen by Trade Union Immunities to be a natural extension 
of ballots for the election of trade union officers. If, however, trade union officers were 
democratically elected, it could be argued that it was inconsistent with the objective of 
promoting democracy within trade unions to circumscribe their authority to organise 
industrial action.
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The Green Paper outlined two main approaches to industrial action ballots, the objectives 
and underlying justification for which were very similar:
[The approaches] share a strong belief that, in a matter of such importance 
to an employee’s livelihood as a strike, it is right that he should have the 
opportunity of registering his view on the issue in a secret ballot (para 
253).
The first was to make statutory provision for ballots to be ’triggered’ by union members. 
The proposals reflected calls from Conservative backbenchers during debates on the 1980 
Employment Bill for the introduction of a legal mechanism whereby strike ballots could 
be triggered by a demand from trade union members10. The second approach was to rely 
on encouraging ballots in a non-mandatory way. This had been the approach of section 
1 of the 1980 Employment Act which had made funds available to reimburse trade unions 
for the costs of certain postal ballots. The difference between the two approaches was 
said to be one of emphasis and practicability; between those who believed that the 
extension of the practice of balloting would only take place if established in law, as 
against those who believed that to impose a requirement on unions to hold ballots could 
inhibit the greater use of ballots as a normal union practice and undermine ’responsible’ 
union leaders who sought to make use of the funds under section 1 EA 1980 to move 
towards the wider use of ballots:
It could be claimed by unions that the government was seeking to interfere 
in their internal affairs, overriding their constitutions and rules which are 
themselves democratically determined (para 258).
Trade Union Immunities took into account the implacable opposition of the trade union
10. See summary in Trade Union Immunities para 252 of proposals put forward by 
Conservative backbenchers in the debates on the Employment Bill 1980.
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movement to previous compulsory strike ballot proposals11. It was argued that ’triggered’ 
ballots avoided some of these difficulties by placing enforcement in the hands of trade 
union members12. The Green Paper recognised, however, that the practical problems of 
legislating for ’triggered’ ballots were considerable (para 259). These were difficulties 
that had previously concerned public policy makers. They included determining when the 
threshold of members required to trigger the ballot had been crossed; deciding, in cases 
of uncertainty, who was to determine when a ballot should be held; and whether in the 
meantime industrial action would attract trade dispute immunities. It was also recognised 
that there would be particular difficulties where more than one union was involved. 
Where these issues could not be resolved, it might be necessary to involve an outside 
supervisory agency and then ’the expected advantage of this approach - that it did not 
intervene in the affairs of the trade union - would be lost’ (para 259).
Trade Union Immunities argued that the most difficult issue to resolve was the question 
of sanctions. This was presumed to be loss of immunities which led naturally to the 
question of the applicability of such provisions to unofficial action. As paragraph 260 
stated:
...perhaps the greatest problem posed by "triggered" ballots is whether they
should apply to unofficial industrial action.
If they did not apply to unofficial action, the Green Paper argued that ’a premium would 
be placed on irresponsible behaviour’. If they did, ’it might be possible for unofficial 
strike leaders to use the ballot procedure to secure respectability and recognition’. Overall,
n . The trade union movement was very hostile to the then Labour Government’s 
proposals contained in In Place of Strife (1969). See also Weekes et al. 1975, on the 
experience of the 1971 Industrial Relations Act.
12. Department of Employment 1981 para 256; see also para 318 on Taft-Hartley.
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therefore, while Trade Union Immunities was supportive of balloting as such, its tone did 
not appear to promote either the legislative requirement to ballot or legal regulation of 
industrial action ballots. The technical complexities associated with ’triggered’ strike 
ballots might help to explain why they were not taken up - despite their obvious initial 
attractions for a Government committed to enhancing the role of individual trade union 
members in decision making - in its 1982 labour legislation.
Whilst the tone of the Green Paper Democracy in Trade Unions (Department of 
Employment 1983) was not noticeably more enthusiastic about the requirement to ballot 
and cited a number of practical difficulties, there was a change of emphasis. It now 
seemed to be assumed that the case for ballots had been made and the need was to devise 
a scheme that would overcome these difficulties. The arguments were based on two 
themes similar to those in the earlier Green Paper. The first of these was to ensure the 
protection of the rights of individual union members vis a vis the union as a body and to 
ensure that union leaders were ’properly accountable’ to the members. The second theme 
related to the ’power’ of trade union leaders ’to initiate industrial action which could 
damage the economic and commercial interests of others’. This reflected a broader 
concern that trade unions should operate ’in a manner which commands public 
confidence’ (para 3).
Once again the primacy of the ’militant leadership/moderate membership’ argument is 
notable. There continued, however, to be a note of caution in the Government’s 
approach. The Government was concerned to ensure that, in legislating for strike ballots, 
this should avoid giving trade unions an unintended advantage in negotiations. There was 
a particular concern13 that if trade union members saw ballots as a vote of confidence in
13. See Lord Gowrie, Government spokesperson in the House of Lords in the House 
of Lords debate on the Green Paper Democracy in Trade Unions (Department of 
Employment 1983) House of Lords Debates Volume 4, cols 727-797 16 March 1983, 
especially 744.
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their leaders, this could result in ballots invariably producing votes favour of industrial 
action by large majorities. The Government did not respond, however, to arguments such 
as those of Lord McCarthy, the Opposition front bench spokesperson, that once a ballot 
had been held this could make it more difficult to settle a dispute.
The focus of the Government’s concern in relation to strike ballots was, therefore, to 
protect the interests of individual union members and the public. The need to regulate 
trade union behaviour was assumed to go unchallenged. The rationale for legislative 
proposals relied on the assertion that ’trade unions have refused the opportunity to reform 
themselves voluntarily’ (para 2). It should be noted that this assertion in itself confused 
two separate issues, which were, firstly, balloting per se and, secondly, the use of postal 
ballots.
Chapter 3 of the Green Paper, which was by far the shortest substantive chapter in 
Democracy in Trade Unions, detailed the proposals on industrial action balloting. It made 
the assumption that - as in the case of trade union elections - the case for industrial action 
ballots was simple and unanswerable. The chapter amplified and combined the two 
themes outlined in the introduction to the Green Paper. Industrial action ballots had a role 
in reducing the incidence of industrial action by giving a voice to ’responsible’ trade 
union members:
Society has a right to expect that the strike weapon will be used sparingly, 
responsibly and democratically. It is wholly unacceptable if this power is 
exercised irresponsibly or by leaders who are out of touch with their 
members’ views (para 56).
Democracy in Trade Unions was quite circumspect about the practical difficulties of 
implementing a requirement to ballot before industrial action. Like Trade Union 
Immunities, it recognised the problems of enforcing the balloting requirement in relation 
to small-scale unofficial stoppages, but equally the danger that to confine the requirement 
to official action could have the result of encouraging unofficial action. This reflected
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once again the difficulties inherent in a policy of putting more power into the hands of 
trade union members at the expense of allegedly militant stewards and officials, without 
undermining the power of trade union leaders to control unofficial action. This concern 
was reflected among Government supporters in the House of Lords debates on the Green 
Paper, Democracy in Trade Unions14. Democracy in Trade Unions also raised the 
question of overtime bans, go-slows and work-to-rule, concluding that ’it would be even 
more impractical to apply a balloting requirement to action short of a strike than to 
unofficial strikes’ (para 60).
The 1983 Green Paper commented that, in responses to the 1981 Trade Union Immunities. 
there had been a lack of enthusiasm for imposing mandatory ballots before industrial 
action. Fuller consideration was, therefore, given to more limited proposals which were 
said to have been the focus of public debate. These were ballots triggered by trade union 
members and ballots initiated by employers. Consideration was also given to the 
reintroduction of powers for the Secretary of State to order ballots to be held in certain 
defined emergency circumstances. Consistent with the Government’s unwillingness to be 
seen to play a direct role in industrial relations matters and in particular its aim to distance 
itself from the handling of disputes, this option was not favoured by the Green Paper. It 
is also notable that the Government was faced by evidence from both UK and US 
experience which showed that ballots in emergency situations by no means always led to 
a ’moderate’ vote by trade union members.
The proposal for ballots ’triggered’ by union members was seen to have a particular 
advantage:
If the demand for a ballot comes from within the union, it cannot so easily
be turned into a test of union solidarity or so easily be represented as an
14. See the House of Lords debate on the Green Paper Democracy in Trade Unions 
(Department of Employment 1983) House of Lords Debates Volume 4, cols 727-797 16 
March 1983, especially 786.
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"external interference" in union affairs (para 63).
This point was reinforced by the Government spokesperson in the Lords, Lord Gowrie, 
who said that the USA experience of the Taft Hartley Act showed that ballots held under 
the emergency provisions legislation tended to become a test of membership solidarity and 
so obscure the ’real’ issues15. In outlining the potential disadvantages of ’triggered 
ballots’ Democracy in Trade Unions echoed Trade Union Immunities. Practical 
difficulties were associated in particular with defining the constituency for the ballot once 
it had been triggered, which would have a crucial influence on the outcome of the vote. 
Questions were also raised about the percentage of members required to ’trigger’ the 
ballot, possible sanctions, the question on the ballot paper and who should decide on this, 
and whether there should be provision for more than one ballot to be held in protracted 
disputes. Furthermore, in the context of considering the case for member ’triggered’ 
ballots, the Green Paper did not discount the danger that the wording and timing of ballots 
could be turned to advantage by trade unions (para 66).
Consideration was also given in the Green Paper to ballots called at an employer’s 
initiative, conducted either by the employer or trade union(s). This was an approach that 
had not previously been canvassed in Trade Union Immunities. Whilst ballots ’triggered’ 
by employers were seen to have the advantage of reducing the risk of a trade union - or 
militants within the union in the case of weak leadership - using ballots tactically (para 
67), practical difficulties were seen to lie, as in the case of ballots triggered by union 
members, in defining the eligibility of those who should be included in the ballot. 
Moreover:
Whom should the ballot cover if the strike had not yet started but the
15. On the 1947 Taft Hartley Act emergency provisions see above chapter 2. It was 
recognised that the advantage of triggered ballots would be lost if it was necessary to 
appoint an external supervisory agency to ensure that ballots held by trade unions were 
conducted fairly and ’to check on abuse and manipulation’ (para 66).
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employer had been given notice that it would be called in the near future 
or if a strike were simply threatened? Would the trade union decide the 
questions to be asked? How would the problems of supervision be solved?
(para 68)
Remarkably, the Green Paper went on to suggest that an advantage of employer 
’triggered’ industrial action ballots conducted bv the employer would be to ensure that 
non-union members could be included. A further possibility canvassed was that funds 
should be made available for employers to hold strike ballots where unions had refused 
to ballot their members.
In the event neither of the two proposals was included in the provisions of the Trade 
Union Act 1984. It may be that the complexity of the issues involved persuaded the 
Government that a mandatory requirement for unions to hold a ballot before official 
industrial action was the only way of achieving the policy objective of promoting the use 
of ballots in relation to industrial action. As noted above, mandatory strike ballots, whilst 
not rejected as an option in Democracy in Trade Unions were acknowledged not to have 
attracted widespread support in response to the Government’s earlier Green Paper, Trade 
Union Immunities (1981). It has been suggested, therefore, that the provisions in the 
1984 Trade Union Bill were of recent, and perhaps hasty, consideration (Hutton 1985).
At the time of the 1984 Bill, Parts one and three, elections for trade union officials and 
political fund ballots, had far more prominence. The importance of the strike ballot 
provisions to the Government was evident, however, in that it pressed ahead despite ’the 
absence of consensus’ surrounding the proposals (ACAS 1985, chapter 1). Whilst 
Government and Ministerial policy statements between January 1983 and the time that the 
Bill was passed in July 1984 emphasised the importance of promoting trade union 
democracy, which was linked in public policy terms to requirements for union elections 
and political fund ballots, there was also a concern to give employers new rights in 
disputes. The mechanisms of the law on strike ballots bear out this policy objective.
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Thus, the Government did not address one of the key questions posed by critics, which 
was that if one of the principal purposes of the balloting legislation was to ’enfranchise’ 
individual union members, it could not be justified that no power was put in the hands 
of individuals to call for a ballot to be held; remedies depended on employers. This in 
fact changed with section 1(1) of the Employment Act 1988, which gave a broad right 
to individual union members to restrain unballoted industrial action. The choice of a right 
for individual members rather than ’triggered’ ballots did nothing to abate the controversy 
surrounding the enforcement provisions. Some commentators suggested that section 1 of 
the 1988 Act could be used by employers to gain advantage in the bargaining process by 
encouraging a single dissident union member to apply for an order under section 1 
(McKendrick 1988).
In the Green Paper, Trade Unions And Their Members (Department of Employment 
1987), the Government claimed ’profound and wide-ranging effects’ (para 1.2) from the 
changes already made in industrial relations law. By this time mandatory industrial action 
balloting had been in operation for over two years. Trade Unions and Their Members 
was able to place the law on strike ballots at the forefront of the perceived achievements 
of the Government’s policy of labour law reform since 1979. Workers now expected to 
be consulted and employers were said to be more willing to use the law. Paragraph 1.2 
continued:
Significantly, union members have on a number of occasions refused to be 
precipitated into industrial action contrary to their best interests and to their 
own better judgement.
A combination of pressures was seen to have been exerted on trade unions by both 
members and employers as a result of the industrial action balloting legislation, leading 
to a reduction in industrial action:
There is now a firm and widespread expectation amongst members that 
they will be consulted by secret ballot. Together with the willingness of
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employers to use the legal rights now available to them - which they have 
done in about a hundred cases - this is securing important and beneficial 
changes in our industrial relations system. The country as a whole has 
gained from the consequent avoidance of much unnecessary and damaging 
industrial action (para 1.2).
The Government did not respond to continuing concerns about the impact of industrial 
action ballots expressed by ACAS. In its Annual Report for 1985, for example, ACAS 
argued that industrial action ballots might give decision making within unions a greater 
validity and legitimacy, but could be an oversimple way of assessing membership opinion 
in a complex situation (ACAS 1986, 16). ACAS went on to argue that the involvement 
of the courts and use of legal processes was no substitute for discussion, consultation and 
negotiation (ACAS 1986, 22).
There was, however, an underlying feeling of dissatisfaction with the balloting legislation 
in Government circles. On analysis much of this dissatisfaction appeared to relate to the 
fact that, as ACAS commented in its 1985 Annual Report, trade union negotiators 
appeared to have accommodated ballots into their negotiating strategy and had often 
denied to Government its goal of securing ballots in which members voted against 
industrial action. The experience of the early years of the industrial action balloting 
legislation was that a majority of ballots were producing votes which supported industrial 
action16. The Government’s response, which was to increase the complexity of the 
legislation and the difficulties for trade unions in winning a ’yes’ vote, was consistent 
with an intention of using the law on ballots, as in the earliest proposals on strike ballots, 
to reduce the incidence of industrial action. As noted above there were, however, much 
wider implications to the policy of promoting ’no’ votes in ballots because these could 
clearly undermine trade union leaders’ authority and credibility in negotiations. Arguably, 
increasing the technical difficulties of balloting would do little in reality to increase the
16. See further below chapter 5.
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rights of trade union members and democracy in the workplace, which depended on the 
effective collective representation of workers, who individually did not have bargaining 
power vis a vis their employer. But increasing the number of ’lost’ ballots would have 
the potential to undermine the standing of trade union leaders, a trade union’s bargaining 
strength and thus its ability to maintain the support and allegiance of members.
The Government associated a number of practical difficulties with the implementation of 
the 1984 Act, which had prevented the balloting legislation from meeting its expectations. 
These were blamed in part on deficiencies in the 1984 Act, but also on examples of 
abuse. Trade unions were perceived to be exploiting loopholes in the legislation to their 
advantage. This related in particular to unions’ freedom under the original provisions to 
define the balloting constituency. This allegedly enabled union officials to create artificial 
constituencies to maximise the possibility of votes being in favour of industrial action 
(Wilkinson 1987).
In the 1987 Green Paper, Trade Unions and Their Members it was proposed that 
individual union members should be given the right to restrain a trade union from 
authorising or endorsing industrial action before a ballot had been held. Giving rights to 
individual members against their unions, which were not based on trade union rule book 
provisions, represented a further move away from the middle ground. In practical terms, 
giving this right to individuals, rather than relying on ballots ’triggered’ by a certain 
number of members was seen to avoid problems - such as ’undue delay’ (Department of 
Employment 1987, para 2.7). The Green Paper recommended that members should not 
be given a right to insist on a ballot being held because of the danger that this might 
interfere with the settlement of a dispute (para 2.8). The Government failed to answer 
criticisms that the enforcement mechanisms proposed would do little to further the cause 
of trade union democracy.
There was a highly controversial proposal in the 1987 Green Paper to provide protection 
for trade union members who refused to take part in industrial action, even if a ballot had
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been held and a majority had voted in favour of the action. This was presented as a 
matter of fundamental principle, which, the Government argued, could be traced back to 
Trade Union Immunities (1981) and earlier legislative proposals. Simply put:
Every union member should be free to decide for himself whether or not 
he wishes to break his contract of employment and run the risk of 
dismissal without compensation (Department of Employment 1987, 2.22).
The emphasis in the Green Paper was on the individual, acting as an individual, not on 
trade union membership and the collective rights and responsibilities to which this gave 
rise.
Moreover:
it must be noted that it is a very particular type of individual who is the 
beneficiary of these new rights. It is the individual who does not wish to 
go on strike and who wishes to restrain his union from embarking on 
’unlawful’ activity. No new rights are given to the union member who 
wishes to strike or who wishes to engage in industrial action despite the 
fact that no immunity is provided for such action (McKendrick 1988).
The 1988 Act could, therefore, be seen to reflect a new approach on the part of the 
Government to the role of ballots in industrial action. Ballots had been presented in 
policy documents of the early 1980s as a democratic means of ensuring that industrial 
action would only ever be taken with the full support of trade union members. But the 
inclusion of separate place of work ballots in the 1988 Bill and the emphasis on the right 
of individuals not to take part in industrial action, together with the draft code of practice 
on balloting published in November 1988 reflected another strand of policy, which was 
to maximise the constraints on unions to call industrial action even if this had been 
supported by members in a ballot.
In March 1989 Removing Barriers to Employment was published (Department of
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Employment 1989a). Its approach was to place balloting in the context of new freedoms, 
rights and protections which had been provided to individuals and employers. Balloting 
was also linked to the wider objective of removing barriers to the efficient working of the 
labour market:
The harm which inappropriate and unnecessary forms of industrial action 
can do to the economy, and to jobs, needs no emphasis. Much has been 
achieved already, not least through the right which both employers and 
trade union members now have to insist on a properly-conducted secret 
ballot before industrial action (para 1.9).
The Green Paper argued the case on the basis of evidence from ACAS which suggested 
that balloting on industrial action had become a common practice among unions (para 
3.13). The expectation among union members that they would be consulted had been ’a 
major step forward to secure union members’ rights and make unions properly 
accountable to their members’ (para 3.14). Notable examples of trade union members 
voting against industrial action were reported within the previous year, as in the cases of 
local government workers, miners and dockers. The main proposal on balloting was to 
extend the statutory requirement to ballot before industrial action to the authorisation or 
endorsement by a union of industrial action taken by its members working under contracts 
for services, in other words self-employed. This was hardly a major issue outside 
construction, where ballots were difficult to hold anyway and did not often take place.
A much more radical extension of the balloting requirement was put forward in Unofficial 
Action and the Law in October 1989 (Department of Employment 1989b). Chapter one 
of this Green Paper outlined the case for legislation to curb unofficial action (see 
especially paras 1.2 and 1.3). Government concern for unofficial action was not new. 
What had changed was a belief that a legislative response was possible17. Following the
17. See Michael Howard on the day after the Employment Act 1990 became law said 
that it tackled the ’longstanding problem of unofficial action’ Financial Times 2.11.90.
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’summer of discontent’ in 1989, the Government expressed a particular concern about 
unofficial action which took place prior to the holding and outcome of a ballot. As a 
result of extensive unofficial action by members of ASLEF, the train drivers’ union, on 
London Underground during a dispute in 1989, the Government recognised that carefully 
orchestrated campaigns of unofficial industrial action within the context of a major dispute 
could frustrate the intentions of the balloting legislation. It now proposed in Unofficial 
Action and the Law that to deal with this unacceptable scenario the balloting requirement 
needed to be extended to unofficial action:
Unofficial action can threaten an employer’s business without the union 
having to take responsibility either in terms of giving financial support to 
the strikers or in terms of accepting legal liability for the consequences of 
the strike. In particular, unofficial industrial action has immunity even if 
there has been no secret ballot. To this extent it is easier to organise an 
unofficial strike than it is to organise an official strike18.
An extension to the balloting requirement was linked in the Green Paper to the need to 
protect essential public services:
Essential public services have also been the target of unofficial action in 
recent years. In some cases this has caused widespread hardship to the 
community (para 1.9).
The Government was not deterred from a further legislative response, even though the 
London Underground dispute could be seen to support arguments that the use of the legal 
process had contributed to an increase in unofficial industrial action by delaying and 
frustrating the ability of trade unions to offer official support. There was little evidence 
that in the London Underground dispute, trade union leaders welcomed the unofficial 
action. The proposals in Unofficial Action and the Law, together with stricter repudiation
18. Department of Employment 1989b, para 1.14. Emphasis in the original.
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requirements, were enacted in the Employment Act of 1990. Whilst the law did not make 
it a requirement to ballot before all industrial action, the extension of the vicarious 
liability of trade unions so that they became legally responsible for some unofficial action, 
led to a widespread perception that this was the case. Where trade unions repudiated 
action in accordance with the provisions of the 1990 Act trade union members were liable 
to dismissal by their employer without redress regardless of the circumstances of the 
dispute.
The 1990 Act represented a shift of emphasis in public policy19, but further broadening 
and tightening the balloting requirement was entirely consistent with the ’step by step’ 
approach to the reform of industrial relations law which progressively circumscribed and 
restricted trade unions’ freedom to organise, and work groups’ freedom to take part in, 
lawful industrial action. The 1991 Green Paper, Industrial Relations in the 1990s 
(Department of Employment 1991) highlighted the achievements of the balloting laws, 
linking the requirement to ballot to a decline in working days lost through disputes 
(Department of Employment 1991, see especially paras 3.2, 3.4). The Green Paper also 
returned to the theme of trade union democracy, welcoming the fact that ’unions 
themselves are now more committed to consulting their members before calling on them 
to take industrial action’ (para 3.5)20. The Green Paper stated that:
The fundamental purpose of the statutory requirements for unions to hold 
strike ballots is to guarantee the democratic rights of union members, and 
thereby prevent the abuse of union power (Department of Employment 
1991, para 3.7)
19. Davies and Freedland 1993 suggested that it was only following the experience 
of the 1989 disputes that the Government determined to make such a radical extension of 
the balloting requirement.
20. For a criticism of Government claims see below chapter 5.
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The Green Paper proposed further major changes in the law. The first was the extension 
of mandatory postal ballots to industrial action. The earlier Green Paper Trade Unions 
and Their Members (Department of Employment 1987) argued that postal ballots for the 
election of trade union officers had given trade union members ’the opportunity to vote 
away from possible pressures which might arise at the workplace (Department of 
Employment 1987). It is notable that in the House of Lords debates on section 1 of the 
1988 Act the Government resisted an amendment which sought to make postal ballots 
mandatory for industrial action on the grounds that such a proposal was ’impractical’21. 
By 1991, however, the Government believed that postal ballots on industrial action were 
required to provide ’a greater assurance that voting will be both secret and free of 
intimidation’ (para 3.22). Arguably, although the Government often emphasised the 
individual rights argument, given the generally lower turn out in postal ballots than for 
workplace ballots there was little merit in the decision to impose fully postal ballots on 
industrial action (after 1993)22.
Secondly, it was proposed that unions should be required to comply with a series of notice 
and information requirements before and after a ballot on industrial action. These were 
to provide the employer with notice of the intention to hold a ballot (para 3.25), a sample 
copy of the voting paper, details of the ballot result and a copy of the report by an 
independent scrutineer23, and seven days’ notice of the start of industrial action (para 
3.18). Where a union planned to call for intermittent industrial action, such as a series 
of one day strikes, it was proposed that the union would be required to give at least seven 
days’ notice of each day or other separate period of industrial action (para 3.20). The 
proposal for seven days’ notice of industrial action contained a particularly controversial
21. House of Lords debates 1987 vol 495, col 449.
22. There is some evidence that it is not always the case that turnouts in postal ballots 
on industrial action are low.
23. The Green Paper also proposed to make independent scrutiny mandatory for all 
ballots on industrial action.
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requirement:
[The notice] would have to identify which workers (or class of workers) 
were to be called upon to take the industrial action..(para 3.18)
A complex notification process to employers, based on these proposals, came into effect 
in 1993. This imposed considerable new constraints on unions’ freedom of manoeuvre 
in the use of industrial action ballots and timing their call for industrial action to begin:
It may be that the 1993 changes in the law will prove to be the key to 
making the law on strike ballots achieve what it has so far failed to 
achieve: weakening trade unions’ bargaining power by removing the force 
of the threat of collective action by the workforce (Simpson 1993, 296).
4.4 Encouraging employers to use the law
In practice, the onus for making the balloting provisions work was clearly on employers 
and the Government needed to be able to persuade employers to ’make use’ of the law. 
The 1979 Government initially approached with caution the question of whether 
employers would be prepared to use the law. A change of tone and approach could be 
seen over time in Government claims, as later administrations became more confident 
about the ’success’ of the balloting legislation. This is not to argue, however, that this 
necessarily reflected the reality of employers’ position (see further below chapter 6). In 
1981 Trade Union Immunities argued:
The Industrial Relations Act 1971 was frustrated both because trade unions 
were able to build a concerted campaign of opposition to it and because 
employers did not generally see it as in their immediate interests to make
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use of its provisions24.
Trade Union Immunities reported 33 applications by employers for relief from industrial 
action between 1972 and 1974 under the Industrial Relations Act (para 133). These did 
not, of course, relate specifically to balloting. Only one of these cases reached a full 
hearing of a claim for damages25. This was the Con Mech case. The refusal of the 
AUEW to pay any fines or to co-operate with the court led to sequestration of its assets. 
The union called a national strike, but called it off when the court accepted an offer from 
anonymous donors to discharge all the union’s liabilities. Trade Union Immunities 
concluded:
the experience of the operation of the 1971 Act must raise doubts about the 
extent to which employers might exercise their right to claim damages 
from unions (Department of Employment 1981).
The policy documents of later Conservative governments adopted a less cautious approach 
and the Government gave a high profile to cases in which employers had taken action in 
the courts to deter or put a stop to industrial action. Following repeal of section 14 of 
TULRA in 1982 most employers’ actions were against unions rather than individual 
officers. In 1989 Unofficial Action and the Law argued:
Previous legislation has shown the effectiveness of such legal proceedings 
against trade unions and their funds26.
24. Department of Employment 1981, para 13. See also McCarthy in McCarthy (ed) 
1992. None of the small number of applications from employers under the unfair 
industrial practices were from employers of any size.
25. Weekes et al. 1975, 198.
26. Department of Employment 1989b, para 2.12. It should be noted, however, that 
employers’ actions were invariably not damages claims.
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Whether in practice the repeal of section 14 was as significant as some have argued27, the 
repeal had considerable symbolic importance for the Government (and trade unions). It 
was an important part of extending the rights of employers and improving their prospects 
for substantial financial recompense were they to make use of the law. The Government 
clearly wanted to promote the use of legal remedies.
There was Government encouragement too for employers to take advantage of the 
vulnerability of individuals taking part in unofficial action:
The government believes that employers should not be liable to penalties 
for dismissing employees who choose to take industrial action which has 
not been authorised or endorsed by a trade union and which has not been 
put to the test of a secret ballot by the union (Department of Employment 
1989b, para 3.8).
It was claimed that over the 1980s employers were making greater use of new rights 
under the balloting legislation. In February 1987 the Green Paper Trade Unions and 
Their Members (para 2.2) asserted that:
Employers have made increasing use of the remedies available to them 
against industrial action called without a properly conducted ballot 
(Department of Employment 1987, para 2.2).
The Green Paper referred to ’almost 40 cases’ relying on part II of the Trade Union Act 
1984. It made particular reference to Austin Rover and News International, two disputes 
that gave rise to high profile legal proceedings.
Norman Fowler, then Secretary of State for Employment, said in a speech to a CBI
27. See Auerbach 1990, who calls the repeal of section 14 the Tynchpin’ of 
Government policy.
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Conference June 1989:
Today, employers can in general settle pay rates with employees, or their 
trade unions, free from external interference. They are free to take legal 
action against unacceptable forms of industrial action, and against strikes 
which have not been supported by a majority of workers in a secret ballot.
And the courts have shown clearly that these are not just paper rights; they 
are effective in practice28.
Conservative Government’s of the 1980s did not appear to share the concerns expressed 
by ACAS that the ’growing willingness of both sides’ to apply to the courts posed a 
serious potential danger to longer term industrial relations29. The Government believed 
unequivocally that, if employers could bring a case against trade unions which would 
undermine industrial action, it was ’good’ for employers to make use of the law. It is 
notable that, despite Government claims focusing on a handful of high profile cases, an 
analysis of the case law shows that overall there were not a large number of court cases 
and these were limited to a small number of industrial sectors. There is also a question 
about using legal proceedings as the accepted measure of employers’ ’use’ of the law. 
In later chapters this thesis goes on to explore the achievement of the Government’s 
policy objectives in relation to broader measures of employers’ ’use’ of the balloting laws 
in their dispute strategies.
4.5 Conclusions
Some important conclusions emerge from this review of ideology and Government policy 
on industrial action ballots.
28. Speech reported in International Journal of Manpower 10,4 (1989) 28.
29. ACAS Annual Report 1984. 12.
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Firstly, that from the beginning of the 1980s there were some clear guiding principles 
which included the unwaveringly individualistic conception of the rights of trade union 
members. This underpinned two apparently contradictory objectives in Government 
policy. On the one hand the Government argued that existing trade union practices for 
consulting the membership on industrial action were inadequate and undemocratic and 
opened the way for intimidation. The Government described its policy as ’giving trade 
unions back to their members’. On the other hand, though, the Government sought to 
promote a ’responsible’ union bureaucracy which would be encouraged to take control 
over the activities of shop stewards and workgroups. The overriding emphasis, however, 
was on the individual trade union member and their role in restraining industrial action.
Secondly, that it is at least arguable that the industrial action balloting legislation was 
conceived as an arm of wider economic and labour market policy. It is notable that in its 
response to the 1984 Act in August of that year the TUC was already very clear about the 
unstated intention behind the balloting provisions:
The purpose claimed for the Trade Union Act by the government is that 
it will ’give trade unions back to their members’ and ’safeguard the rights 
of members in relation to their unions’. The TUC General Council 
however reject this wholly spurious claim. The real intention is to weaken 
unions, and thereby weaken their ability to serve and protect their 
members’ (TUC 1984).
Thirdly, that the incremental nature of changes in the law could also be seen, however, 
to reflect the more pragmatic roots of the legislation and that as a result of learning from 
experience the Government approach to balloting evolved over time. Part I of the 
Employment Act 1988, giving new rights to trade union members, was at least in part a 
response to events during the bitter miners’ dispute of 1984-1985. The extension of the 
balloting requirement to unofficial action in 1990 met concerns that arose, inter alia, from 
the dispute between ASLEF and London Underground in 1989. The elusive ’success’ of 
the industrial action balloting legislation, from the Government’s perspective, depended
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in part on adding to the complexity of the balloting laws to make it more difficult for 
trade unions to win yes votes.
Conservative Government policy was to maximise all possible avenues for legal 
challenges to trade union decisions on industrial action in relation to the balloting 
legislation - through employers, trade union members, consumers and most recently, in 
1996, the users of public services. Encouraging employers to take advantage of greater 
opportunities for challenging decisions on industrial action had been at the heart of the 
Government’s balloting policy since 1984. In 1988 the establishment of the office of the 
Commissioner for the Rights of Trade Union Members (CROTUM) was specifically 
intended to encourage trade union members to use the law, under trade union rules or 
section 1 of the 1988 Act, to restrain unballoted action. In this respect, the Government’s 
policy clearly promoted the rights of individual trade union members over and above the 
collective responsibilities of their membership. The 1993 Act introduced consumers’ 
rights to restrain unballoted action and a new Commissioner for Protection Against 
Unlawful Industrial Action to encourage the use of these rights30. The range and extent 
of these rights suggested that ultimately a concern to deal with the ’strike problem’, rather 
than a genuine concern for the rights of trade union members and trade union 
’democracy’, can be seen to have informed balloting policy.
30. Neither the CROTUM nor the Commissioner for Protection Against Unlawful 
Industrial Action (in practice the same person and office as the CROTUM) have dealt 
with more than a handful of enquiries and have not been successful policies from the 
Government’s point of view.
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CHAPTER 5 TRADE UNIONS AND THE BALLOTING REQUIREMENT
5.1 Introduction
The central themes of the chapter will be developed by analysing the results of 
original fieldwork for the research. This included a questionnaire survey of trade 
union negotiators in 1991-1992. The analysis draws on information from the trade 
union negotiators’ questionnaire, supplemented, where appropriate, by the wider 
research including interviews with national trade union officers and employers’ 
interviews. The trade union negotiators’ questionnaire used a number of measures of 
how trade unions, through their negotiators - most respondents were full time officers - 
adapted to the new legal framework of the 1980s which required ballots to be held 
before most industrial action. This chapter relates to information on the impact of 
changes in the law for the internal government of trade unions. (The next chapter will 
provide an analysis, based on the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire, of the role 
of ballots in collective bargaining.) While information from the research project will 
be used to provide contextual information on trade union rule books, the focus in this 
chapter will be on changes in practice.
The information from the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire will be analysed in 
the context of the history of balloting among trade unions. This chapter is particularly 
interested in information relating to the ability of trade unions to adapt to a mandatory 
balloting requirement and the effect of ballots on the internal distribution of power. 
The research indicates that while the imposition of industrial action ballots had the 
potential to formalise and centralise decision-making powers within trade unions, this 
development was limited by the wide discretion accorded to full time officers in the 
conduct of collective bargaining and disputes, which has continued to be a feature of 
trade union organisation post-1984.
Before presenting the results of the fieldwork, the chapter places the research in the 
context firstly of the trade union movement’s response to the balloting legislation and 
secondly of two important studies of the use of industrial action and reference back
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ballots before and after the 1984 Trade Union Act. These studies provide important 
comparative material for the research (Undy and Martin 1984; Martin et al. 1991)1.
5.2 The TUC’s response to legislative proposals on balloting
In 1984 the TUC issued a detailed analysis of the balloting legislation and the trade 
unions’ position (TUC 1984). The trade union movement’s opposition to the industrial 
action balloting legislation was unequivocal. It was based primarily on the principle 
of maintaining the autonomy of trade unions in relation to their internal affairs. The 
TUC made clear its very strong objection:
to unwarranted and unacceptable state interference in unions’ internal 
affairs, overriding unions’ constitutions and rules which are 
democratically determined by their members (TUC 1984, 1).
The approach of the TUC and its affiliated unions concentrated, therefore, not on 
specific alternatives to balloting, but on the principle of trade union autonomy. This 
was in part because decisions taken by a show of hands at members’ meetings, which 
prior to 1984 was a widely used method of consultation on industrial action, received 
an almost universally bad press. Trade unions did not find it easy to defend to a 
wider audience this way of consulting members. There were not necessarily 
widespread abuses; criticisms were often based on little more than impressionistic 
evidence of manipulation by leaders or unofficial work groups. In proposals for 
legislation on industrial action ballots, however, the Government asserted that:
The methods trade unions use to consult their members are often totally 
inadequate. Few things have done more to lower public regard for 
trade unions than the spectacle of strike decisions being taken by a 
show of hands at stage-managed mass meetings to which outsiders may 
be admitted and where dissenters may be intimidated (Department of 
Employment 1983, para 56).
*. See also Martin et al. 1996.
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The TUC also expressed a number of more pragmatic concerns about the anticipated 
effects of mandatory strike ballots. Firstly that the result of the balloting provisions, 
combined with section 15 of the 1982 Act, would be to create internal divisions and 
the result ’could be to encourage the disengagement of trade unions and their officers 
from involvement in ’unofficial’ disputes’ (TUC 1984, 9).
It is notable that the TUC document did not anticipate the argument that trade unions 
would respond to the balloting requirement by strengthening central control2. This was 
an argument which gained currency as trade unions began to adopt ballots into their 
procedures. A shift in the balance of authority to the centre could, for example, be 
a product of the detailed advice and guidance issued by many union head offices and 
the onus on officers and lay officials to abide by this because of the threat, if they did 
not, of laying the union open to legal action. The trade union negotiators’ 
questionnaire and the interviews with National Officers explored this question in some 
detail.
Secondly, the TUC argued in 1984 that the law depended on a model of a clear 
distinction between official and unofficial industrial action, which did not in practice 
reflect the reality of the way in which trade union decisions were made and carried 
through. In the past the issue would have arisen in many trade unions only in relation 
to strike pay. This was highlighted by the WIRS2 study. WIRS2 included a question 
which sought to distinguish the extent of official and unofficial action. Whilst 
respondents did not have any difficulty reporting on the status of strike action, they 
had more difficulty identifying whether action short of a strike had been official or 
unofficial (Millward and Stevens 1986, 278-81).
Thirdly, the TUC’s response criticised the insistence on strike ballots in unions and 
industries where they were inappropriate because of practical difficulties relating to 
their organisation and conduct. This could be seen to apply in particular to industries 
such as construction and shipping. More broadly:
2. See chapter 4 above on the contradictory objectives of Government policy.
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[the Government’s] insistence on strike ballots even in inappropriate 
circumstances could serve to restrict the negotiator’s room for 
manoeuvre in seeking a settlement to the dispute and make the task of 
reaching agreement more difficult. The Act is likely to create a degree 
of inflexibility which is wholly undesirable (TUC 1984, 9).
Some trade union leaders urged non-compliance with the law. The TUC did not 
explicitly condone defiance of the law by its affiliates, but the General Council agreed 
to support unions facing legal actions by employers based on a failure to comply with 
Part II of the 1984 Act, in accordance with decisions taken at the 1982 TUC Wembley 
Conference (TUC 1984, 10)3. Where unions pursued dispute strategies which came 
into direct conflict with the requirements of the law, some trade union leaders believed 
that TUC support had been, at best, equivocal. There were heated debates within the 
TUC about what the nature of this support should be. What was clear, however, was 
that even those within trade unions who urged compliance with the law were 
unequivocally hostile to the imposition of industrial action balloting through legislation 
and advocated its early repeal.
One of the consequences of trade unions’ experience of the operation of the 1984 
strike ballot provisions was a major rethinking of trade union (and Labour Party) 
policy on ballots. After initial legal skirmishes4, including injunctions won by some 
major employers over unballoted industrial action, unions that had not done so started 
to ballot, although this was by no means always according to the law. At the 1985
3. In 1982 the TUC organised a conference of affiliates to establish policy towards 
changes in the law. This became known as the Wembley Conference. Decisions were 
made which enabled unions to seek the assistance of the General Council where their 
actions were threatened by the new employment laws.
4. See Ewing and Napier 1986 generally on the use of the law in the Wapping 
dispute. Other reports of injunctions being awarded against unions on the basis of 
their failure to hold ballots before industrial action include: CPSA in respect of 
unballoted action in the Civil Service (FT 23.3.85); UCW in the Post Office (FT 
2.4.85); injunctions against the NUR in relation to unballoted action were obtained by 
both British Rail (FT 24.7.85) and LUL (FT 17.5.85); Guardian Newspapers 
successfully applied for an injunction against NGA over unballoted action (FT 6.7.85).
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NUR Conference the General Secretary of the TUC supported trade unions’ use of 
ballots in relation to industrial action. He called for a ’firm and flexible’ response to 
Conservative labour laws and said that the use of ballots was not necessarily 
inconsistent with Wembley Conference decisions5. In 1988 the response of trade 
union leaders to the further balloting provisions of the Employment Act was much 
more circumspect than it had been in 1984. There continued to be a progressive 
rethinking of trade union policy, so that by 1993 an MSF submission to an House of 
Commons Employment Committee did not include balloting in its discussion of 
changes in the law which had hindered the union’s ability to organise industrial 
action6.
In the event, therefore, trade union leaders by and large pragmatically accepted the 
need to ballot. In two major unions, the NUR and NAS/UWT, the change in union 
practice took place under the threat of legal action from employers. In the NUR a 
formal change in union policy was agreed at the 1985 Annual Conference7. In 
general, however, there did not prove to be a widespread or sustained campaign of 
principle against the balloting laws. This was in part because the practice of using 
ballots was already well established in a number of trade unions. This is an important 
point because the Government did not acknowledge the widespread practice of the use 
of ballots in the union movement prior to 1984 - both reference back and industrial 
action ballots - as well as those for the election of officials. In the current research, 
one negotiator, responding to the statement that ballots were a good thing for unions, 
commented: ’ballots are a good thing but we have always had them!’.
5. Financial Times 2.7.85.
6. House of Commons Employment Committee Session 1992-3 The Operation of 
Employment Legislation Governing Industrial Disputes Minutes of Evidence 19 May 
1993 Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union (London: HMSO).
7. It was reported that British Rail was seeking £200,000 damages from rail 
unions over unballoted action in support of the miners in January 1985, which was 
used as a lever by BR to demand a change of union policy. See Financial Times 
10.6.85.
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5.3 Industrial action balloting: the historical context
Undy and Martin’s book, Ballots and Trade Union Democracy, is the seminal work 
on the use of ballots by trade unions in the early 1980s, prior to the introduction of 
the legal obligation to ballot on industrial action in 1984s. Undy and Martin found 
that the information on industrial action balloting was not easy to separate from the 
use of ballots to refer back to members agreements reached by negotiators. They 
suggested, however, that in broad terms the use of industrial action ballots would 
reflect that for the reference back of agreements; if anything, ballots might be more 
extensively used by trade unions in relation to industrial action.
Two general points of some importance were highlighted by Undy and Martin’s study. 
The first was that in the context of negotiations balloting did not, in the view of trade 
union officers, provide a single means of consulting members; balloting, where it was 
used, was an integral part - but only a part - of the consultation process. It was 
customary, for example, for unions to organise workplace meetings to accompany 
ballots. Undy and Martin argued that ballots should not be seen, therefore, as the sine 
qua non for union democracy (Undy and Martin 1984, 118). The second point related 
to the complexity of the issues surrounding industrial action balloting. This was well 
illustrated by the row over the NUM’s decision in 1984 not to call a national strike 
ballot as provided for in the union’s rules. It was ironic that a union which made 
extensive use of balloting prior to 1984 and achieved high levels of participation 
should be used by the proponents of strike ballots as an example of bad practice and 
deficiencies in union ’democracy’ which not only made the case for the balloting 
requirement but later for extending its enforcement mechanisms to individual members 
(Undy and Martin 1984, 135).
Undy and Martin’s research was updated by a later survey of the use of ballots by
8. Undy and Martin 1984. Chapter three covers ballots in collective bargaining.
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trade unions in negotiations, both reference back to members and industrial action 
ballots (Martin et al. 1991). This was an extensive survey of trade union rule books 
and of practice in 24 unions accounting for 75% of TUC membership. More detailed 
case studies were carried out within 6 unions: the AEU, TGWU, GMB, CPSA, NCU, 
EETPU. The fieldwork was carried out in 1987.
5.3.1 Trade union rules
In summary Undy and Martin found that in the early 1980s union rule books regulated 
collective bargaining procedures less precisely than electoral procedures. Only nine 
out of 103 union rule books were found to require reference back of agreements 
(Undy and Martin 1984, 119. For more details see Annex B). There was much more 
often a discretionary power which was, however, used frequently. Unions consulted 
extensively before accepting agreements or deciding on strike action, although the 
form that this took varied widely:
among manual workers voting by show of hands at meetings remains 
the most frequent method, whilst among non-manual workers 
workplace ballots are most common, although few unions confine 
themselves to only one method (Undy and Martin 1984, 118).
Undy and Martin found that union officials saw themselves as representatives of their 
members in negotiations (and not simply delegates). Officials argued that to carry 
their members with them did not depend on direct consultation in all circumstances. 
Where consultation did take place, the particular methods chosen depended upon a 
number of factors, including bargaining tactics, practicalities (such as the most 
effective way of consulting a dispersed membership) and the priority attached to 
consulting members. The most common form of ballot was workplace. Where postal 
ballots were used they increased the formal nature of the consultation process.
In 1987 there was a similar picture in which few unions had mandatory requirements 
in their rules on the reference back to members of agreements, but approximately one 
third of rule books included discretionary provisions. What was noted as a significant
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change was that more than a third of those unions with discretionary reference back 
provisions required this to be by ballot. In the earlier study no union rules had 
included this provision (Martin et al. 1991, 200).
Mandatory provisions for ballots before national industrial action also increased in the 
period between the studies. In the case of strikes, Undy and Martin found that in the 
early 1980s the emphasis in union rule books was on authorisation of industrial action. 
There was little formal devolution of the powers of National Executive Committees, 
although where strikes began unofficially, it may well have been that they came before 
the NEC for endorsement or authorisation once the industrial action had started or 
even after it was over9. Twenty five unions (a quarter of the total number surveyed) 
laid down a procedure for calling national industrial action; sixteen of these required 
some form of ballot. A further 41 unions were found to have rules which included 
the discretionary use of ballots before national strike action and these included seven 
of the twenty five unions with over 100,000 members, including the TGWU10. By 
1987 there were mandatory provisions for ballots before national industrial action in 
about a third of unions (Undy and Martin 1984, 200). There was also some evidence 
of change in rule book provision in relation to local industrial action. In 1980 17 of 
the unions required the membership to be consulted before local industrial action and 
a further 43 made provision for discretionary consultation, including the GMWU and 
AUEW(E). Most did not specify the method to be followed. By 1987 nearly a 
quarter of unions specified that ballots were required.
Those unions with well established use of ballots included two in the 1980 survey
9. In the fieldwork for the current research this was found to be the experience 
in particular of one union covered by the fieldwork which ballots extensively on 
industrial action.
10. Undy and Martin 1984, 121. TGWU rules required a ballot to be held in 
national disputes involving more than one trade group. It is notable that the definition 
of balloting used by Undy and Martin appeared to incorporate votes taken at members’ 
meetings and delegate conferences. See Undy and Martin Table 3.3 p. 123.
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(BIFU and the NUS) whose rules provided for fully postal ballots. The provisions in 
the GMWU rule book required a vote in favour by two thirds ’of the members 
belonging to the Branch or body immediately concerned’. The vote could be by ballot 
or show of hands and in practice this varied between regions - workplace ballots being 
frequent in the Northern region. Thus there were variations in the use of ballots 
between different regions within the same union. In these unions the key features of 
their rule books which predated the 1984 Act had not changed by 1987.
5.3.2 Trade union practice
The provisions in union rule books alone would, however, clearly underestimate the 
importance of consultation with members, including the use of ballots. Undy and 
Martin’s findings suggested that in trade unions some form of consultation with 
members was ’the norm’, both prior to signing a collective agreement and undertaking 
industrial action. This was not reflected in union rule books, firstly because to specify 
procedures, including ballots, would be seen by trade union officials as restricting their 
room for manoeuvre. Secondly, consultation tended to be according to local needs and 
circumstances and ’national and even regional officials are not fully aware of the 
precise extent of methods of consultation used’ (Undy and Martin 1984, 126).
The WIRS1 study provided more detailed information which confirmed the broad 
conclusions reached by Undy and Martin. WIRS1 found that at the beginning of the 
1980s consultation with members over the acceptance of agreements was widespread 
(Daniel and Millward 1983,194). Consultation took place in 72% of bargaining units 
covering manual workers and 64% covering non-manual workers11. WIRS1 reported 
that differences in the use of reference back did not necessarily reflect union policy:
Although there were differences reported in the extent of consultation
between unions, in general these reflected differences in the industries
n. No similar figures were available for industrial action. Since WIRS3 this is 
now a question in the WIRS survey.
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in which the unions recruited rather than in the policies of the unions 
concerned (Daniel and Millward 1983, 126).
Consultation was found to be the norm, but was more likely to be reported in 
industries, like engineering, where local bargaining was of major importance. It was 
also more likely in larger establishments:
Not surprisingly, this norm is less likely to be achieved in small 
establishments, or in the service sector; however, it is also less likely 
to be achieved by unions organising non-manual workers in the public 
sector (Daniel and Millward 1983, 127).
WIRS1 reported that unions with non-manual members were more likely to have 
experience of balloting, a show of hands was rarely used - even in the non-manual 
sections of predominantly manual unions. This was true of TGWU/ACTTS and 
GMWU/MATSA for consultation on collective agreements.
By the end of the 1980s Martin et al. concluded that, while trade union rules changed 
little between 1980 and 1987:
practices changed more extensively, with increasing use of ballots in 
the reference back of collective agreements and in decisions on national 
or local industrial action (Martin et al. 1991, 200).
In the 1987 survey, however, where unions did refer agreements back to members, a 
slightly greater number of officials referred to the use of delegate conferences than 
secret ballots (62% as against 57%).
In relation to industrial action, by 1987 all 24 unions reported that ballots were 
’usually’ held12. For 11 of the 23 unions which made use of ballots at the time that
12. Martin et al. 1991, 201. The research did not say whether this finding related 
to national industrial action only.
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the fieldwork was carried out13 this represented a change of policy. The remaining 
unions had previously made use of ballots, but for them what had been an occasional 
practice became universal.
The AEU provided one case study example of the impact on trade union practices of 
the change in the law in 1984. In 1980 the National Committee was the major policy 
making body of the AUEW(E), which had the power under the rules to call and 
terminate strikes. Members were almost invariably consulted over calling and calling 
off industrial action. This was most often voting by a show of hands, although there 
was some small use of non-postal ballots. The National Committee had the power to 
hold postal ballots, but the provision was rarely used, ’[n]or is there any intention to 
extend the use of ballots either in reference back or in disputes: extending the use of 
ballots in such circumstances is seen more as a media preoccupation than as a real 
concern of union politics’ (Undy and Martin 1984, 152). The rules required a ballot 
to be held where a strike involved the whole membership of a district. In this case, 
industrial action had to be endorsed by a three to two majority of members voting in 
a ballot, but disputes very rarely involved the whole district membership. Undy and 
Martin noted an increase in the number of offers referred back to members. This was 
attributed partly to members’ increased expectation of consultation and partly to 
officers’ unwillingness to take responsibility for accepting or rejecting offers, which 
in a recession were often unsatisfactory. Consultation over wage agreements, however, 
did not generally involve ballots, which were used only in exceptional circumstances 
to resolve particular issues. The absence of ballots in collective bargaining was noted 
in comparison with the union’s well-developed electoral system based on secret 
ballots. After the Trade Union Act of 1984 the AEU changed both its policy and 
practice to encompass the use of industrial action balloting.
Undy and Martin found that ballots were a response to both external and internal 
stimuli: external related to bargaining strategies (see further below chapter 5). In 
terms of the internal stimuli, not surprisingly, practical and logistical considerations
,3. One union had changed its practice subsequent to the fieldwork.
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played an important part in the extent to which trade unions, prior to 1984, had made 
use of ballots. Practical considerations included the dispersal or concentration of 
members; the availability of other channels of communication - such as, for example, 
the regional industrial conferences in the GMWU; the potential for a ballot to resolve 
conflict within bargaining units; and difficulties in gathering members together for 
meetings, especially in the case of those members working shifts. There were also 
examples of ballots being used by union officers on occasion to manage or undermine 
opposition, such as by the GMWU during water industry pay negotiations in 1977-8 
and 1980 (Undy and Martin 1984, 148). Undy and Martin reported that, in addition 
to the well-established use of ballots in electricity supply and among oil tanker drivers, 
occasional ballots were organised in the TGWU at regional and local level in other 
sectors, although the practice was rare.
In these cases officers used ballots in anticipation that members would reject a call for 
industrial action:
Secret ballots are thus likely to produce less militant responses than 
alternative methods of consultation, in part because secret ballots are 
likely to be used in circumstances in which it is known or suspected 
that the membership holds non-militant views: the circumstances in 
which the method is likely to be used, rather than the method itself, is 
the crucial factor (Undy and Martin 1984, 151).
This should add a note of caution to any analysis of ballots ’won’ and Tost’. Undy 
and Martin reported that little information was available about whether members voted 
in ballots with or against the recommendations of the National Executive Committee 
(NEC). This information could in itself be somewhat misleading. In the NUM 11 
ballots were held on wage offers between 1969 and 1982. Three went against the 
recommendation of the NEC, but:
on all three occasions the moderate majority recommended a vote for 
strike action for tactical reasons, being anxious to avoid being 
outflanked by the broad left: the NEC was thus not unhappy when its
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recommendations were rejected14.
Undy and Martin concluded that as a means of resolving internal union conflicts 
ballots had been successfully used by officers, but it was argued that they, 
nevertheless, had one key weakness. Although decisions made by ballot were clear- 
cut, the reasons for the decisions could be unclear:
Where ballots result in positive majorities, whether for endorsing 
agreements or for strike action, this limitation on knowledge is not 
important. However, where ballots result in negative votes there is 
little basis for future policy formulation: doors are closed but none is 
opened (Undy and Martin 1984, 166).
The results of Undy and Martin’s work presented a complex picture of the role of 
ballots in the early 1980s. This complexity was ignored by those who argued that 
ballots would lead automatically to an increase in ’democracy’ within trade unions.
5.4 The nature of trade union democracy
To assess the impact of the widespread increase in balloting after 1984 on trade union 
government, it is important to understand the nature of decision-making processes 
within trade unions. It could be argued that, far from enhancing trade union 
democracy, balloting served to centralise power within unions at the expense of lay 
officials and members. Historically, trade union organisation depended upon a strong 
network of local representatives.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, with the development of shop steward networks, a 
number of unions, including notably the TGWU and NUPE, decentralised their
14. Undy and Martin 1984, 135. The ballots took place in 1973, 1979 and 1982.
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structures, to devolve decision-making and to increase direct membership 
involvement15. In some cases the impetus for wider consultation had come from 
representatives acting under pressure from their own members. This had been 
achieved in major unions such as the TGWU without the extensive use of balloting. 
In the GMWU, as in the TGWU, the practice of referring agreements back to members 
increased in the 1970s, but ballots were rarely used, one exception being the 
fibreboard packing case industry national agreement. There were pressures in other 
unions which tended towards the consolidation of decision-making authority in the 
hands of full time officers. These were, notably, the development of political factions 
surrounding the election of the National Executive Committee and full time officers 
in the EETPU and AEU. This involved the greater use of balloting in elections, but 
not widely in collective bargaining16. The success of radical factions within the NUM 
and NUS, however, did lead to a greater use of balloting accompanied by devolution 
in decision-making processes.
Undy and Martin’s study found that ballots in collective bargaining could be seen as 
a potential threat to established representative structures. TGWU officers expressed 
reluctance to increase the use of balloting in collective bargaining and apparently faced 
little pressure from lay activists to do so. One reason was that both officers and shop 
stewards feared that ballots could exclude representatives from involvement in the 
bargaining process. TGWU officers emphasised the priniple that:
lay representatives should be fully involved in the negotiating process 
through the union’s representative system; this could be obtained most 
easily by organizing lay delegate conferences to formulate policies and 
to discuss proposals in detail with full-time officers, rather than by 
relying upon a system of full-time officers dealing directly with the 
membership (Undy and Martin 1984, 143).
15. See Hyman ’Trade Unions: Structure, Policies and Politics’ in Bain (ed) 1983. 
The development of shop steward networks also took place in white collar public 
sector unions.
16. The EETPU was an exception because ballots were used both in elections and 
in collective bargaining.
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There was a concern that organisational changes which aimed to improve consultation 
with members should not be allowed to jeopardise the integrity of representative 
institutions (especially shop steward networks). Where ballots were used, unions 
sought to protect the collective nature of decision making and tended, therefore, not 
to make use of postal ballots. Undy and Martin found that in the early 1980s the 
unions making most use of postal ballots were EETPU, MATSA (GMWU), NUPE, 
and BIFU. Only in the EETPU, however, were postal ballots the most commonly 
mentioned method of consultation and even in the EETPU postal ballots were reported 
only in a minority of instances. Undy and Martin concluded that in 1980 there was 
’a general presupposition that postal ballots were not, in general, desirable’ (Undy and 
Martin 1984, 162). In 1987, 17 of the 23 unions surveyed used workplace ballots 
(Martin et al. 1991, 206).
A key point of interest for the current study was Undy and Martin’s finding that the 
use of industrial action balloting prior to 1984 had not brought about any major 
devolution of authority within unions. Their research suggested that ballots brought 
about a limited increase in membership participation, but were often used to confirm 
decisions already taken elsewhere. Ballots were favoured as a means of consulting 
members in situations in which collective bargaining was centralised. One reason that 
balloting was favoured by TGWU officials in electricity supply was that it posed less 
of a threat than delegate conferences might to the centralised structures of the industry 
(Undy and Martin 1984,141). Whilst balloting might, therefore, broaden consultation 
it did not necessarily lead to the devolution of decision-making power17. Ballots could 
be seen to have contributed to a process of centralisation of decision making and 
formalisation of trade union internal government, which was not necessarily consistent 
with the aim of putting more decision-making power into the hands of individual 
members (Undy and Martin 1984, 164-66). From the results of their later survey, 
Martin et al. concluded:
17. It is of interest that the ballots covered a number of unions and were organised 
by the National Joint Industrial Council (NJIC) which was seen to avoid any potential 
inter-union problems.
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the major effect of the balloting provisions is to increase centralisation 
(Martin et al. 1991, 205).
Twenty two of the 24 unions covered by the study were found to issue detailed 
instructions on the conduct of disputes to workplace representatives. Trade unions had 
needed to develop bureaucratic efficiency and a more formal approach to the conduct 
of disputes in response to the balloting legislation. The nature of these developments 
in trade union organisation and decision-making was explored in the fieldwork for the 
current research, which tended to throw doubt on findings that trade union government 
became more centralised.
5.5 Analysis of the results of the research: changes in union rules
The 1984 Trade Union Act did not require changes to be made in trade union rules. 
Union rule books have traditionally been more concerned about the authorisation of 
industrial action, than the processes whereby, once authorised, industrial action was 
called. There were, however, a number of notable examples of changes in trade union 
rules following the 1984 Act. In some cases, including for COHSE and NUPE, the 
legislation seemed to be an opportunity to update and clarify rule book provisions. 
COHSE and the Health Visitors’ Association incorporated changes which included 
specific reference to industrial action balloting legislation18. Other public sector unions 
amended their rules on industrial action to incorporate balloting. The POA 
constitution and rules 1990 provided that:
The NEC shall be required to hold a workplace ballot of the 
Association’s entire membership whenever national strike action is 
contemplated (Rule 5).
18. See COHSE Rules 1990, the new 14(ii); the Health Visitors’ Association’s 
Action for Health (1988).
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The NAS/UWT rules did not incorporate the requirement to ballot, but laid down 
procedures for running a postal ballot should one take place and for the appointment 
of independent scrutineers. At the time of the survey, none of the education unions 
had made rule changes to incorporate the central requirement of the legislation to 
ballot before industrial action. The unions concerned emphasised that members were 
fully consulted about industrial action and that the balloting requirement of itself did 
not necessitate any wholescale procedural changes. Moreover, it was unusual for these 
unions’ rules to cover in detail the procedural arrangements for calling industrial 
action. The AMMA (now ALT) referred to industrial action in the context of the 
objects of the Association. As in the case of the NAS/UWT, noted above, the AUT, 
NATFHE and AMMA made provision for independent scrutineers. Among education 
unions there were no major rule book changes, but there was evidence that trade 
unions had taken account of the law.
In NUPE, rule changes reflected a major change in practice from branch-based block 
votes to workplace-based consultation with members voting as individuals. This 
change complemented the wider use of ballots, whilst not specifically providing for 
them. There were other unions, notably the GMB and NALGO, in which detailed 
rules on calling industrial action already existed and these were not changed. The 
GMB rules required a two thirds majority in a vote of members before industrial 
action could take place19. GMB rules did not include any specific reference to ballots, 
but it is clear that in practice this rule was used to cover the conduct of ballots20. 
Provisions for industrial action balloting were not incorporated, however, into the rules 
of all unions. NALGO’s rules (1990) formally maintained the discretion of the 
Conference and Executive Council to issue an instruction to members to take industrial
19. As in many trade unions this specific rule was subject to the overriding 
authority of the Central Executive Committee to waive the requirement.
20. See GMB Rules 46 and GMB Guidance on Industrial Action Ballots revised 
12.11.92.
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action21.
The TGWU rule book referred to balloting in the context only of national industrial 
action. The creation of RMT brought together two unions, the NUR and NUS, with 
very different rule book provisions relating to industrial action. NUS rules had 
included a requirement to ballot where industrial action was likely to involve a 
majority of members22. This did not appear in the rule book of the merged union 
which was based much more closely on the NUR’s rule book and provided that the 
Council of Executives should have the power to ’order and direct’ members to 
withdraw their labour.
Most unions tended not to have separate, detailed rules on industrial action, but 
subsumed these within rules governing the functions of the NEC. Thus IPCS [now 
IPMS] and the NUT restricted the authorisation of industrial action to the National 
Executive Committee (NEC); the BMA to the Council of the Association; CPSA to 
the National Disputes Committee (NDC). NUCPS rules (1989) emphasised that it was 
’only’ the NEC or NDC that had the power to authorise industrial action. The Society 
of Radiographers, which operated under the authority of a Royal Charter and did not 
have a rule book as such, restricted the authorisation of industrial action to two senior 
officers. In 1985 the AEU National Committee took away from district committees 
their longstanding powers to endorse strikes and vested them solely in the National
21. There were further regulations covering industrial action in NALGO’s 
’Industrial Action Handbook’ [n.d]. These provided for the Emergency Committee 
of the NEC to ’authorise and/or instruct’ industrial action without a ballot in two 
situations. The first was ’where in its judgement those circumstances are such as to 
preclude the taking of a ballot’ and the second was action short of a strike ’where the 
Committee is satisfied that such action enjoys the support of the membership 
concerned’.
22. The NUS rules also included a provision for a ballot to be held before 
industrial action was called off.
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Executive23.
At the time of the survey, RCN rules had the distinctive feature that they included a 
no-strike commitment. The General Meeting could, however, empower the Council 
to take a decision:
..in respect of limited industrial action if circumstances should be such 
as to warrant such action’.
The RCN rule book also stated that its no-strike policy:
..does not preclude action taken by College members in the interests of 
safe standards of professional practice, which does not breach their 
contractual obligations to their employer or their professional duty to 
their patients.
Whilst this included representations made by RCN members, it ’does not include so- 
called ’working to grade’. The fact that many nurses, including some RCN members, 
’worked to grade’ during the clinical regrading dispute in the Health Service in 1988 
became the subject of media comment. This rule was changed in 1995, following a 
two thirds vote at Conference in favour of balloting members, who subsequently voted 
by over nine to one to lift the no-strike commitment24.
5.6 Analysis of the results of the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire 1991-2: 
changes in union practice
The analysis of the results of the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire begins by 
reporting on negotiators’ experience of ballots held.
23. On the change in AEU rules see Evans 1987.
24. See The Guardian 30 June 1995.
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Overall, 82% of respondents reported ballots held in the last three years. See Table 
5.1 below.
Table 5.1 Number of negotiating officers reporting industrial action ballots within the 
last three years
Number of respondents reporting 
industrial action ballots in the last three 
years
Percentage of total responses to the 
questionnaire
691 82%
Table 5.1 shows that in the period between 1989 and 1991 negotiators had widespread 
experience of industrial action ballots. There were no significant variations between 
unions. The experience of balloting was as widespread in white collar unions in the 
public sector as manual unions in the private sector. Just a half of respondents in one 
Civil Service union had experience of strike ballots, but this was exceptional. More 
than three quarters of all respondents in two large public sector unions, with a mixed 
manual and white collar membership, had experience of strike ballots. In certain 
sectors responses reflected national campaigns of industrial action in which ballots had 
played a central part. In one education union, 93% of respondents reported experience 
of industrial action ballots within the previous three years.
Responses to the questionnaire suggested that, by the end of the 1980s, unions and 
their officials sought by and large to conduct industrial action lawfully, in accordance 
with the balloting requirements. Ballots were unlikely to have involved major changes 
in the practices of white collar unions. The caution with which the strike weapon had 
traditionally been used and the care taken over consultation with members facilitated 
an easy transition to balloting procedures. Moreover, whether or not contained in the 
rules a number of public sector unions, including NUCPS, CPSA, NALGO and
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COHSE had used ballots prior to 1984. As one respondent in a Civil Service union 
commented:
The consultation methods used by this union have not changed as a 
result of the legislation because we have always balloted. Only the 
wording on the ballot papers has changed.
Other unions, including notably NUPE, AEU and RMT, had not balloted on industrial 
action before the changes in the law. Whilst consultation was well-established in each 
of these unions, methods other than balloting were used. They too had accommodated 
the requirement. A National Officer, in a large public sector trade union which did 
not ballot on industrial action prior to 1984, commented that he could not envisage 
circumstances now in which full time officers were involved in a dispute in which 
members took industrial action without a ballot being held. Despite one union’s 
policy of retaining discretion for the NEC to authorise unballoted action, the National 
Officer who took part in the research commented that the NEC was now requiring a 
ballot to be held in most situations. Action short of a strike and demonstrations of 
half or one day were still, on occasion, authorised, however, without a ballot being 
held.
Interviews with National Officers endorsed the view that some unions, including those 
in the public sector, were at first slow to make the changes in their practices necessary 
to comply with the balloting legislation. This was not necessarily a deliberate policy 
of defiance of the law. Whilst the Legal Officer of one public sector union said that 
holding ballots did not in itself pose particular difficulties, she also commented that 
early industrial action ballots probably did not meet the strict requirements of the law. 
In some cases union head offices were slow to issue advice to officials on the balloting 
laws. Often advice was issued in response to a specific dispute. COHSE’s guidance 
was issued in October 1988 during the nurses clinical regrading dispute; NUCPS 
issued detailed guidance on ballots in preparation for a one day protest strike against 
market testing in November 1993. Evidence from interviews with Health Service 
managers confirmed that in the mid 1980s some union officials were not aware of the 
obligation to make a dispute official and hold a ballot. Health Service managers
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commented that balloting - in particular the specific requirements of the legislation - 
’perplexed’ union officials (Elgar and Simpson 1994d).
What was clear from the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire was that by 1989-1991 
the practice of balloting before industrial action was a well-established part of disputes 
procedures for negotiators across a broad spectrum of trade unions - manual and white 
collar, public and private sector.
There were, however, wide variations in the number of industrial action ballots 
reported by individual officers. Table 5.2 is a summary of the results.
Table 5.2 Number of strike ballots held in the previous three years
Number of ballots held Number of respondents Percentage of responses
1 104 15%
2-5 350 51%
6-10 124 18%
11-25 79 11%
26-50 23 3%
>50 11 2%
Total responses 6918 100%
vJote:
a. 691 respondents reported ballots held. A further 102 reported that no 
ballots had been held within the previous three years.
Overall, more than a half of respondents reported between two and five ballots held 
over the previous three years. Negotiators in three predominantly manual unions, 
which were both craft-based and general, reported significantly higher than average 
numbers of ballots. In part this simply reflected that some unions had more 
experience of industrial action and, therefore, that a greater number of ballots were
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held. Within the large general unions there were also particular industrial sectors 
which made greater use of ballots. The average number of ballots tended to be lower 
for unions representing white collar members and for unions in the public sector. As 
respondents commented:
In large sections of the civil service industrial action is still a very rare
event.
The members I represent do not have a tradition of industrial action -
they work in professional grades.
In one public sector trade union representing members in a specialised area of work, 
however, all respondents reported high numbers of ballots - an average of 15 industrial 
action ballots in the last three years. This was the highest number of ballots reported 
by any of the unions in the survey. Moreover negotiators in one large white collar 
union, including professional and technical members, reported a higher than average 
number of ballots.
Variations in the number of ballots reported could also reflect campaigns of national 
industrial action during the period 1989-1991. Ballots were held in public sector 
national disputes - in education, the Health Service and local government. The most 
striking example, however, was provided by unions in the engineering industry. 
Higher numbers of ballots reported reflected trade union strategy during the 
engineering hours disputes of 1989 to 1991, in which ballots played a central part. 
A rolling programme of ballots were held in individual workplaces. 83% of 
respondents in one engineering union reported experience of strike ballots, the average 
number of ballots being seven.
Another factor was the national and local trade union response to the nature of the 
issue in dispute. Both interviews with National Officers and the trade union 
negotiators’ questionnaire confirmed that industrial action was often not an option for 
unions in response to major developments in the delivery and management of public 
sector services that were gathering pace in the mid and late 1980s. These included the
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contracting out of services in the National Health Service and local government. 
Contracting out and competitive tendering were major issues at the time of the 
fieldwork, but trade union negotiators saw themselves in a difficult position, which 
was reflected in the following comment:
As an official my job is more one of delaying changes than stopping 
them. Of getting the best deal for members rather than saving their 
jobs.
This was quite a common response from negotiators in the public sector. Interviews 
with managers found little evidence of locally-organised industrial action ballots in the 
Education and Health Services (Elgar and Simpson 1994c).
Interviews with Health Service managers confirmed that the special circumstances of 
the NHS included the existence of the RCN as the largest union, following a strong 
growth in its membership throughout the 1970s and 1980s25. At the time of the 
fieldwork the RCN had a policy of not taking industrial action. Other Health Service 
unions found it increasingly difficult to compete with the RCN in recruiting and 
retaining members26.
Similarly in the Civil Service, where far-reaching organisational changes were taking 
place, including privatisation, contracting out and, more recently, market testing:
The [1980s] have meant a toughening up of management, a diminished 
role for trade unions in the public sector with management consulting 
less. The law has not been a big factor since disputes rarely get to the 
stage when strike action is contemplated.
25. See Certification Officer’s Annual Reports.
26. It is interesting to see how rapidly this situation changed in mid 1995. The 
nature of the relationship between the major Health Service unions became 
increasingly complex during the dispute which led up to RCN members voting to end 
the College’s long standing ban on industrial action.
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Overall, union negotiators in the survey did not give the impression that balloting had 
caused particular difficulties. There was a perception among some respondents, 
however, that ballots made it more difficult for members and officials to respond 
quickly in disputes:
Union law has made ’immediate action’ ie. walk outs almost 
impossible, yet this was always the most effective. [The law] has 
helped in controlling some unofficial action.
The legal detail was also seen by some respondents as a way of undermining industrial 
action:
The law on industrial action ballots...stacks the odds against 
authorisation for industrial action. It is also a nightmare to follow to 
prevent the possibility of legal challenge by employers.
There were more specific circumstances, in which the difficulties associated with 
balloting could reduce the number of ballots held. Where unions faced particular 
difficulties in organising ballots, they tended to fall into three categories: dispersal of 
members across a number of different workplaces; the administration of balloting and 
membership records; and co-ordinating ballots in a multi-union situation. 
Respondents’ comments illustrated the very practical nature of their concerns about 
meeting the requirements of the industrial action balloting legislation:
It is only with the advance of new technology that, with so many 
workplaces, unions like [ours] are in the position of being able to 
conduct ballots so as to comply with the law.
Prior to industrial action ballots it was far easier to obtain agreement 
by a show of hands. The most difficult aspect is ensuring that every 
member receives a ballot paper, especially where I have so many 
workplaces, depots, etc. and plus the fact it is now extremely difficult 
with so few who are prepared to become stewards/convenors etc. The 
areas of responsibility are far greater and time is the greatest enemy.
Where some unions in a multi-union workplaces used postal ballots, which was the
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policy and practice of the EETPU, this could create additional difficulties in co­
ordinating dispute strategies and industrial action.
The results from the questionnaire showed, therefore, that industrial action balloting 
was widespread during the period 1989 to 1991. There were significant variations in 
the experience of negotiators in terms of the number of ballots held. While a number 
of practical difficulties related to the organisation of ballots were highlighted, by and 
large these were not seen to be insurmountable. Other factors, such as the nature of 
the membership and existence of campaigns of national industrial action, accounted 
to a greater extent for differences in the number of ballots held.
5.7 Industrial action balloting and trade union procedures
The questionnaire sought information on the use of workplace and postal industrial 
action ballots. Questions relating to trade union consultation procedures and the role 
of negotiators in holding ballots provided an opportunity to explore further any 
centralising tendencies imposed on trade union government by the balloting 
requirement.
There was considerable evidence from the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire that 
ballots had been integrated by trade unions into existing consultation procedures. 
Table 5.3 summarises the results of a question on methods of consultation with 
members about industrial action.
Consultation on industrial action took a number of forms, but invariably included a 
ballot, either workplace or postal. Just 23 respondents (3%) referred only to a show 
of hands at a members’ meeting and no other method of consultation.
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Table 5.3 Methods of consulting with members about taking industrial action
Method of consultation Number of respondents'1 Percentage of total 
responses
Workplace ballots 589 71%
Postal or semi-postal 
ballots
374 45%
Show of hands at a 
members’ meeting
177 21%
Total responses 832 100%
Note:
a. The figures reflect the fact that more than one method of consultation 
was used in a number of cases.
The preponderance of ballots were workplace. Overall, 71% of respondents referred 
to workplace ballots and 45% to postal ballots. In just two of the trade unions with 
a predominantly manual membership a greater number of respondents referred to 
postal ballots; in addition, respondents in three white collar unions reported greater use 
of postal than workplace ballots.
The information from the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire thus confirmed the 
findings of earlier research that union negotiators had greater experience of workplace 
ballots (Undy and Martin 1984). This reflected in part a concern among negotiators 
to minimise the ’decollectivising’ tendencies of balloting, which were associated in 
particular with postal ballots:
I do not disagree with the concept of secret ballots. If handled properly 
they can be put to the advantage of our members, providing that prior 
to the ballot taking place the members have a crystal clear 
understanding about the issue concerned and have had ample 
opportunity to debate.
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Some negotiators shared concerns expressed by National Officers in a number of 
unions about the longer term impact of balloting on trade union organisation and 
membership participation. They believed that if decisions were no longer taken at 
branch meetings - whether about industrial action or on pay offers - an important 
function of branches would be removed. Trade unions might then find that their 
organisation at local level was seriously weakened. One negotiator commented:
The practice of balloting - particularly postal balloting - has proved a 
disincentive to attendance at branch meetings and this has meant that 
’grass-roots’ membership does not participate in the formulation of 
union policy nor are policies subjected to the kind of scrutiny and 
debate that ought to prevail. In short, government legislation which 
purports to widen democracy has had the effect of reducing it.
In most unions, however, at least a third of negotiators said that they made use of 
postal ballots. While this may at first sight appear surprising, the relatively 
widespread use of postal balloting needs to be seen in the context of ballots as one 
method of consultation, used in conjunction with others. One Civil Service union, for 
example, combined members’ meetings with postal ballots, whereas others opted for 
workplace ballots. Negotiators’ comments emphasised the broad nature of the 
consultation process:
Consultation on industrial action is first by members’ meeting, then 
secret workplace ballot.
I think there is some confusion between consultation and industrial 
action ballots. On a personal note, I would have already consulted our 
members prior to an industrial action ballot. A negative ballot result 
only weakens the negotiators hand.
At the time of the survey the evidence was that trade unions had, therefore, 
accommodated the balloting requirement. While this had the potential to undermine 
the role of existing decision-making bodies, their role was protected by using ballots 
as part of a broader consultation process.
The research sought evidence from the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire about
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centralising tendencies imposed on trade union decision-making by industrial action 
balloting27. The information from interviews with National Officers provided some 
clear examples of where this had taken place. These related in particular to occasions 
on which Officers of the union had appealed directly to members by means of a ballot, 
either reference back or industrial action28. The General Secretary of one Civil Service 
union said that activists within the union were Tess willing to flout the law than the 
union’s constitution’.
For most unions, however, the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire produced little 
evidence that decisions had been taken out of the hands of negotiators because of the 
requirement to ballot before industrial action29. Table 5.4 is a summary of the results.
Table 5.4 Trade union negotiators responsible for organising industrial action ballots
Responsible for organising industrial 
action ballots
Number and percentage of respondents 731 (88%)
Total responses 834
27. For a theoretical discussion of the power of trade union leaders see Heery and 
Fosh in Fosh and Heery (eds) 1990, especially 15. They argue that the domination 
of trade union leaders is based on three factors: control of administration, monopoly 
of expertise and exercise of charismatic authority.
28. Examples included the use by IRSF National Executive Committee of a ballot 
of members in 1988 as a device to overturn a Conference decision to reject a new pay 
deal.
29. It should be noted that this was primarily a survey of full time officers, rather 
than lay activists.
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Overall, 88% of negotiators said that they were responsible for organising industrial 
action ballots. This figure was significantly lower than two thirds in only two unions.
The extent to which negotiators had freedom over the nature and timing of ballots 
varied between unions. This reflected, in part, the degree of centralisation which 
already existed in the union’s organisation and the level at which, in practice, 
decisions would be taken about industrial action. In one Civil Service union, for 
example:
industrial action has taken place, but will all have followed the same 
pattern as the NEC has to sanction all industrial action and give 
clearance to ballot forms.
In the advice and guidance issued to members on balloting, unions were careful to take 
into account traditional channels for authorising industrial action. NUCPS guidelines 
cautioned branches against organising ballots without prior authorisation:
Do remember that legally only the NDC [National Disputes Committee] 
can authorise ballots and industrial action on behalf of the union30.
In practice larger unions, in particular, relied on Regional Officers to organise ballots 
and gave them freedom to do so, if necessary, prior to seeking NEC authorisation. In 
one large general union, Officers had considerable autonomy within their regions. The 
Legal Officer emphasised that the union’s approach to balloting had to respect their 
authority and recognise the limits to their tolerance of ’the minutiae of legislative 
requirements’. Elected officials in manual unions (who were more often former 
members, less often professionally trained) might often be less willing to adapt their 
practices to conform with the detailed requirements of the legislation, than their 
appointed counterparts in white collar unions.
30. NUCPS Legal Guide on Industrial Action Ballots September 1993, 2.
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The trade union negotiators’ questionnaire and interviews with National Officers 
provided evidence of the increasing importance of detailed advice and guidance on 
balloting issued by most major unions. In two large general unions this covered 
methods of voting, the wording of ballot papers and balloting procedures, including 
the complicated requirements for separate balloting constituencies in different 
workplaces. In many trade unions there were circulars and detailed guidance from 
headquarters on organising ballots. In a number of unions ballot papers were prepared 
centrally in consultation with the union’s solicitors. Whilst, therefore, balloting on 
industrial action had taken place in a number of unions prior to 1984, this new legal 
dimension made pre-and post-1984 ballots very different from a trade union 
negotiators’ perspective. It increased negotiators’ dependence on specialist Officers 
at headquarters and procedures administered nationally.
Some of the advice was highly prescriptive, as for example circulars issued by the 
AMMA (now ALT). After 1993 NUCPS guidance included 13 required stages to the 
balloting procedure. Other unions tried to maintain a low key approach to the 
balloting requirement. The Guidance on Balloting of one public sector trade union, 
first issued in 1988, was described by the union’s Legal Officer as ’unintimidating and 
practical’. It was only three pages long and was intended to be ’permissive, rather 
than prescriptive’.
Another measure of the potential of the industrial action balloting requirement to 
increase centralisation within trade unions was the use of advice and guidance. 
National Officers believed that there had been an increase in the demand from 
negotiators for advice and information. The trade union negotiators’ questionnaire 
included questions on negotiators’ access to advice on balloting and how often they 
made use of this advice. Table 5.5 is a summary of the responses about the sources 
of advice.
161
Table 5.5 Sources of advice on industrial action ballots
Sources of advice Number of respondents Percentage of total 
responses'1
Legal Officer 369 50%
Other Full Time Officer 310 42%
Solicitors 77 11%
Other 85 12%
No-one 79 11%
Total responses 731 -
Note:
a. Percentages reflect the fact that more than one source of advice was 
used by a number of negotiators.
Advice was widely sought31. A half of those negotiators who were responsible for 
organising industrial action ballots said that other Full Time Officers were their main 
source of advice; 42% referred to the union’s Legal Officer. Where unions employed 
Legal Officers negotiators often appeared to have direct access to them, which was 
reflected in the high proportion of negotiators who consulted them. Smaller numbers 
in other unions referred to Legal Officers who may not have been legally qualified, 
but a Full Time Officer with special responsibility for legal or balloting matters. Only 
a small minority referred to seeking advice from outside solicitors.
31. One large public sector union was an exception in that almost a quarter of 
respondents said that no-one provided them with advice or assistance.
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Negotiators were asked how often they made use of this advice. Nearly two thirds of 
those responding to the question said often or always. See Table 5.6 below.
Table 5.6 Use bv negotiators of advice on industrial action balloting
Use of advice Number of respondents Percentage of total 
responses
Never 27 4%
Seldom 50 8%
Sometimes 149 24%
Often 131 21%
Always 271 43%
Total responses 628 100%
The evidence of the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire was, therefore, that 
negotiators sought by and large to conduct industrial action within the law, in 
accordance with national policy. Their dependence on specialist knowledge and advice 
clearly had the potential to centralise decision-making powers within unions. National 
Officers believed that the complexity of the legal requirements served to increase 
negotiators’ dependence on head office advice because negotiators were not always 
fully confident about the details of the legislation. In turn, the advice from head office 
was clear. In the words of the Legal Officer in a large general union: when there was 
a trade dispute, officers must get the law right first. Many negotiators had experience
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of a time when it did not matter what the law said. Information from the trade union 
negotiators’ questionnaire confirmed that there was a new legal dimension for them 
in disputes, which they saw as a notable development. Respondents were aware of the 
concern from headquarters that in organising ballots they had complied with all the 
legal detail. This may help to explain why a high proportion attributed influence to 
the law in general terms, although it should be noted that this question did not relate 
specifically to balloting. In response to a question about the general influence of the 
law, nearly two thirds responded that the law had been the most important factor 
affecting industrial action. This compared with a smaller proportion, although still 
more than half (52%) who believed that the law had been an important weapon 
favouring employers in their own negotiations.
Seeking advice should not necessarily be seen, however, to undermine the autonomy 
of negotiating officers. It is notable that 88% of respondents reported that they were 
responsible for organising industrial action ballots. Unions rely crucially on the 
experience and expertise of their negotiating Full Time Officers - and the relationship 
that they have built up with workplace representatives32. The research did not provide 
any evidence that the balloting legislation had encouraged trade unions to take 
decision-making authority away from negotiators. The requirements of the law were 
seen to demand this only in exceptional circumstances. A significant factor working 
against centralisation of union decision making powers was the fragmentation, 
throughout the 1980s, of employing bodies and national negotiating structures in both 
the public and private sectors. This required unions to rely more on local 
representatives.
The evidence from the research, therefore, was that trade unions tended to favour 
workplace ballots, although a significant number of negotiators also had experience 
of postal ballots. Ballots had been incorporated into procedures which included other 
methods of consultation and there was a concern among National Officers and
32. The study by Kelly and Heery (1994) highlighted the wide discretion of 
negotiators in their work. They also pointed to the small number of Full Time 
Officers, which increased the importance of building up lay representation.
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negotiators to protect these. Negotiators were widely responsible for organising 
ballots. On this measure, therefore, there was little evidence that decision-making 
powers had been centralised in trade unions in response to the balloting legislation. 
Trade unions continued to rely on negotiating officers, who in practice operated with 
considerable autonomy. There was, however, evidence that the balloting requirement 
had added a new legal dimension in disputes, which made trade union negotiators 
more dependent on head office advice and assistance and centrally determined 
procedures.
5.8 Balloting, unofficial action and local disputes
In relation to major industrial action, there was considerable evidence that both 
National Officers and negotiators would require a ballot to be held. One National 
Officer in a public sector union commented:
In the last national dispute management didn’t resort to the law, but 
then the union was very careful not to infringe the law, particularly in 
relation to balloting and picketing.
There did appear, however, to be a distinction drawn between national and local 
industrial action. The respondent quoted above went on to say: ’local industrial action 
would present a very different picture’. Another respondent commented:
If a group of members feel strongly enough to take immediate action,
I would support them. That would represent a failure of previous 
discussions and negotiations to resolve a particular problem. In my 
experience, management has accepted some responsibility for that 
failure. The law might be mentioned in passing, as a fact, not a threat.
It was clear from the questionnaire that balloted industrial action had not replaced 
unballoted action. This was neither the expectation of National Officers nor the 
experience of respondents to the questionnaire. On occasion this would involve a 
trade union taking a calculated risk that employers would not make use of the law,
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where there was clearly membership support for the action.
While, therefore, there was evidence in the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire of 
an increasing use of ballots, which had become very much part of organising industrial 
action for trade unions, they were not universally held before all industrial action. 
30% of all respondents were aware of unballoted action that had taken place within 
the last three years. The use of ballots in relation to local industrial action depended 
on the nature of the dispute and many other factors in addition to the law. The 
following excerpts reflect comments made by respondents in a range of unions:
when three branch officers at [one] college were suspended without 
pay, 90% of members ’deemed themselves locked out too’ (ie. went on 
strike) without a ballot, instantly and without questions asked by either 
side.
H&S issues which may threaten workers may mean that you do not 
have the luxury of winning an official ballot as it takes time.
Members are aware that the short, sharp, unofficial action without a 
formal ballot is very effective.
In some of the larger unions the proportion of respondents who were aware of 
unballoted action taking place within the previous three years was considerably higher. 
While balloted and unballoted action co-existed, respondents’ comments did reflect 
concern that the requirement to ballot could be a source of conflict, on occasion, 
between officers on the one hand and members and lay activists on the other:
It should not be forgotten that we still have bad areas of work where 
conditions are so bad that members have taken industrial action 
immediately - eg. walk outs. In these areas our members look at us 
suspiciously and often think that we are management’s tool in that they 
see us stopping industrial action when they themselves have very 
serious problems.
Legislation in the 1980s has made industrial action more difficult.
Trade unions cannot officially support any action taken if it does not 
strictly comply with (a) the law, (b) the union rulebook. This has led 
to increasing frustration for members with FTOs having to tell them 
what they ’cannot’ do rather than what they can. This has all been part
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of an obvious intention to decrease the trade union influence in the 
workplace33.
Following the 1990 Act unions had to be prepared to ’repudiate’ unofficial action if 
a ballot had not been held. At the time of the research these changes in the law were 
still relatively new, so did not feature greatly in responses to the trade union 
negotiators’ questionnaire. Some employers, notably engineering employers on the 
advice of the Engineering Employers Federation, had been quick to require repudiation 
of action that started without a ballot. The National Officers interviewed appeared 
confident that unions could move quickly to repudiate unofficial action and organise 
a ballot. They were well aware, however, that repudiation could leave members 
exposed to dismissal without the possibility of legal redress, if the industrial action 
was not immediately called off and a ballot organised. The potential for decisions 
which were unpopular with local officials and members leading to divisions within 
trade unions was thereby increased34.
The evidence from the research suggested, therefore, that unballoted industrial action 
was quite widespread during the period 1989 to 1991 and co-existed with balloted 
action. There was little evidence that the balloting requirement had created internal 
divisions within trade unions. The impact of changes in the law in 1990, however, 
which introduced complex procedures for trade unions to negotiate in order to 
’repudiate’ unofficial industrial action, had not been fully realised at the time of the 
fieldwork35.
33. It should be noted that in 1984 the TUC had expressed concern that the 
balloting legislation would create divisions within trade unions and increase the 
incidence of unofficial action. See above pp. 133.
34. See Miller and Woolfson 1994. The AEEU repudiated the industrial action 
in Timex dispute. This created tensions between shop stewards and full time officers.
35. There were also subsequent changes in the law in 1993 which imposed a 
requirement for all industrial action ballots to be fully postal, which had the potential 
to create further internal divisions.
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5.9 Accommodating the balloting requirement: reasons for balloting on industrial 
action
In the questionnaire survey of trade union negotiators, respondents were requested to 
rank seven possible reasons for balloting in order of importance. The seven were: (i) 
members expected to be balloted, (ii) union policy, (iii) to provide information on the 
views of members, (iv) that balloting was a requirement of the law, (v) to strengthen 
the hand of negotiators, (vi) to provide a breathing space in negotiations, (vii) ballots 
were required by employers. The aim was to explore the extent to which, in the early 
1990s, the legislation itself was still seen to be the driving force, or whether other 
factors had come to play a more important role. In terms of the hypothesis that trade 
unions had accommodated the balloting requirement, the research would expect to see 
prominence given to factors other than the law. Table 5.7 is a summary of the 
responses.
The table shows that, overall, the main reason for holding strike ballots was the law - 
mentioned by 63% of respondents - although there were some unions including the 
Civil Service unions, in which the law did not figure as a significant factor in 
determining the use of ballots. Whilst nearly two thirds of respondents referred to the 
law as one of the two most important reasons for balloting on industrial action, almost 
a half (48%) also referred to union policy and members’ expectations (46%). In some 
unions, including one large general union, a high proportion of respondents (80%) 
referred to the law, but also to union policy (69%). In another large general union, 
6 6 %  referred to the law as one of the two most important reasons for balloting on 
industrial action and 49% referred to members’ expectations that they would be 
balloted. In these cases it could be concluded that the law had become one of a 
number of reasons for balloting on industrial action. As one respondent commented:
we first started balloting because the law forced us to - we now think 
on the basis of experience that ballots are democratic and give great 
strength to the members when they are won.
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Table 5.7: Most important reasons for using ballots to consult members about
industrial action
Reason for balloting Number of respondents Percentage of all responses
Required by law 482a 63%
Union policy 366 48%
Members expect to be 
balloted
353 46%
Strengthen hand of 
negotiators
245 32%
For information on 
members’ views
105 14%
Breathing space in 
negotiations
42 6 %
Required by employers 30 4 %
Total responses 760 -
Note:
a The figures refer to the number of respondents who ranked the reason first or 
second in order of importance out of the seven reasons for balloting. They 
also include those who indicated that a number of reasons were significant 
without ranking these in order of importance.
Not surprisingly, the importance attributed to union policy was particularly high in 
those unions in which the use of ballots pre-dated the Trade Union Act 1984. It is 
also notable, however, that in some unions where complying with the legislation had 
involved a change of policy, respondents now cited union policy as well as the law as 
an important reason for balloting. Negotiators in other unions attributed less
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importance to union policy as a reason for balloting on industrial action. In these 
unions, in common with many other unions, members’ expectations were referred to 
by a significant number of respondents. There was just one union in which the law 
emerged clearly as the most significant factor, far above all others: this was a union 
in the education sector. In this union 90% of respondents referred to the requirements 
of the legislation whilst only 31% referred to members’ expectations and 24% to union 
policy.
An additional point made by some respondents, although it was not specifically asked, 
was that balloting was used where members were dispersed.
The significance attributed by respondents to union policy and members’ expectations 
of being balloted suggested that in many unions, despite the persistent modification 
of the law, strike ballots had been accommodated as an aspect of internal union 
procedures.
5.10 Wider use of balloting in consultation with members
The questionnaire provided evidence of the use of balloting in the reference back of 
agreements to members. This was a further measure of the extent to which the 
balloting requirement had been accommodated by trade union negotiators.
The vast majority of negotiators (84%) in trade unions covered by the survey reported 
that they found members were more reluctant to take part in industrial action. It could 
be argued that as a result, considerable importance was attached to prior consultation 
with members to avoid exposing negotiators to a no vote in an industrial action ballot. 
Balloting increasingly provided a framework for this wider consultation, although there 
were significant variations between unions. A summary of the results is in Table 5.8.
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Table 5.8 The use of ballots in consultation on pay offers8
Method of consultation Number of respondents Percentage of total 
responses
Workplace ballots 472 58%
Members’ meeting show of 
hands
420 52%
Postal ballots 263 32%
Stewards committees 146 18%
Delegate conferences 117 14%
Feedback from activists 94 12%
Varies 276 34%
Changes in methods of 
consultation in recent years
276 34%
Total responses 81 lb "
Note:
a. The figures reflect the fact that balloting was one among a number of methods 
used.
b. 811 negotiators reported that members were consulted over accepting 
or rejecting pay offers. This was 96% of the 844 who answered the 
question.
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As Table 5.8 shows, the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire found that balloting 
was the most commonly used method of consultation with members. Show of hands 
at a members’ meeting, however, was still widely used and was the most common 
method of consultation in a number of major unions, both manual and white collar, 
in the public and private sector. Changes in methods of consultation were reported 
by more than a third of negotiators and this invariably included the greater use of 
ballots. In all cases, where balloting was used it was one among a number of methods 
of consultation used.
The interviews with employers confirmed that members’ meetings continued to be a 
prevalent method of decision making in reference back:
While balloting before industrial action had become normal, the TGWU 
also maintained traditional methods of consultation with members 
through conferences of garage delegates and garage meetings (Elgar 
and Simpson 1994e, 12).
This could be seen to indicate that union officers preferred to make use of a show of 
hands where they still had discretion over the decision-making process - or where a 
show of hands was considered to be more appropriate. National policy in some unions 
supported the use of methods of consultation other than balloting. Not all unions 
welcomed the general increase in consultation on pay offers which balloting seemed 
to have generated. The practice was resisted by one union which made the point that 
if there was strong feeling among members, national officers would be aware of this.
There was no evidence, however, that union negotiators would favour a return to a 
show of hands in decisions over industrial action. This was as true of the large 
general unions as of more specialist and white collar unions. Despite the widespread 
use of members’ meetings in reference back, it was said by a number of respondents 
that balloting was popular among members - and not unpopular among officers - 
although the legal detail and the difficulties this created for unions was seen as a 
device to restrict industrial action by some respondents:
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The membership, it has to be said, seem to favour the workplace secret 
ballot before strike action, but do not support other areas such as 
having to reballot after 28 days and dismissal while taking industrial 
action.
Members have quickly adopted balloting procedures and have come to 
expect to be asked as to whether they accept or reject offers and take 
industrial action. They are happier that these decisions are not taken 
at mass meetings.
The information suggested, therefore, that by 1989-91 ballots had become an important 
aspect of consultation on pay offers. While a significant number of negotiators 
continued to favour a show of hands at a members’ meeting, balloting was 
increasingly used. Workplace ballots and members’ meetings were notably more 
common in reference back consultation than postal ballots.
5.11 Conclusions
The research showed how trade unions adapted both their rules and, more importantly, 
their practice to meet the balloting requirement. From responses to the questionnaire 
the picture that emerged was of unions and their officials who by and large sought to 
conduct industrial action lawfully. Negotiators had widespread experience of industrial 
action ballots. There was little evidence that ballots were primarily seen as an external 
imposition. Many negotiators listed union policy and members’ expectations that a 
ballot would be held as important reasons for balloting.
Industrial action ballots were integrated into existing consultation processes. This 
helped to reduce any practical difficulties and minimised the dangers of no votes. The 
complexity of these practices and procedures - reflecting the nature of the membership, 
different levels of decision-making within unions and a variety of policies on industrial 
action - led to wide variations in negotiators’ experience of the number of ballots held, 
whether these were workplace or postal, and how they related to other methods of 
consultation. Although ballots were widely held and were now very much part of 
trade unions’ dispute strategies, they were not universally held before all industrial
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action.
It is notable that the balloting laws were seen to have engendered a more cautious 
approach to industrial action among trade union officers. Some negotiators believed 
that this was as a result of the demonstration effect of the use of the law by major 
employers in a number of high profile cases:
This has imbued senior TU officials and myself with a fear that 
contravention of a law or a court order would not be worth the effort 
that it brought about.
The secret ballot is a good thing as it often strengthens members’ 
commitment to action. However the law is entirely weighted to the 
employers’ side and this makes unions very careful (in my opinion 
often too careful).
Caution among trade union negotiators had been reinforced by the complexity of the 
balloting requirements. This increased the potential for ballots to centralise decision­
making within trade unions. The influence of the law was felt by negotiators in the 
form of detailed guidance issued by union legal and research departments. The 
evidence from the questionnaire was that negotiators widely made use of this advice 
and information. National Officers believed that there had been a significant increase 
in demand. There was clearly a new legal dimension in disputes.
There was little evidence, however, from the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire 
that the balloting requirement had undermined negotiators’ role in disputes, leading the 
research to conclude that industrial action balloting had been accommodated without 
a notable centralisation in trade union decision making. A high percentage of 
negotiators (88%) reported that they were responsible for organising industrial action 
ballots. Balloting was used alongside other methods of consultation and 
encompassed both workplace and postal ballots, although negotiators expressed a 
preference for workplace ballots. Negotiators also reported an increase in the use of 
reference back ballots, which in many respects reflected expectations engendered by
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the balloting legislation. The interviews with National Officers and results of the trade 
union negotiators’ questionnaire suggested that direct consultation with members using 
both industrial action and reference back ballots was not unwelcome to trade unions. 
Nor did the use of ballots affect the pivotal role of negotiators in trade union 
workplace organisation.
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CHAPTER 6 INDUSTRIAL ACTION BALLOTS: EMPLOYER AND 
TRADE UNION STRATEGIES IN DISPUTES
6.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the role of ballots in negotiations, drawing on the results of 
the questionnaire survey of trade union negotiators, interviews with National Officers 
of trade unions and employers. It will explore the impact of ballots on the processes 
of negotiations, relating this to the likely effect on negotiated settlements and industrial 
action, and changes in the balance of power in the bargaining relationship. The impact 
of the balloting legislation on disputes and industrial action has been the subject of 
widely differing interpretations. In the words of one respondent to the union 
negotiators’ questionnaire:
It is probably easy at this time to assume that the law has played a
greater role in reducing industrial action, than is the case.
Tom King, then Employment Secretary interpreted the impact of the balloting 
legislation quite differently. He asserted in 1985 that the law requiring ballots before 
industrial action was the most important factor in the fall in the number of disputes 
which was at its lowest for 50 years. In support of this argument, he quoted 21 cases 
of legal action, involving 11 companies and 21 unions1.
In 1984 the trade union movement saw ballots as one aspect of the Government’s 
determination to impose restrictions on industrial action and thus undermine the ability 
of trade unions in disputes to use the credible threat of industrial action to defend the 
interests of their members. The TUC response to the balloting legislation placed the 
requirement to hold industrial action ballots clearly within the framework of the 
Employment Acts 1980 and 1982 which had trespassed into the area of trade union 
immunities. Part II of the Trade Union Act was seen as ’a further erosion of the right
l . See Financial Times 31.5.85.
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to take industrial action’ (TUC 1984, 9).
In 1984, before the addition of further complexities to the balloting requirement, the 
TUC had already expressed concern that a failure to comply with the technical detail 
of the law would leave ballots open to challenge by employers:
[T]he difficulties of obtaining a legally valid ballot would appear to be 
considerable (TUC 1984, 10).
Conversely, with the benefit of the experience of eleven years of the balloting 
requirement, it has been argued that ballots have assisted trade unions in negotiations. 
Ballots undoubtedly ’quickly became an established feature of the industrial relations 
scene’2 and ACAS statistics provided evidence that the majority of ballots produced 
votes in favour of industrial action. See Table 6.1 below.
Table 6.1 ACAS figures on the number of industrial action ballots ’won’ and Tost’ 
in the 1980s.
Number of ballots Number in favour 
of industrial action
Percentage in 
favour of industrial 
action
1985-6 253 196 77.5%
1987 280 251 90%
1988 331 305 92%
1989 359 336 94%
Source: ACAS Annual Reports
As the table shows, the proportion of ’yes’ votes steadily increased. It has been
2. ACAS 1987,14. See also Labour Research 1995, 3.
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argued, therefore, that if ballots resulted in strike action not taking place, this was 
seldom because ’moderate’ members had overturned the recommendations for action 
of more ’militant’ leaders, but more often because a ’yes’ vote in a ballot proved to 
be an effective negotiating tactic for union officials, assisting them to obtain a 
satisfactory settlement without the industrial action going ahead (Auerbach 1990,120).
This chapter provides an analysis of evidence from the trade union negotiators’ 
questionnaire to test the argument that ballots strengthened the hand of union 
negotiators and also evaluates the evidence in relation to the opposite argument that 
ballots increased the difficulties for trade unions in winning membership support for 
dispute strategies involving industrial action and thus increased the power resources 
available to employers. The analysis begins with information on ballots won and lost.
6.2 Industrial action ballots won and lost
The overwhelming evidence from the fieldwork was that, in the experience of trade 
union negotiators, most ballots produced votes in favour of industrial action. Overall, 
nearly three quarters of respondents (74%) reported more ballots won than lost. The 
results are summarised in Table 6.2 below.
Unions in which respondents reported a significantly higher proportion of ballots won 
than lost included manual and white collar unions, in both the public and private 
sectors. In two unions, respondents reported that all votes had been in favour of 
industrial action. Negotiators in most unions had experience, however, of members 
voting against industrial action. In two unions covered by the survey, negotiators 
reported more ballots in which members had voted against industrial action than 
ballots in which they had voted in favour.
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Table 6.2 Yes and no votes in ballots held in the previous three years
Proportion of ballots in 
favour of industrial action
Number of respondents Percentage of total 
responses
Up to 25% 95 14%
25-50% 85 12%
50-75% 74 11%
More than 75% 427a 63%
Total responses 681 100%
^ote:
a 339 respondents said that all ballots held had produced votes in favour 
of industrial action.
The trade union negotiators’ questionnaire provided information to test whether 
officers who reported a greater number of ballots held were more likely to report a 
higher percentage of Tost’ ballots. In most unions the percentage of yes and no votes 
in ballots was not significantly affected by the number of ballots which the respondent 
had experienced. Contrary to expectations perhaps, in some unions - notably those in 
the Civil Service and one major public and private sector union respectively - where 
only one ballot had been held, officers were somewhat more likely to report a vote 
against industrial action than where a number of ballots had been held. In some 
unions a greater number of ballots did lead to a significant decline in the likelihood 
that ballots would be won. In one large public sector trade union, for example, where 
only one ballot had been held, all officers reported a vote in favour of industrial 
action. Where between two and five ballots had been held, 75% produced yes votes.
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In a large general union, Officers reporting more than five ballots were as likely to 
lose as win them, compared to 60% overall who reported more ballots won than lost.
The wording on the ballot paper was one possible influence on the chances of winning 
or losing ballot decisions. Despite the increasing complexity of the requirements, trade 
unions retained discretion over whether questions on strike action and action short of 
a strike should be included on the same ballot paper. The research revealed a wide 
range of different practices. It might be anticipated that a potential danger for trade 
unions in combining questions on strike action and action short of a strike was that 
this could encourage members to vote for a Tesser’ form of industrial action by 
rejecting strike action and supporting action short of a strike. There was very little 
evidence from the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire to suggest that members 
voted against strike action and for action short of a strike3. A wide range of advice 
was issued by trade unions. Legal departments of two large general unions 
recommended to negotiators that as a general rule only one question, relating either 
to strike action or action short of a strike, should be included on the ballot paper, 
except where it was anticipated that the action was likely to escalate from action short 
of a strike to strike action. In practice, though, the Legal Officer in one of the unions 
believed that in most cases the model ballot paper, which included both questions, 
would simply be reproduced. In the other union guidance had been revised to include 
three separate model ballot papers. National officers believed that since this guidance 
had been issued, negotiating officers were increasingly likely to use the appropriate 
ballot paper rather than ask both questions in all cases. One Civil Service union 
advised that if members were being asked to vote on both questions separate ballot 
papers should be sent out.
By contrast, there was evidence from a number of unions that both questions about
3. National Officers, notably in two large general unions in the survey, believed that it 
would be surprising if this had not happened rather more frequently than these results would 
suggest. Assuming that most officers reported this situation as a vote in favour of industrial 
action, this would in one sense overstate the proportion of ballots won.
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strike action and action short of strike action would be asked on the ballot paper. This 
included one union in the education sector, which had a tradition of industrial action 
combining action short of a strike and short strikes. Ballot papers included questions 
on strike action and action short of a strike and National Officers were confident that 
members would vote in favour of both.
Respondents’ comments did not suggest that votes against industrial action and for 
action short of a strike had been common in the experience of negotiators. There were 
a small number of exceptional cases, which suggested that when this happened it 
completely undermined dispute strategies:
Members voted against strike action. Action short of a strike was 
ineffective and was not supported at a number of units.
Negotiators in all 25 unions expressed more concern that low turn outs or a narrow 
majority in favour of industrial action, whether strike action or action short of a strike, 
were most damaging to their negotiating position.
A potential difficulty of a more technical nature of including both questions on the 
same ballot paper related to the counting of the votes. In West Midlands Travel Ltd 
v TGWU4 the Court of Appeal rejected an employer’s attempt to invalidate a ballot 
on the grounds that the majority vote for strike action represented fewer than half of 
those members who took part in the ballot. The situation had arisen because a number 
of members had not answered both questions on the ballot paper. TGWU guidance 
subsequently warned officers that where two questions were asked but only one was 
answered, these should be treated as spoilt ballot papers.
The advantage of asking both questions could be the flexibility this provided in 
conducting disputes. In 1991 guidance issued by one Civil Service union suggested 
that if both questions were included, decisions about appropriate action could be taken
4. West Midlands Travel Ltd v TGWU Court of Appeal [1994] ICR 978.
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following the ballot result:
In the light of the extent of membership support for the action, the size 
of the turnout and any subsequent negotiations, decide on the preferred 
form of action to be taken (eg one day strike or indefinite strike).
Information from Electoral Reform Balloting Services in 1994 suggested that in the 
early 1990s questions about strike action and action short of a strike were usually both 
included on the ballot paper5. This would tend to confirm the findings of the 
negotiators’ questionnaire, which suggested that asking both questions on the ballot 
paper could be a positive part of negotiating strategies.
The evidence from the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire that more ballots were 
won than lost is consistent with the evidence from ACAS Annual Reports of the 
increasing ability of trade unions to hold ballots which produced majorities in favour 
of industrial action. Overall, the high proportion of ballots won suggested that 
balloting could be a positive factor of some significance in trade union negotiating 
strategies. Whilst, however, it could be argued that it was a ’serious misjudgement’ 
for any union to lose an industrial action ballot6, there were situations in which 
negotiators were not in a position to make a decision to hold a ballot independent of 
other factors. These included union policy, the balance of interests of different groups 
or factions within the union, the attitude of employers and members’ expectations that 
they would be balloted. All had an impact on the use of ballots in trade unions’ 
negotiating strategies and could lead to ’no’ votes. Centralised decision-making within 
some unions enabled Executive Committees to control the number of ballots held. 
One Civil Service union, for example, maintained the practice throughout the 1980s
5. Information from Electoral Reform Balloting Services reported in Industrial Relations 
Services Employment Trends 553 February 1994. 120 postal ballots were monitored between 
1st September 1993 and February 1994: 52% sought a mandate for both strike action and 
action short of a strike.
6. This was said during an interview by a former General Secretary of a Civil Service 
union.
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of organising ballots only where the Executive was confident that there was 
membership support for industrial action. Other unions had less centralised 
procedures.
6.3 Prescriptive nature of the balloting requirement and maintaining flexibility 
in negotiations
One of the most powerful potential constraints on the use of ballots by trade union 
negotiators in disputes was the prescriptive nature of the legislation -  a feature which 
was accentuated by amendments to the law in 1988 and 1990. Unions’ freedom to 
determine the nature of the ballot and the questions posed prior to 1984 was replaced 
by an increasingly rigid regime. The advice issued by trade union national and local 
officials sought to balance the need to prevent legal challenges against maintaining 
flexibility in negotiations. National Officers emphasised that if the guidance was 
followed it was not impossible to comply with the law and organise an effective 
campaign of industrial action. The TGWU’s 1987 guidance, The Law and You, for 
example, assured representatives:
’[t]here is nothing in law to prevent our members from continuing to 
take strong, effective dispute action including a strike action if 
necessary..’.
Respondents in a number of unions expressed concern, however, about the practical 
difficulties associated with balloting. Negative comments focused on the complexity 
of the provisions:
the complexities which now surround the process of balloting cannot 
be construed as a ’good thing’ for unions, being clearly designed to 
trap unions in a legalistic morass, rather than a means of establishing 
members’ wishes.
Ballots as such cause me no practical, moral, or philosophical 
problems. What does cause me problems are the legislative 
requirements within which the ballots are conducted, as the legislation
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is designed to give advantage to the employers at the expense of 
employees and their trade unions.
Potential difficulties for trade union negotiators in the successful conduct of disputes 
related to a number of different requirements associated with the balloting laws.
6.3.1 Combined reference back and industrial action ballots
The use of combined reference back and industrial action ballots was common in trade 
unions which used ballots prior to 1984 Whilst the evidence from research in the 
1980s confirmed that the practice continued (Martin et al. 1991, 201), combined 
ballots could not satisfy the requirements of the legislation and trade unions became 
increasingly cautious about their use.
By the time of this research, combined ballots - although still used within certain trade 
unions7 - did not emerge as a significant issue for trade union negotiators. This may 
be, in part, because most unions had incorporated ballots as an integral part of the 
consultation process. A number of respondents commented that the research had 
confused consultation, which took place first, with the ballot which then followed the 
consultation. This enabled union officers to avoid situations in which a vote against 
industrial action would have been particularly damaging to their negotiating position. 
As one officer commented, a ballot was not held because: ’initial indications showed 
a lack of support for action’.
6.3.2 Wording
The research suggested that a key issue for trade union negotiators was complying 
with the required wording on the ballot paper. This in turn raised a broader issue 
about trade unions’ freedom to define the nature of the dispute. Some employers saw 
the wording on the ballot paper as an opportunity for trade union leaders to influence
7 A National Officer of one large general union commented that negotiators still used 
ballots that combined decisions on offers and industrial action as part of the negotiating 
process. See also Elgar and Simpson 1994e, 10. Managers reported that unions in British 
Rail held ballots which combined reference back and industrial action.
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the outcome of the vote. Employers expressed more concern that questions on the 
ballot paper and accompanying information should give a ’fair’ account of the issues 
in dispute, than that ballots complied with the technical detail of the law. For their 
part, however, union National Officers said that the increasingly prescriptive nature 
of legislative requirements for the ballot paper created the greatest opportunities for 
employers to intervene in, and influence, decisions on industrial action.
Evidence from the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire was that the wording on the 
ballot paper was the most common basis for legal challenge to ballots. Overall, 60% 
of employer threats of legal action related to balloting, and more than two thirds of 
these concerned the wording on the ballot paper. National Officers believed that key 
to avoiding a legal challenge was to define disputes carefully with an eye to the law. 
The advisory circular on ballots of one of the large general unions warned negotiators 
to avoid a situation in which developments in a dispute following a ballot could enable 
an employer to question the validity of the ballot. Recent case law has confirmed the 
importance for trade unions of ensuring that all written documentation associated with 
a dispute points to there being a dispute within the trade dispute definition. The 
wording of the ballot paper can be a very important factor8.
Officers were also advised that the accompanying information should state:
The industrial action authorised by the ballot will be the full extent of 
that contained on the ballot paper and is not restricted to that currently 
intended9.
This would enable negotiators to maintain a flexibility in dispute tactics and escalate
8. See the case of Wandsworth LEA v NAS/UWT [1994] ICR 81 where the Court of 
Appeal ruled that the NAS/UWT had successfully established the existence of a trade dispute. 
Neill LJ said: ’we attach considerable importance to the wording of the question posed in the 
ballot paper’.
9. See discussion of this issue regarding Blue Circle v TGWU in Simpson 1989, 234.
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industrial action without the requirement for a further ballot10. In practice the sample 
ballot papers collected in the course of the research indicated that there were 
considerable variations in the wording of ballot papers within, as well as between 
unions.
6.3.3 Time limits on industrial action
The legislation required that industrial action should take place within 28 days of the 
date of the ballot. The effect of court proceedings during the 1989 docks dispute over 
the abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme provided evidence that this could 
in certain circumstances undermine trade unions’ dispute strategies11. The research 
highlighted cases in which unions were encouraged to implement industrial action to 
stay within the time limit. In October 1987 the Scottish POA balloted members on 
industrial action. Having won a mandate for industrial action, the union faced the 
prospect of the four week time limit being exceeded. Members were, therefore, 
instructed to refuse to fill in time sheets. In 1989 the General Secretary referred to 
the ongoing action as ’more technical than anything’ to keep alive the mandate of the 
1987 ballot12.
Meeting the 28 day time limit did not emerge as an issue of any widespread 
significance for negotiators in the current research13. The balance of negotiators’
10. Maintaining flexibility has become increasingly difficult since 1993 with the 
imposition of the four notice requirements.
n. Associated British Ports Ltd v TGWU [1989] IRLR 29. But see now the possibility 
of the extension of the four week time limit in these circumstances, TULRCA section 234, 
discussed above pp.81-2.
12. See Secretary of State for Scotland v. Scottish Prison Officers’ Association [1991] 
IRLR 371. For a general discussion of the case, see Simpson 1993.
13. It should be noted that the fieldwork was carried out before the 1993 changes in the 
law which added requirements for notifying employers of industrial action. This could further 
delay industrial action. No compensatory provisions were made to lift the restrictions on the 
timescale.
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responses indicated that the time limit was a positive element in negotiations, enabling 
trade union negotiators to successfully put pressure on employers, leading to the 
satisfactory settlement of the dispute:
Following positive ballot result for strike action I contacted the 
employer and gave notice that in the event of no further progress being 
made in negotiations (by a specific date), we would implement the 
ballot decision of our members. Subsequent talks resolved the 
difficulties.
In a small number of cases, however, exceeding the time limits was said to have led 
to industrial action being called off without the dispute having been settled in 
negotiations:
The employer started talks that did not resolve the problems. Because 
of the legal time limits members had to be re-balloted.
This could impose an additional delay because of the time taken to hold a ballot.
In the experience of negotiators covered by the questionnaire, the complexity of the 
provisions for the wording of the ballot paper was the most significant of the 
prescriptive requirements imposed on trade unions in relation to industrial action 
balloting post-1984. It led to a number of legal challenges from employers and, of 
wider significance, enabled employers to exert an influence over the conduct of the 
ballot. It also led to a greater reliance among negotiators on detailed advice and 
guidance from National and Legal Officers.
6.4 Ballots and trade union negotiating strategies
The findings of Undy and Martin’s survey of trade union practices in the early 1980s 
suggested that prior to 1984, the use of ballots in collective bargaining was relatively 
limited. In the TGWU, for example:
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union full-time officers preferred to consult via lay committees, shop 
stewards meetings or, as in cars, mass meetings rather than to use 
formal ballots, arguing that the method was more flexible, and less 
open to employers’ influences (Undy and Martin 1984, 144, 163).
There was, however, long experience of ballots in certain negotiating groups and the 
more general, although occasional, use of ballots by trade unions to meet particular 
needs. More systematic evidence on the use of industrial action ballots by trade 
unions in negotiations has been lacking. The trade union negotiators’ questionnaire 
sought to explore this issue. Overall the evidence of the questionnaire suggested that 
ballots assisted trade unions in negotiations, but that this was qualified in certain 
important respects.
Respondents were asked about the most important reasons for balloting on industrial 
action. A third of respondents said that strengthening the hand of negotiators was one 
of the two most important reasons. This compared with two thirds who referred to 
the legal requirement to ballot and almost a half who referred to union policy and the 
expectation of members that they would be balloted14. In some unions, notably a large 
general union and large public sector union, almost a half of respondents referred to 
strengthening the hand of negotiators.
Whereas, overall, only a third of respondents referred, therefore, to strengthening the 
hand of negotiators as one of the most important reasons for balloting on industrial 
action, the use of ballots emerged clearly as a feature of union strategy in negotiations. 
The trade union negotiators’ questionnaire sought information not only about industrial 
action that had taken place, but also industrial action seriously considered. Where 
industrial action did not take place, negotiators were asked whether disputes had been 
settled in negotiation or whether there had been a failure to reach a negotiated 
settlement. In each case negotiators were asked whether a ballot had been held. Of 
those who reported that industrial action had been seriously considered but did not
14. See above chapter four for more details.
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take place, an overwhelming majority said that in their experience disputes had been 
settled in negotiation and that, at least on occasion, this had followed a ballot. For a 
summary of the results see Table 6.3 below.
TABLE 6.3 Strike ballots in negotiations
Number of respondents Percentage of total 
responses
Occasions on which 
threatened industrial action 
did not take place
599 88%a
Ballot held 489 82%
Dispute settled in 
negotiations
519 87%
No industrial action/dispute 
not settled
169 28%
Total responses 599
Note:
a There were 683 respondents to this question. 599 (88%) reported that 
there had been occasions on which threatened industrial action did not 
take place. The following percentages are out of the 599 responses.
While it is not possible from the available information to determine how the terms of 
a settlement differed from those on offer before the ballot, the evidence suggested that 
there was a strong correlation between successful ballots and a negotiated outcome to 
disputes. The results also indicated, however, that ballots alone did not determine 
negotiators’ ability to reach a negotiated settlement. The relationship between the 
absence of a ballot and failure to achieve a negotiated settlement was far less marked 
than the positive correlation between a successful ballot and negotiated settlement of
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a dispute. There were unions in which notably fewer respondents referred to ballots, 
but a high proportion of disputes were settled in negotiations. This was particularly 
true of unions in the Civil Service. Similarly, in one education union fewer than a 
half of respondents who reported that disputes had been settled in negotiations said 
that, at least on occasion, this followed a ballot. In a major public sector union, fewer 
than two thirds of respondents reported a ballot held in this situation.
While, therefore, achieving a negotiated settlement did not depend on ballots, other 
evidence suggested that they were a factor of critical importance. Respondents’ 
comments in all unions confirmed that a convincing yes vote in a ballot could often 
lead to an improved offer or withdrawal of proposals in dispute without industrial 
action going ahead:
I think that the legislation on ballots, if followed, helps to strengthen 
the union at the workplace. It gives a legitimate and legal view of the 
workforce which I find most employers have a problem with. In the 
past the employer often argued that the impending action was brought 
about by coercion, this is now virtually impossible.
I believe that whilst creating administrative and financial burdens for 
the trade unions, industrial relations law is in fact a double-edged 
weapon and tactically can be used very effectively against employers.
Evidence from two craft unions - one with and one without a history of using ballots 
in collective bargaining - indicated that negotiators in both unions had made use of 
ballots in negotiations widely. In these unions, respondents’ comments confirmed that 
they recognised the positive aspects of balloting:
In factories where trade unions are strong and well organised...it is 
possible by the exercise of a disciplined approach to put pressure on 
managements through the use of industrial action ballots.
In the past employers used to say that members were coerced into 
voting one way or another. This they cannot now do.
When the members felt strongly and expressed their views in a ballot 
a settlement by negotiation [was] common. A settlement was sometimes 
reached before we balloted the members.
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The tactical advantages of balloting on industrial action were also recognised by 
negotiators in white collar unions:
Ballots on industrial action have proved a useful bargaining tool in 
demonstrating [the] extent of members’ support.
Employers now have to be aware that their offer will be put to ballot 
and they are also under pressure to be realistic in what they offer.
It was notable, however, that more than a quarter of respondents, (28% overall), 
reported occasions when no industrial action had taken place for reasons other than 
settlement of the dispute through negotiations. This was normally because members 
had voted against action or where the majority and/or numbers voting were not 
convincing enough to sustain the taking of industrial action. This would suggest that 
negotiators were not always in a position to decide when to hold a ballot and then 
have the best opportunity to persuade members to vote in favour of industrial action 
to improve their bargaining position. A substantial minority of negotiators in a 
number of unions, for example, said that an important reason for using ballots was 
members’ expectations. It may be that, on occasion, members’ expectations required 
a ballot to be held in situations where a no vote, a narrow majority in favour of action 
or a low turnout was the likely outcome and this did not help a negotiator’s bargaining 
position. Unions in which a relatively high proportion of respondents reported 
disputes not settled in negotiations, but where no industrial action took place, included 
public and private sector and manual and white collar unions.
Negotiators were aware that a successful ballot result was no guarantee of success in 
negotiations. One of the negative effects that seemed to be of concern to some 
negotiators, especially in two large predominantly manual trade unions, was that they 
could find themselves exposed in negotiations if a ballot majority was not reflected in 
support among members for actually taking industrial action:
A nil increase meant that over a three year period wages had been 
seriously eroded. Members balloted to take strike action convinced that 
management would then concede something. When this did not happen
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they were worried that the company would pull up stakes and move 
from the area (management threat). They really could not afford to be 
without money and had to accept the situation bad as it was.
Due to the factory being closed and transferred out of the area, 
members were afraid of being sacked whilst in breach of their contract 
and losing their redundancy pay. [This was] even though they had 
voted for action short of a strike.
This was the negative side of the element of bluff which a number of full time officers 
claimed to have built into the bargaining process by using ballots. A number of 
negotiators reported that ballots had given a ’false picture’ of the strength of 
membership support for industrial action. As one commented:
After voting yes in the ballot, the members just decided to accept the 
proposed change.
Particular problems were associated with the use of industrial action ballots in multi­
union workplaces, or where disputes involved a number of different unions. This 
could explain why in two major public sector unions the use of ballots did not emerge 
more strongly as a feature of union strategy in negotiations. In fact the loss of a ballot 
or insufficient membership support was more likely to be reported as a factor in an 
unsatisfactory outcome of a dispute. The wider research suggested that unions in the 
public transport sector often failed to co-ordinate their response in disputes, 
undermining the effective use of ballots in negotiations. This reflects the difficulties 
some unions face in overcoming traditional rivalries, even though individual officers 
might be well aware of the potential tactical advantages in co-ordinated ballots (Elgar 
and Simpson 1994e, 11).
Some respondents referred to the difficulties of organising a ballot where issues 
affected members’ interests differentially. One respondent representing members in 
a large car plant commented:
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We were among the first to move to mass meetings followed by 
workplace ballots. We believe that this way is excellent and 
democratic for issues of plant significance. However on ’lesser’ issues 
- eg. a sacking - we also have to ballot at plant level, which causes 
problems. On the set piece battles the changes in the law ironically 
have strengthened us. On other questions it has made strike action very 
difficult to organise - therefore the employer is stronger in negotiations.
In general, however, there was little evidence from the negotiators’ questionnaire that 
balloting had made it more difficult for negotiators to win the support of members for 
industrial action. More trade union negotiators believed that balloting had 
strengthened members’ resolve and commitment to industrial action. Moreover, there 
was little evidence from the interviews with employers that they believed that ballots 
were more likely to produce ’moderate’ rather than ’militant’ outcomes.
A more general measure of the importance attached to ballots in trade union 
negotiating strategies was provided by negotiators in response to the statement that 
strike ballots were a good thing for trade unions. Overall slightly more than two 
thirds (68%) of respondents agreed. In a number of major unions more than three 
quarters of respondents agreed that ballots were a good thing for trade unions. In one 
manual union with a long standing practice of balloting on reference back if not 
industrial action, 96% of respondents believed that ballots were a good thing. The 
balance of respondents’ comments on balloting was positive. Negotiators recognised 
that the emphasis on consultation with members and a strategic, planned approach to 
industrial action, as a corollary to balloting, was not without a positive element:
The requirement to ballot and all the petty stipulations surrounding the 
ballot form are more nuisance value than a deterrent. If you can’t win 
a ballot, you will never win a strike.
A number of employers welcomed ballots as a useful ’cooling off period. Equally, 
however, the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire provided evidence that trade 
unions could benefit from a more carefully planned approach to the threat of industrial 
action.
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In this section it has been noted that the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire found 
a strong correlation between a successful ballot and negotiated settlement of a dispute, 
without the need for industrial action to go ahead. This supports the argument that 
ballots have assisted trade unions in negotiations. The research has also highlighted a 
number of provisos, which qualify the general conclusion. These include the evidence 
of settlements reached by negotiators without the assistance of a ballot, ballots lost or 
where the majority was not sufficient to sustain the taking of industrial action, and 
negotiators’ concern about the complexity surrounding the balloting provisions.
There was one further important proviso. To strengthen the hand of negotiators, the 
threat of industrial action backing the ballot needed to have credibility with employers. 
Interviews with regional trade union officials in the construction industry confirmed 
that balloting played a very small part in their negotiating strategies. Union influence 
in the construction industry was not based on strong site organisation and respondents 
recognised that a ballot would not carry with it a credible threat of industrial action:
While there is evidence that in other industries holding a strike ballot 
is seen as a useful negotiating tactic by trade unions, the obstacles in 
the way of organising a lawful ballot of construction workers mean that 
this is far less likely to be the case in this industry. Moreover there 
was no tradition of balloting before industrial action on construction 
sites (Elgar and Simpson 1994b, l l ) 15.
This was a particular feature of the construction industry, reflecting its distinctive 
industrial relations practices.
6.5 Employers’ use of the law
The trade union negotiators’ questionnaire provided information on legal proceedings
15. For a general discussion of developments in construction which have affected site 
based union organisation see Evans and Lewis 1989.
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initiated or threatened by employers under the balloting provisions. Whilst this 
contributes to a body of information on this issue16, it can only lead to a partial 
understanding of the impact of the law. The analysis here is based on the broader 
’use’ of the strike ballot laws by employers in negotiations and the extent to which the 
balloting requirement played a part in employers’ negotiating strategies.
6.5.1 Background
The enforcement mechanisms of the 1984 strike ballot provisions depended on 
employers’ willingness to invoke their new legal rights against the organisers of 
industrial action. It has been argued that:
[The] eventual decision to link the statutory immunities to pre-strike 
ballots appears to have been heavily influenced by the increasingly 
hard-line attitude taken up by employers’ organisations towards trade 
union law reform since the June 1983 election (Hutton 1984, 214).
The Government believed that employers would be willing to make use of the law by 
challenging unlawful industrial action in the courts. This, however, made huge, 
largely untested assumptions. As Poole and Mansfield have argued, whilst the level 
of interest in studies of management has increased in recent years:
our knowledge of the extent to which managerial attitudes and 
behaviour in industrial relations are sensitive to major shifts in the 
external political environment is still circumscribed (Poole and 
Mansfield 1993).
The TUC in its response to the balloting legislation proposals argued that employers 
would recognise that seeking injunctions could easily inflame situations, harden 
attitudes and jeopardise the early settlement of a dispute (TUC 1984). Experience has 
confirmed that for employers there was an immense difference between expressing 
support for the principle of ballots before industrial action and willingness to make use
16. See especially Evans 1985, 133-137; and Evans 1987; Labour Research Department 
1988, 1990, 1991, 1993.
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of new opportunities to challenge industrial action in the courts by taking legal action.
Evans’ work involve collating and analysing evidence of employers’ injunction 
applications. His research showed that in the period 1984 to April 1987, 47 of the 80 
recorded injunction applications arose from the balloting legislation (Evans 1987). 
Labour Research found that in the period to July 1988 there was one further injunction 
application relating to balloting (LRD 1988). While this approach has produced 
invaluable information, it has limitations as a measure of the impact of the law. One 
is that it is based largely on newspaper reports of proceedings and is, therefore, 
sometimes of questionable accuracy. The use of Evans’ work, by others who have 
often not acknowledged the original source of the data, as a definitive survey of the 
incidence of legal proceedings, leading to an understanding of the impact of the law, 
could, therefore, be highly misleading17. It also excludes from consideration all those 
situations in which the requirement to ballot had an impact on negotiations, but legal 
proceedings were not invoked. Evans, found, for example, that injunction applications 
were concentrated among a small number of employers and sectors, notably printing, 
shipping and transport, and the public services (Evans 1987).
The current research sought both to update and broaden the nature of the enquiry. It 
included questions, which were asked of both trade union negotiators and employer 
respondents, about not only legal proceedings, but also threats made by employers to 
invoke the law. This was seen to be one way of seeking a truer measure of the ’use’ 
of the law by employers.
6.5.2 Evidence from the research
The trade union negotiators’ questionnaire showed that where industrial action had 
been seriously considered, just over a quarter of negotiators (28%18) in 23 of the 25 
unions had received some form of threat by employers to use the law over actual or
17. See, for example, Metcalf 1990.
18. 203 respondents of 846 in total.
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potential industrial action. See Table 6.4 below.
Table 6.4 Threats of legal action bv employers in response to industrial action taken 
or seriously considered
Number of respondents Percentage of total 
responses
Threats of legal action by 203 28%
employers
Total responses 737* 100%
*4ote:
1 737 respondents of the total 846 reported that industrial action had been
seriously considered within the previous three years.
Steps by employers to start legal proceedings were experienced by negotiators in 18 
unions, but in small numbers. Writs and/or solicitors’ letters were reported by 50 
negotiators. This was a quarter of those who had received threats of legal action, or 
less than 7% of those who had seriously considered industrial action. Negotiators in 
some unions, in particular one large general union and a public sector transport union, 
appeared to face employers who were more likely to invoke the law. A notably lower 
proportion of respondents referred to threats of legal action in a number of unions, 
including one large craft union and a union in the education sector. In two smaller, 
specialist unions, threats of legal proceedings were a one-off.
Overall, nearly two thirds (60%) of these threats related to ballots. See Table 6.5 
below.
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Table 6.5 Grounds for employers’ threats of legal action8
Grounds Number of respondents Percentage of total 
responses
Ballots only 92 45%
Ballots and other law 30 15%
Other law onlyb 59 2 9 %
Not known 22 11%
Total responses 203 100%
Notes:
a The table does not record the incidence of legal threats by employers.
The figure of 203 reflects the number of negotiators with experience of 
an employer threatening to use the law. In each case, threats may have 
arisen in relation to more than one incident of industrial action.
b The reasons given were not always grounds on which legal action could
be based, such as failure to observe procedures.
A significantly higher proportion related to balloting in four major unions: one large 
general union, an education union, a union representing professional and technical 
members and a public sector transport union. In just four of the 23 unions, negotiators 
did not report any employers threatening to use the law in relation to balloting. There 
were 30 examples of solicitors’ letters or injunction applications relating to balloting. 
These were more highly concentrated than threats of legal action and 21 related to just 
three unions - all large unions representing manual workers. Balloting was, on 
occasion, one of a number of grounds for employers’ action.
Where further information was given by respondents, the single most common basis 
for employers’ challenges related to the wording on the ballot paper. Many
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negotiators referred, however, to various aspects of balloting procedure, including 
notably balloting constituencies. This was a change from the Evans’ findings based 
on the period 1984 to 1987 when most injunction applications were based on the 
absence of a ballot19. In some unions, however, challenges to unballoted action 
continued to be prominent, notably one large public sector union.
While in the experience of most union negotiators it was rare to get near to legal 
proceedings, therefore, it was not uncommon for employers to invoke the law in a 
general sense as a negotiating tactic. There is one important proviso. It is difficult 
to know how many employers’ threats, including those relating to balloting, had a 
clear legal basis. As one respondent commented:
I find that employers threaten to serve injunctions without knowing
what for!
An analysis based on trade union officers reporting threats of legal action may, 
therefore overstate the influence of legal proceedings. On occasion, trade union 
officers were influenced by threats to make use of the law which did not have any real 
substance. In the words of the Legal Officer of one large, general union, this was one 
more area for ’myth-making’ about the power of the law.
In addition to the threats of legal action, negotiators reported occasions when, while 
there was no formal threat of action, employers made it clear that they would monitor 
carefully everything done in connection with organising industrial action and would 
take legal action if this failed to comply with legal requirements. As the complexity 
of the legislation increased, so did the difficulties of complying with the detail of the 
law. The research found that trade union Legal Officers were often not prepared, for 
example, to give general advice to negotiators on the question of balloting 
constituencies. The interviews with employers suggested, however, that most
19. See Evans 1987. Forty three injunction applications were said to relate to unballoted 
action, three more to the wording of ballot papers and one to balloting procedures.
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employers were not keen to challenge the technical detail of ballots20.
Where employers did threaten to invoke legal proceedings this did not necessarily lead 
to a positive outcome from their point of view. In the trade union negotiators’ 
questionnaire no clear trend emerged from responses to questions on the impact of 
threats by employers to use the law. Significant minorities of negotiators said that 
they had not been influenced at all or that they had been influenced a lot. The majority 
said that they were influenced ’a little’ or ’to some degree’. Where officers reported 
that they had been influenced by a threat of legal action, this had not always served 
to undermine the industrial action. Some respondents commented that it had greatly 
strengthened members’ resolve.
A small number of respondents had actually experienced employers initiating legal 
proceedings on balloting grounds. Earlier research by Martin et al. used the 
withdrawal of industrial action as evidence of the impact of injunctions on bargaining 
outcomes (Martin et al. 1991, 204-5). The current research sought to go beyond this 
by asking separate questions about the impact of legal proceedings on industrial action 
and on bargaining outcomes. The overall number of cases were small, but negotiators 
tended to be more confident in reporting the impact of legal proceedings on industrial 
action. Where negotiators reported that they were unsure about the influence of 
solicitors’ letters and writs, this usually related to the bargaining outcome. Responses 
did not fall into a clear pattern and negotiators were fairly evenly divided over 
whether employers’ use of legal proceedings had affected either the industrial action 
or the bargaining outcome. There were some notable differences between unions, but 
with such small numbers it is difficult to draw conclusions from them. In one craft- 
based union, there were five legal proceedings relating to balloting. These had no 
impact on the industrial action or bargaining outcome. In one large general union 
there were ten legal proceedings relating to balloting. Eight affected either the 
industrial action or bargaining outcome.
20. See in particular Elgar and Simpson 1993a. It should be noted that these were all 
federated employers.
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While the number of responses here were too small to make the percentages 
statistically significant, the research showed that the threat of legal proceedings and, 
in particular, the actual use of legal proceedings by employers had a range of 
different results from union and employer negotiators’ perspective. This broadly 
reflected findings from Evans’ earlier surveys, which reported ’mixed success’ for 
employers where they sought injunctions21.
Interviews with 66 employer representatives in six sectors provided evidence of legal 
proceedings over balloting within the previous three years in just two disputes in the 
public transport sector. There were further examples of employers giving serious 
consideration to use of legal proceedings. These ranged across a spectrum from 
greater to lesser substance and formality. They were limited to three sectors: public 
sector transport, the Health Service and engineering.
In the public transport sector a number of respondents referred to injunctions sought 
by British Rail and London Underground Ltd on the grounds of balloting irregularities 
in the course of major national disputes in 1989. In the experience of BR managers 
in the survey there had been two further occasions on which threats to initiate legal 
action against unions had been made. These related to local disputes. London Buses 
had threatened legal action over a ballot in 1989. In the Health Service, management 
respondents reported no injunctions relating to balloting, but two Health Service 
managers said that they had been prepared to consider injunctions, and a third had had 
occasion to make trade union officials ’aware of the laws on balloting’. Just two 
management respondents in 17 engineering companies reported occasions on which a 
threat to invoke the laws on balloting had been used (Elgar and Simpson 1993a, 8). 
One other respondent said that the company would be prepared to do so. There had 
been no cases in which employers had seriously considered using the balloting laws 
to challenge industrial action in the education sector, printing or construction.
21. See Evans 1987. There were 26 cases over the failure to hold pre-strike ballots in 
primary disputes. Fifteen led to a ballot and a vote in favour of industrial action, ten to 
industrial action being called off.
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6.7 Explaining employers’ limited use of legal proceedings
Whilst there is some, albeit limited, evidence from secondary sources and from this 
research that some employers have taken up the Government’s challenge to them to 
’use the law’, a Legal Officer of one of Britain’s largest unions commented that he 
was ’astonished’ by how infrequently the union faced the threat of legal proceedings 
by employers.
There were significant differences between the approach of employers in different 
sectors. Employers in the public transport sector - British Rail, London Underground 
Ltd and London Buses - had had greater resort to legal proceedings in disputes than 
management respondents in any other organisations, private or public sector, covered 
by the survey (Elgar and Simpson 1994e). In BR and LUL this could be seen to 
reflect difficult relations between management and unions at a time of radical change. 
It also demonstrated a shift in management approach, following organisational changes 
in BR in 1982 and the division of London Transport into London Underground and 
London Buses in 1985. Managers found themselves operating in a very different 
cultural environment and as a result were less willing or able to reach a compromise 
with trade union negotiators in disputes.
A change in management approach was also evident in other sectors, but manifested 
itself in different ways. In the engineering sector, the survey of 17 companies found 
that actual or threatened industrial action only rarely gave rise to a management 
response which included a legal dimension. Where it did, this related to the laws on 
balloting or took the form of warnings to individual workers about the possible 
consequences of taking part in industrial action (Elgar and Simpson 1993a).
One of the key concerns of most managers covered by this research was to avoid an 
escalation of disputes. In the Health Service interviews with managers indicated that 
although the laws on balloting were generally seen to have been of assistance to 
managers, there were limits beyond which they were unlikely to go. While managers 
wanted union officers to be clear that they were ’aware’ of the law, respondents
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expressed the view that the actual use of the law would be counterproductive (Elgar 
and Simpson 1994d). In one case a general ballot of the workforce was held which 
was not restricted to the members of an individual union. In the event the vote was 
not in favour of strike action - although by a small majority in favour of action short 
of a strike - but if it had been, management would have been prepared to challenge 
the lawfulness of the ballot. This strategy was seen, though, to involve a risk for 
management of escalating the dispute. There were also cases where respondents 
agreed that they would not insist on the need for a ballot because the strength of 
feeling among a particular group of workers over the issue in question was beyond 
doubt. It appears that this was the policy of at least one region in relation to industrial 
action arising from the medical secretaries regrading claim in 1987. Local managers 
believed that to insist on a ballot in these circumstances would have been 
counterproductive. In the experience of union negotiators many managers did not 
want to run the risk of fuelling a dispute by invoking the law:
Most employers take the view that industrial relations should be 
divorced from the law as much as possible. They obviously expect 
compliance (on ballots) but often to cover themselves from criticism for 
not threatening legal action. Most take the long term view that after 
any action we still have to live together.
Evidence from the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire and other sources 
demonstrated how invoking the law could raise the stakes in a dispute:
If [the employer] had not issued a writ against...representatives...it is 
unlikely that the membership would have gone on strike. If [the 
employer] had been prepared to negotiate, a solution would have been 
found to end the dispute. Had [the employer] not taken the decision to 
sack their employees involved in the strike, the dispute would have 
ended much sooner.
The responses are consistent with Miller and Woolfson’s case study of the Timex, 
Dundee dispute, which showed how an employer’s resort to legal action undermined 
the process of negotiations and led to the subsequent escalation of the dispute (Miller 
and Woolfson 1994).
203
The evidence from the employer interviews suggested that a complicating factor in the 
public sector was that managers were not necessarily in a position to make decisions 
independently about the handling of disputes because they were bound by more senior 
levels of management. The balloting laws were used in disputes, the conduct of which 
was not within the control of respondents. In these cases, managers’ attitudes 
sometimes reflected a lack of whole-hearted support for the policies of more senior 
managers and national negotiating bodies. There was a widespread perception among 
respondents in British Rail that, in the 1989 dispute, the use of the law to challenge 
an NUR ballot, in which a clear majority had voted in favour of industrial action, had 
been ill-conceived and did little more than undermine management’s position and 
galvanise NUR members’ support for the industrial action (Elgar and Simpson 1994e).
Trade union negotiators confirmed that there could be a difference between the more 
pragmatic approach of local employers and national negotiating bodies. Negotiators 
reported that during the 1993 dispute in further education the Colleges Employers’ 
Forum, the national negotiating body, was ’in the mood’ to use the law. The 
employers took legal advice to ascertain whether there were grounds for challenging 
the ballot on administrative sanctions. This mood was not reflected in the attitude of 
local employers.
In the Health Service, managers’ essentially pragmatic response to the use of the law 
appeared to reflect conflicting pressures - political, budgetary and to meet service 
targets - and the shifting balance between them (Elgar and Simpson 1994d, 14). In 
the public services, however, managers’ reluctance to make use of the law would need 
to be balanced against the political pressure to do so. On occasion Government 
intervention has been quite explicit. In 1988 the Government announced that it would 
support any Health Authority taking legal action against a trade union for encouraging 
nurses to work to grade without a ballot22 [check Public91 FN44]. There was 
evidence from the employer interviews that one authority had raised this issue with 
trade unions. Similarly, a distinction was drawn by the Local Authorities Conditions
22. See the Financial Times 21.11.88.
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of Service Advisory Board (LACSAB - now Local Government Management Board) 
between politicians in local government who would make use of the law and managers 
who would recognise the longer term damaging implications for industrial relations.
Another factor limiting management’s resort to the law was that where industrial 
action took the form of action short of strike action, managers were not necessarily 
sure when a ballot could be required. Interviews with managers in the public transport 
sector revealed some uncertainty over whether withdrawal of overtime and rest day 
working was in breach of workers’ contracts23 and needed to be preceded by a ballot. 
Interviews with engineering employers highlighted the use by unions of action short 
of strike action and subtle forms of non-cooperation, which did not fall within clearly 
defined boundaries of industrial action. In these circumstances the question of 
balloting often did not arise (Elgar and Simpson 1993a). Respondents in the Health 
Service also referred to occasions on which workers ’withdrew goodwill’ as part of 
dispute strategies and unions argued that this did not constitute industrial action so a 
ballot was not required. Examples included ambulance control officers, who took 
industrial action which involved ’withdrawing goodwill’ in 1987. Similar issues were 
raised when some nurses expressed their dissatisfaction by ’working to grade’ during 
the clinical regrading exercise in 198824.
Finally, resort to the balloting legislation was limited by the range of responses to 
actual or threatened industrial action, which were available to managers. Management 
responses were as likely to involve requiring union officials to repudiate industrial 
action. This was often combined with warning those involved that sanctions might be 
taken against them as individuals. Whilst, therefore, injunction applications were rare,
23. The leading case is still Secretary of State for Employment v ASLEF [1972] ICR 19, 
CA. See Napier 1972.
24. On whether such action amounts to a breach of contract see British 
Telecommunications pic v Ticehurst [1992] ICR 383 CA.
205
managers were increasingly ’having an eye to the law’25. In the case of unofficial 
action, as from 1991, the advice of the Engineering Employers’ Federation to member 
companies was not to threaten litigation against the union, but to move quickly to call 
on the union to repudiate industrial action immediately.
6.7 Balloting and management negotiating strategies
As noted above, statistics on labour injunctions do not provide an accurate measure 
of either the use of the law or its influence. This section analyses the information 
from the employers’ interviews and the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire on the 
part played by the balloting requirement in management negotiating strategies26.
The evidence from interviews with employers showed that there were significant 
sectoral variations in experience of disputes, industrial action and ballots held. Table 
6.6 below is a summary of the results.
Seventeen engineering companies were interviewed. Eleven of these reported a total 
of 17 industrial action ballots held, a number of which were in the engineering hours 
campaign. Most of the industrial action that took place, however, was short-lived and 
unballoted. In the construction industry, just three of the 12 managers interviewed 
reported ballots in recent years, one of these was in a highly specialised area. Six had 
experience of unballoted action. In general printing, two of the seven companies 
reported that unions had balloted on industrial action.
Table 6.6 Employers’ experience of industrial action ballots based on interviews in six 
sectors
25. Elgar and Simpson 1993a. Cf. role of Engineering Employers Federation in advising 
Timex on the law in the Timex dispute Miller and Woolfson 1994, 215-6.
26. On the ’power resources’ available to employers and unions in negotiations see Kelly 
and Heery 1994. Cf. Edwards and Scullion 1982, 243.
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Sector Number of 
respondents
Respondents with 
experience of 
industrial action 
ballots
Total number of 
ballots
Engineering 17 11 17
Construction 12 3 3
General printing 7 2 2
Public sector 
transport
11 11 several
Health Service 10 5 6+
Education 8 2 2
Total responses 65 34 -
In the public transport sector, all eleven respondents reported that unions held a 
number of ballots in the period from the mid 1980s into the early 1990s. Ballots were 
held in local as well as national disputes. Most respondents were also aware of 
unballoted action in local disputes, which had always taken place unofficially. In the 
Health Service five of the ten respondents reported ballots held in recent years, either 
in major, national disputes or over localised issues27. Industrial action balloting had 
occurred on more than one occasion in the experience of only one respondent; for 
others an industrial action ballot had been an exceptional occurrence. Four 
respondents were aware of unballoted action, three of whom also had experience of
27. Five respondents reported ballots in the previous five years; three in the previous three 
years.
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balloted action. In the education sector employers did not report widespread 
experience of ballots in local disputes. Ballots held related to campaigns of national 
industrial action. There were two instances in which local ballots had been held, but 
employers reported that the two most significant cases of local industrial action were 
both unballoted.
The attitude of managers in construction companies was notably different from other 
respondents. Whilst in other sectors the use of ballots was seen by managers, on 
occasion, to give unions a negotiating advantage, this was not true in the construction 
industry. In the words of one management respondent the balloting laws had ’not 
impinged at all’. This in part reflected the absence of effective union organisation at 
site level, which meant that a union’s threat to ballot would lack credibility with 
companies. Moreover, a number of respondents did not believe that unions could hold 
a lawful ballot, especially if this covered more than one site. While industrial action 
had sometimes been protracted, it was invariably unofficial and there was no tradition 
of balloting on sites28. The difficulties involved in holding a lawful ballot only 
encouraged union officials to stand back from disputes and encouraged industrial 
action to take place unofficially (Elgar and Simpson 1994b).
The employers’ interviews included questions on monitoring ballots. By scrutinising 
the conduct and results of ballots it was evident that employers sought, on occasion, 
to gain negotiating advantage. All seven Health Service respondents at District or Unit 
level said that they would always monitor industrial action ballots. Just one said that 
this would involve taking legal advice. Another commented that the degree of detail 
required would depend upon the circumstances, but that management would want to 
see that the ballot was generally ’fair’. Six of the seven printing employers said that 
they would always monitor ballots. Similarly most engineering and construction
28. It should be noted, however, that during an interview one site manager received 
information that a ballot had been held which produced a majority in favour of industrial 
action. It was subsequently reported that this led to a negotiated settlement of the dispute. 
Site managers or industrial relations managers at head office level would not necessarily have 
been aware of all ballots held.
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employers and nine managers in public sector transport said that ballots would be 
monitored. Managers in the education sector were something of an exception in this 
respect. A half of them said that they would monitor ballots held, but only in certain 
circumstances. This would depend on the seriousness of the threat of industrial action 
and would also be informed by their concern to maintain good relations with trade 
unions.
The information from the employers’ interviews suggested, therefore, that the 
monitoring of ballots was a widespread practice among employers, with the notable 
exception of managers in the education sector. Whilst monitoring by no means always 
indicated a serious intention to mount a legal challenge to ballots held, the trade union 
negotiators’ questionnaire highlighted situations in which, although managers did not 
threaten legal action, the balloting laws were nevertheless an ever-present influence on 
their negotiating strategies and the trade union response:
The legislation is used obliquely by management in meetings and 
negotiations. It is far more of an unspoken veiled threat, rather than 
being used in times of acute industrial discontent, when the threatened 
use of the law would only inflame the situation.
The balloting requirement also provided opportunities for employers to influence the 
outcome of decisions. Information from secondary sources suggests that the openness 
or ’transparency’ of union decision making by ballot was quickly exploited by some 
employers. In 1985 the Chairman of London Buses wrote to workers on the eve of 
an industrial action ballot over pay, saying that a vote in favour of industrial action 
could lead to job losses29. Evidence from the interviews with employers suggested that 
direct communication with employees during disputes was an increasingly common 
policy. In British Rail, for example, this was associated with the implementation of 
a number of restructuring packages for different grades of staff.
29. See Financial Times 5.7.85.
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Comments from the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire illustrated how employers 
intervened to their advantage in the process of industrial action balloting. This could 
involve putting pressure on individuals to vote against industrial action. It should be 
noted in this respect that one of the intended effects of the 1993 changes in the law, 
introducing a number of notice requirements, was to encourage employers to intervene 
in this way. These changes included requirements for trade unions to inform 
employers of all those being balloted and all those being called on to take industrial 
action. This would be to underline a development which was already experienced by 
some negotiators:
Management imposed new pay settlement in pay packets. This diffused 
the momentum. [There were] also direct management approach, letters 
and meetings prior to the ballot.
Ballots can, therefore, be seen to have strengthened the power resources available to 
employers in disputes. The nature of the balloting process and the time necessarily 
taken in holding a ballot provided ample scope for employers who wished to 
undermine trade union strategies. All employers welcomed the opportunity to put their 
case to employees. In local government, national employers believed that they needed 
to match improvements made by the unions in communications with members. This 
was described by LACSAB as making use of ’twentieth century public relations’. In 
this respect the requirement to ballot made the mid 1980s a watershed in the conduct 
of industrial relations in local government. Local government employers, nevertheless, 
miscalculated the support of NALGO members for industrial action in 1989, following 
votes against industrial action in 1986 and 1988. Once the ballot had been held, it 
was said that the information came too late to have an impact on the employers’ 
dispute strategies which were already decided. Indeed a ballot in favour of industrial 
action only served to harden employers’ attitudes because it was seen as a challenge 
to their political authority.
In a final section of the interview schedules and questionnaires, employers and trade 
union negotiators were asked for their views on some broad themes relating to 
industrial relations in general, and balloting in particular, in the 1980s. A comparative
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summary of the responses is in Table 6.7.
Table 6.7 General picture of the 1980s: employer and trade union responses compared
Manager respondents Trade union respondents
The law has been the 
most important factor 
affecting industrial 
action8
25% 63%
Employers are more 
hardline in negotiationsb
78% 93%
Ballots are a good thing 
for trade unions
75% 68%
Notes:
a Management respondents in the Health Service were least likely to attribute 
influence to the law and those in public sector transport most likely to do so.
b Fewest management respondents agreed in the construction sector.
Employer and trade union respondents expressed the greatest differences of opinion 
when asked whether the law had been the most important factor affecting industrial 
action. Almost two thirds of trade union respondents believed the law to have been 
the most important factor, compared to a quarter of employers. It should be noted that 
these were respondents’ perceptions of the influence of the law in general.
There were also notable differences when respondents were asked about the influence 
of the law in their own experience. More than half (52%) of trade union negotiators 
believed that the law had been an important weapon for employers in their 
negotiations. For their part, managers provided a range of responses on the 
importance of the law as a factor favouring them in their negotiations with trade 
unions. Overall, 30% said that the law had been an important or very important 
factor. It is notable that in the Health Service, a half of respondents said that the law
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had been important and two of these specifically mentioned balloting. Others, 
especially in the education sector, made clear that the influence of the law included 
the changing statutory framework for the service, which had been a greater influence 
than changes in industrial conflict legislation.
There was a greater measure of agreement that ballots were a good thing for trade 
unions. Three quarters of employer respondents and more than two thirds of trade 
union negotiators agreed with this statement. Overall, while the information suggested 
that employers were well aware of the balloting requirement and that it had influenced 
their negotiating strategies, the research found no evidence that the balloting laws had 
brought about a quantum change in employers’ approach to industrial relations. The 
balloting laws had been incorporated into more traditional management strategies, 
although these were, in themselves, in the process of transformation in all areas. An 
Incomes Data Services survey in the early 1990s (Incomes Data Services 1992) found 
greater awareness among employers of industrial conflict law, in particular balloting, 
than had previously existed. The conclusions confirmed the findings of this research 
that if employer attitudes had shifted, this was a pragmatic response to the wider 
availability of legal sanctions rather than the development of a legalistic approach. In 
broader terms the balloting legislation may have acted as a catalyst for improving 
employers’ communications with the workforce, but this was a small part of a much 
wider process of change which was identified by all respondents, both trade union 
negotiators and employers.
6.8 Sanctions against individuals
One area in which there was evidence that, over the 1980s, management’s response 
to disputes had changed was in relation to the threat and use of sanctions against 
individuals who took part in industrial action. This was of some significance to the 
current research for two reasons. Firstly, it was a development facilitated by the 
balloting requirement. This was accentuated after 1993 with the introduction of the 
notice requirements, but was already apparent at the time of the research. The Court
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of Appeal confirmed in the case of Blackpool and the Fvlde College v NATFHE that 
employers must be given the names of individuals balloted, or information which 
would enable them to ascertain the names30. Secondly, the threat of disciplinary action 
or dismissal could undermine industrial action even following a successful ballot.
The experience of more than a third of trade union negotiators was that dismissals had 
been threatened, where industrial action had been seriously considered or taken31. In 
just over a quarter (27%) of cases the threat was carried out. Employers’ rights were 
not, by and large, dependent on changes to the law in the 1980s32. The trade union 
negotiators’ questionnaire highlighted, however, the importance in the 1980s of the 
realisation among some employers that the threat of sanctions against individual 
workers taking part in industrial action could be very effective33. In the context of 
balloting this could mean, for example, that rather than challenge the details of a ballot 
in favour of industrial action, employers would threaten dismissal if the industrial 
action went ahead.
In the Health Service and education sector, there was little evidence of threats of 
dismissal, but pay deductions became an increasingly contentious issue in disputes
30. Blackpool and the Fvlde College v NATFHE [1994] ICR 648. In this balloting case 
a list of names of individuals being balloted was not given to the college.
31. 255 respondents.
32. As a general rule workers dismissed while taking part in industrial action cannot seek 
any redress for unfair dismissal. This is, however, subject to a now extremely complex 
exception in some cases where the employer has not treated all those taking part in industrial 
action in the same way. For example some workers are dismissed and others are not. Or all 
are dismissed, but only some are offered their jobs back at the end of the dispute. The 
uncertain application of the exception has generated extensive case law. See, in particular, 
K. Ewing The Right to Strike (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 1991, chapter 4.
33. See, for example, British Rail in which managers’ threats to dismiss workers were 
seen as a significant departure from previous practice. See Elgar and Simpson 1994e, 13.
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throughout the 1980s34. The enthusiasm of Health and Education Authorities for 
making use of the developments in case law on pay deductions may be contrasted to 
their relative lack of interest in exploring the possibilities of any sort of challenge to 
trade unions using the industrial action balloting legislation. In 1991, LACSAB issued 
a strongly worded requirement for Local Education Authorities to respond to the 
NUT’s proposed boycott of testing with pay deductions. If full pay were to be 
continued when there was a clear breach of contract, this:
..may well be regarded as ’wilful misconduct’ under section 20 of the 
Local Government Finance Act 1982..It is therefore essential that LEAs 
have clear policies on how they will deal with breaches of contract 
whether they take the form of strikes or action short of a strike35.
Local Authorities could in turn be subject to penalties if they were found to be 
committing an act of wilful misconduct. In two education sector unions, almost a half 
of negotiators reported that pay deductions had been made from members’ pay during 
industrial action.
It is a persuasive argument that threats against individual workers would be much 
more within the understanding of most employers than seeking injunctions against the 
organisers of industrial action. They were also much more likely to be directly 
effective with the union’s members - in deterring or ending industrial action, or 
influencing the vote in a ballot - thus undermining trade union dispute strategies. As 
one respondent commented:
On one occasion the membership support evaporated under threat of
34. These developments were not dependent on changes to statue law, but decisions in the 
courts which broadened employers powers. For the case law, see Rovle v.Trafford MBC 
[1984] IRLR 184, Sim v. Rotherham [1986] ICR 897, House of Lords decision in Miles v. 
Wakefield MBC [1987] ICR 368, Wiluszvnski v Tower Hamlets LBC [1989] ICR 493.
35. Local Authorities Conditions of Service Advisory Board Education Employers’ 
Bulletin No. 139. April 1991. Para 4.
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dismissal.
Threats of dismissal were, of course, intended to have their effect at a collective level. 
This was given a new legal dimension by the Employment Act 1990, after which 
unofficial strikers who were dismissed were denied redress against unfair dismissal in 
any circumstances.
6.9 Conclusions
There was evidence from the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire that overall ballots 
had assisted trade unions in negotiations. This was reflected in the high proportion 
of ballots won and the fact that trade union negotiators widely reported that, following 
a ballot, disputes had been settled in negotiation without the need for industrial action 
to go ahead. Whilst it was not possible in each case to know how the terms of the 
settlement were improved from a trade union point of view, the balance of negotiators’ 
comments clearly indicated that positive ballot results were seen to have strengthened 
their bargaining position. Trade unions faced employers whose strategies were 
changing in ways which, notably in the public sector, undermined traditionally co­
operative industrial relations. In this climate ballots were seen to ’secure’ industrial 
action. Trade union negotiators were not hostile to the need to carefully plan and 
prepare members for involvement in disputes. However, the complexity of the 
provisions, the time and resources devoted to balloting arrangements and the 
opportunities ballots provided for employers to influence members’ decisions were 
seen to have a potentially negative effect on trade unions in negotiations.
The employers and managers interviewed were generally aware of the balloting 
requirement and increasingly, from a management perspective, disputes were 
conducted with ’an eye to’ this aspect of the law. It is notable that employers were 
much less familiar with other aspects of changes made to industrial conflict legislation 
in the 1980s. There were a number of instances of injunction applications. The 
interviews with employers and evidence in the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire
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demonstrated, however, the limitations of trying to assess the influence of the law 
solely by reference to the number of occasions on which legal proceedings were 
actually started or threatened. The majority of employers interviewed would be 
careful to monitor industrial action ballots and now saw this as an integral part of the 
conduct of disputes. In practice, balloting was the one change in industrial conflict 
law whose significance had been felt across different sectors of the economy, with the 
notable exception of construction. Overall, however, while the industrial action 
balloting requirement was seen to have been influential on employers’ negotiating 
strategies it had not, inter alia, radically changed them.
216
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Introduction
The balloting laws were given a high profile in several well-publicised major disputes in 
the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s, including public sector transport disputes 
in 1989 1995 and 1996. It is clear, though, that focusing either on such high profile cases 
or on the incidence of applications for injunctions1 based on alleged non-compliance with 
the balloting laws can provide only a partial understanding of the impact of the law. It 
is equally clear that it is not possible to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the 
balloting legislation by reference to a correlation with changes in strike statistics2. This 
is not least because with this approach it is particularly difficult to separate the impact of 
industrial conflict legislation from broader legislative, political, social and economic 
changes3. Drawing on the experience of trade union negotiators, in the context of a wider 
research project encompassing trade union National Officers and employers, this chapter 
seeks to provide an overview of the findings and to draw some conclusions about the 
impact of strike ballots on (i) trade union practice, (ii) the processes and outcomes of 
negotiations and (iii) the incidence of industrial action.
\  For an approach based on compiling details of injunction applications see McKay 
1996, especially 16-18.
2. See McCarthy ’The Changing Limits of Legal Intervention’ in McCarthy (ed) 1992 
on the general problems of correlating strike statistics and changes in the law.
3. See Edwards ’Strikes and Industrial Conflict’ Edwards (ed) 1995.
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7.2 Overview of findings
Chapters five and six provide a considerable amount of new information on the experience 
of trade union negotiators, relating to disputes, industrial action and the balloting 
requirement. It is apparent that in the 1989-91 period, consideration of industrial action 
was a live issue for a large majority of negotiators in the unions covered by the survey 
(Elgar and Simpson 1993b). Industrial action balloting was widespread: 82% of 
respondents reported ballots held in the previous three years.
The wider research project illustrated that there were two legal issues which were of 
greatest concern to respondents. One, arising from changes in the law in the 1980s, was 
balloting. This stands out as the most important change in industrial conflict law in the 
1980s. The other was the threat of dismissal - or other sanctions - against individual 
workers, which did not depend on changes made to the law in the 1980s, although 
changes to the law of unfair dismissal may have helped to heighten employers’ awareness 
of their rights.
There was considerable emphasis within unions on conducting disputes in accordance with 
the balloting laws. The extent that this required changes in trade union practices 
depended largely on the traditional nature of trade union organisation and the workgroups 
concerned. By the late 1980s and early 1990s trade unions had by and large adapted their 
practices to the balloting requirement. The key conclusions from the research are that this 
was based on:
(i) traditional practices which included balloting, if not specifically
industrial action balloting, in a significant minority of unions before 1984;
(ii) an acceptance among negotiators that balloting would endure;
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(iii) an ability to incorporate ballots into trade union practice alongside
other methods of consultation;
(iv) a widespread belief that ballots assisted in the settlement of disputes.
The picture that emerged from responses to the questionnaire, therefore, was that unions 
in general sought to conduct disputes and industrial action lawfully. This was particularly 
true in major disputes. One illustration was the 1989-1991 engineering hours dispute in 
which the unions’ strategy was structured around the balloting requirement (Elgar and 
Simpson 1993a, 15). This is not to say that all industrial action was lawfully balloted - 
far from it. Evidence from the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire and interviews with 
employers was that a substantial amount of industrial action was unballoted and that 
industrial action was generally too short-lived for the law on ballots to have any 
relevance.
Whether or not it was expressly invoked, however, the balloting law was generally a 
relevant factor in disputes. There was evidence that trade union negotiators had 
accommodated balloting within negotiating strategies. For their part, the research found 
that there was a widespread understanding among employers of the requirement imposed 
upon trade unions to hold a lawful ballot before authorising members to take part in 
industrial action. Employers were willing to consider threatening to invoke the law by 
making applications for labour injunctions, but were concerned to avoid escalating 
disputes. Just over a quarter of trade union negotiators (28%) in 23 unions had 
experienced threats of legal action by employers: 60% of these related to balloting. If, 
however, the evidence from the research was that balloting infused industrial relations 
with a new legal dimension, employers, like trade unions, accommodated balloting within 
existing industrial relations policies, which were themselves often in the process of 
transformation, rather than balloting per se leading to radical new departures.
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7.3 Impact of the balloting requirement: implications for trade union practice
It can be argued that the balloting laws sought to fulfil two contradictory purposes. The 
first related to the concept of responsible trade unionism and aimed to facilitate the 
reversion of authority to ’responsible’ trade union leaders. The second sought to place 
more power in the hands of individual trade union members to challenge the decisions of 
their representatives and established consultation procedures. The balloting laws, 
therefore, had the potential to centralise decision-making powers within trade unions, but 
also to undermine trade union leadership by creating divisions between different interest 
groups - including national leaders, local officials and members. There were few 
examples of national leaders using ballots to appeal directly to members to circumvent 
local officials and representative institutions, although in certain cases it proved to be a 
very effective tactic. If, however, the longer term effect of balloting was to be to 
formalise and centralise decision making within unions, over time this could lead to a 
modification of the substantive policies adopted by trade unions and could indeed be an 
effective way of reducing industrial action.
There was little evidence that the requirement to ballot took the organisation of industrial 
action out of the hands of negotiators: 88% said that they were responsible for organising 
ballots. This was in part because ballots were blended with existing mechanisms for 
consultation. Despite the persistent modification of the law, strike ballots became more 
an aspect of internal union procedures, than something imposed from outside: in a sense 
the law seemed to provide only a background to the organisation of ballots. The main 
reason for balloting was the law, but trade union policy and members expectations also 
featured prominently in the reasons given by trade union negotiators for balloting before 
industrial action. The extent of negotiators’ freedom over the nature and timing of ballots 
varied. This was likely to reflect traditional practices relating to the authorisation of 
industrial action and the level at which, in practice, decisions were made.
Negotiators made widespread use of national advice in relation to industrial action ballots
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and interviews with National Officers confirmed that there was an increasing demand for 
advice and guidance on all aspects of balloting. Many unions had also issued detailed 
circulars on balloting, often in response to particular disputes. An increased reliance on 
national procedures and guidance clearly had the potential to centralise power within trade 
unions, undermining the traditional autonomy of negotiators. The findings of the current 
research suggest, however, that as ballots became more widespread after 1984 and were 
incorporated into well-established consultation procedures, the traditional role of 
negotiators was largely preserved4. National advice and guidance took into account 
existing channels for consulting members and authorising industrial action. The research 
did not provide any evidence that the balloting legislation had encouraged trade unions 
to take decision-making authority away from negotiators. The requirements of the law 
were seen to demand this only in exceptional cases. Indeed in the Tanks and Drums 
case5, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the law allowed unions to leave the final 
decision about resort to industrial action to the negotiator involved. Moreover, other 
developments in the 1980s, such as the fragmentation of bargaining arrangements 
especially in the public services, placed more onus on local officials and limited the scope 
for centralisation within trade union organisation. Interviews with managers in the Health 
Service and Education Authorities provided a very clear illustration of this point (Elgar 
and Simpson 1994c, 1994d).
It appears that there was a high level of membership participation in ballots6. Negotiators
4. For a contrary view see Undy et al.1996, chapters 5 and 6.
5. Tanks and Drums v TGWU [1992] ICR 1.
6. Since the research was carried out the law has changed to require all industrial 
action ballots to be postal [TULRCA]. The early experience was that postal ballots on 
industrial action attracted high turnouts, contrary to expectations in many unions. 
Information from Electoral Reform Balloting Services on 120 postal ballots between 
September 1993 and February 1994 showed that there was a 73% turnout. See Industrial 
Relations Services Employment Trends 553, February 1994.
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believed that they were popular with members. The preponderance of ballots reported by 
negotiators were workplace, which enabled negotiators to maintain the essential elements 
of collective decision making, that is meetings and discussion. It is perhaps more 
surprising that a substantial minority of negotiators (45%) referred to the use of postal 
ballots, but this reflected the fact that industrial action ballots were used alongside other 
methods of consultation, including members’ meetings. Overall, 74% of negotiators 
reported that in their experience a majority of ballots produced votes in favour of 
industrial action; a half of negotiators reported that all ballots held had produced votes in 
favour of industrial action. This suggests that balloting had not promoted an 
individualistic concept of trade union membership, at the expense of a sense of collective 
responsibility.
7.4 Impact of the balloting requirement: implications for the processes and outcomes 
of negotiations
The belief that ballots could strengthen their position in negotiations was widely held 
among negotiators. They did not report insurmountable difficulties in meeting the 
requirements of the legislation. Where particular difficulties did arise these fell into three 
categories, which were the dispersal of members across different workplaces, the 
administration of balloting and membership records, and co-ordination in a multi-union 
situation. There was little evidence that ballots were used tactically by negotiators where 
there was no intention of taking industrial action. Indeed some negotiators expressed 
concern that, on occasion, members refused to take part in industrial action after a positive 
ballot result. There was a strong correlation, however, between a successful ballot and 
negotiated outcome of a dispute. Negotiators’ comments confirmed that a convincing yes 
vote in a ballot strengthened their bargaining position.
The research did not provide information which made it possible to explore in detail the 
effect of ballots on the terms of settlements and whether disputes settled after ballots
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produced outcomes more favourable to the trade union side than would have been on offer 
without a ballot, or more favourable than in cases where a ballot was not held. The 
evidence from the negotiators’ questionnaire was that ballots were widely held in disputes. 
A clear majority produced votes in favour of industrial action, although there were 
occasions when factors, other than a negotiator’s judgement that a ballot would assist in 
the negotiations, required a ballot to be held which did not result in a strong yes vote for 
industrial action. These factors included members’ expectations that they would be 
balloted before being called upon to take part in industrial action7. A high proportion of 
negotiators had experience of disputes being settled following a ballot without the need 
for industrial action to take place. These factors all suggested that ballots could add to 
the power resources available to trade union negotiators.
The employers’ interviews presented a varied picture of the influence of ballots in 
negotiations. The construction sector stood out as the only one of those covered in which 
ballots were generally not a relevant factor in disputes (Elgar and Simpson 1994b). 
Overall the evidence from the research suggests that, whilst trade union negotiators 
recognised the positive benefits of ballots, managers also believed that the balloting 
requirement offered them additional power resources in dispute situations, although not 
all employers chose to take advantage of them. In a minority of cases this included the 
opportunity to mount legal challenges to ballots, sometimes on highly technical issues. 
More often, employers carefully scrutinised the conduct and results of ballots to see if 
they could gain negotiating advantage. In five of the six sectors covered by the research 
a majority of managers said that they would always monitor ballots. The main changes 
in the law in 1993 were designed to facilitate this process8. The research also showed,
1. There were also a number of occasions, especially in the public transport sector, 
on which trade unions appeared to misjudge the feelings of members. See Elgar and 
Simpson 1992, 46-47.
8. See above chapter 3 on the notice requirements introduced by the 1993 Act.
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however, that finding fault on technical grounds did not necessarily lead to a positive 
outcome from an employer’s perspective (Elgar and Simpson 1994e).
Trade union negotiators believed that the balloting requirement provided greater 
opportunities for employers to intervene in trade union decision-making and influence the 
outcome of decisions. This could involve putting pressure on individuals to vote against 
industrial action. Where there was some doubt about the strength of membership support 
for industrial action, this could help to tip the balance in the employer’s favour. 
Negotiators found that in some disputes employers had intervened effectively, either 
before ballots were held or following a positive ballot result, to deter workers from taking 
part in industrial action. The ability of employers to take this action was the combined 
effect of the law on balloting and employers’ rights to impose - and, therefore, to threaten 
to impose - sanctions on individual workers who took industrial action.
However the main conclusions are that responses to the trade union negotiators’ 
questionnaire disclosed a widespread perception among negotiators, firstly that ballots 
could avoid the need for costly industrial action by demonstrating the strength of 
membership feeling to the employers’ side. Secondly, where industrial action did take 
place, holding a ballot was seen to consolidate membership support.
7.5 Impact of the balloting requirement: incidence of industrial action
Throughout the research the emphasis has been on how the legislation took effect in 
different trade unions and within different sectors of the economy9, focusing on processes 
and how these might be expected to have an influence on outcomes. Whilst it is difficult 
to make a final assessment of the link between industrial action ballots and the incidence 
of industrial action, the research offers the following conclusions.
9. Elgar and Simpson 1992, 44-46.
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There was little evidence that trade union decision-making bodies were reluctant to hold 
industrial action ballots for fear of members voting against industrial action. There was 
also little evidence that if ballots do have the effect of reducing the incidence of industrial 
action, this was as a result of a large number of ballots leading to ’no’ votes in situations 
where previously industrial action would have taken place. A minority of negotiators did 
report occasions, however, on which industrial action did not take place because the 
members voted in the ballot against industrial action, or the majority in favour was not 
sufficiently convincing, or there was a low turnout.
Far more common in the experience of trade union negotiators was the situation in which 
a vote in favour of industrial action led to the settlement of the dispute without industrial 
action taking place10. In some cases, therefore, balloting may have replaced industrial 
action as a means of demonstrating members’ support for the negotiators’ position. It 
would be overstating the case, however, to suggest that ballots routinely provided 
information which was not otherwise available to the parties to negotiations, thus avoiding 
industrial action which would otherwise have taken place. The responses of trade union 
negotiators to the questionnaire confirmed the importance of seeing industrial action 
ballots as one mechanism, in a wider process of consulting members, which 
complemented rather than replaced other methods of consultation. Conversely, there was 
evidence to suggest that, on occasion, once a ballot had been held a settlement became 
more difficult to achieve because workers’ expectations were raised.
Union officers were not averse to carefully planning and preparing for industrial action, 
where they believed this to be appropriate. Some respondents expressed concern, 
however, about what they described as an increasingly cautious approach among senior
10. This is consistent with the findings of a small survey sample by Electoral Reform 
Balloting Services. Of 120 postal ballots between September 1993 and February 1994, 
78% led to a vote in favour of industrial action, out of which four actually led on to 
industrial action. See Employment Trends Industrial Relations Services 553 (February 
1994).
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officers engendered by the balloting laws. There was a perception that ballots imposed 
a barrier to industrial action where there was a need to take action quickly. The balance 
of evidence suggested, however, that in many cases unofficial industrial action would go 
ahead unballoted in such circumstances. This represented no change from established 
practices11. Employers did not appear to take a hard line in this respect, often preferring 
to use established disputes procedures and relationships with trade union officials to 
resolve the industrial action quickly, rather than resort to legal rights under the balloting 
laws. The priority, especially in more protracted unofficial disputes, was to channel the 
dispute into recognised procedures where it could be dealt with effectively. On occasion, 
the balloting laws - combined with the law on trade union vicarious liability - could make 
this more difficult to achieve. The research revealed only a small number of cases in 
which this had occurred, but they included one or two high profile disputes12.
7.6 Concluding observations
The 1984 Trade Union Act, and its subsequent amendments, led to the wider use of 
industrial action balloting. From the Government’s perspective, this had unpredictable 
consequences. While industrial action balloting brought about significant changes in the 
processes of organising industrial action in some unions, it did not lead either to a marked 
centralisation in power, or to fundamental changes in the role of trade union negotiators. 
There was evidence from the trade union negotiators’ questionnaire that ballots helped to
n. See on this point Edwards in ’Strikes and Industrial Conflict’ Edwards (ed) 1995. 
He argues that the most important questions are whether more industrial action ballots are 
now held and whether as a result a greater percentage of disputes are settled without 
recourse to industrial action.
12. This was the case in the 1989 dispute on London Underground. See also 
Hougham ’Law and the Working Environment: the Ford Experience’ in McCarthy (ed) 
1992, 231, where he argues that recourse to the law is usually not an appropriate response 
in cases of unofficial action.
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resolve disputes without the need for industrial action going ahead. In this sense it could 
be argued that ballots contributed to a reduction in the incidence of industrial action and 
that, in this respect, ballots were successful.
It is arguable, however, that for the Government the costs of achieving this policy 
objective had been high. There was evidence from both sides of the research that ballots 
assisted trade unions in collective bargaining and strengthened their negotiating position. 
What is more difficult to determine is whether this had a significant impact on the 
outcomes of negotiations. It is at least arguable that in the later 1980s and early 1990s 
the increasingly restrictive terms of the legislation succeeded un shifting the balance of 
power in favour of employers13. Moreover industrial action ballots need to be seen within 
the context of broader changes in 1980s industrial relations. Ballots alone were not seen 
by either trade union negotiators or employers to be responsible for bringing about the 
major changes which had occurred in workplace relations.
It is generally acknowledged that some form of legal obligation to hold ballots on 
industrial action will endure. Ballots are widely accepted by trade union negotiators as 
key elements, both in carrying out consultation with members and in negotiating 
strategies. They are broadly welcomed by employers. The experience of trade union 
negotiators demonstrated the complex balance of forces which determine bargaining 
relationships and suggested a significant, though far from dominating, profile for balloting 
laws in disputes. Overall, the research showed that the use of industrial action ballots was 
incorporated into existing relationships, which were themselves often in the process of 
transformation, without ballots in themselves being a cause of that change. At the time 
of the research the balance of advantage brought about by the introduction of industrial 
action balloting legislation was generally seen - by both trade unions and employers - to 
be with trade unions. Following the 1993 Act initial opinion within the trade union
13. There is evidence that trade union negotiators saw the 1993 Act as a watershed. 
See Elgar and Simpson 1996.
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movement suggested that the balance of advantage derived from the industrial action 
balloting laws shifted significantly towards employers, but whether or not this has 
happened is a matter that requires further research.
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CONFIDENTIAL QUESTIONNAIRE
ANNEX A
TRADE UNION FULL TIME OFFICERS/NEGOTIATORS
There are 4 sections. Please try to complete the questions in all sections and return the 
completed questionnaire in the envelope provided by 1 December 1991. Thank you for 
your co-operation.
SECTION A INFORMATION ABOUT YOU
1. JOB TITLE: _______________________________________________
2. UNION:____ ______________________________________________
3. AREA OR DISTRICT (if appropriate): ___________________________________
4. How long have you held your current position?_______________________
5. Approximately how many members do you represent?_______
6. What is the approximate percentage of those who are:
a) manual
b) non manual
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7. In approximately how many different companies or organisations are these members 
employed? _______
And in approximately how many different 
workplaces? _______
8. Is your membership mainly in workplaces with:
a) less than 50 members? 
b) between 50 and 250 members?
c) more than 250 members?
Please continue with Section B
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□ 
□ 
□
SECTION B NEGOTIATIONS/INDUSTRIAL ACTION IN THE LAST THREE 
YEARS
9. In the last 3 years did you at any time seriously consider
industrial action whether this was strike action or action short of a strike?, , ,---- ,
YES L J  NO □
If yes, please continue with questions 10-21 in Section B.
If no, please go straight to section C.
10. If yes how many times did you seriously consider taking industrial action?
In how many workplaces?
And how many times was this: strike action?
action short of a strike?
11. What were the issues in dispute:
a) when strike 
considered?
Pay Other 
conditions
Job losses/ Changes in 
redundancies working 
practices
□ □
Other
□ □ action was
b) when action 
was considered?
□ □ □ short of a strike
If other, please specify:
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12. At this point, before industrial action took place, did any employer threaten legal 
proceedings against you or the union over the industrial action?
YES tZZZl NO □  Don’t know C H
If yes how many times did this happen? ___________
On how many occasions was/were the threat(s) made over:
the possibility of strike action? ____
the possibility of action short of a strike? L _
both? ____
don’t know I
Do you know on what legal grounds the employer was threatening court proceedings?
YF.S I I NO I
If yes, please give details:
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13. If legal proceedings were threatened against you or the union were you influenced by 
this?
Yes, a lot Yes, to some Yes, a No, not at 
degree little all
EH Bl □  □
14. Were there occasions on which industrial action was threatened, but did not take 
place? r— ,
y e s Q  n o
If yes, had you balloted members on taking industrial action?
YES □  NO
If the threatened industrial action didn’t take place was this because:
a) the dispute was settled in negotiations?
b) for other reasons?
Please give brief details:
□
□
□
□
Section B continues
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The next questions are about situations where industrial action took place.
15. In the last 3 years have your members taken industrial action?
YES E D  NO E D
If yes, how many times? _____
And in how many workplaces? _____
16. Once industrial action had started did any employer threaten legal proceedings against 
you or the union?
YES E D  NO E D  Don’t know E D
If yes how many times has this happened?  I
17. If an employer threatened legal proceedings was this based on:
a) the law on ballots? 1 I
b) because it was secondary action? E H
c) some other law? E D
d) don’t know E D
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If you answered yes to a), b) or c) please give details if you can:
18. Has any employer taken steps to start legal proceedings over industrial action?
YES I 1 NO 1 1 Don’t know 1..... 1
If yes, was this:
a) a solicitor’s letter
b) a writ
c) don’t know
19. If legal proceedings were started did this have any effect on:
a) the industrial action? YES 1 1 NO I J Don’t know I 1
b) the bargaining outcome? YES □  NO □  Don’t know □
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Please give brief details:
Section B cont.../
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20. Has any employer threatened to dismiss any of your members for taking industrial 
action:
a) Before the action started?
YES I I NO I I Don’t know
b) while industrial action was in progress?
YES I I NO I I Don’t know [
If yes, have any of your members been dismissed for taking industrial action?
YES I I NO I I Don’t know [
21. If the industrial action was action short of a strike, did the employer deduct money 
from members’ pay?
YES I I NO I I Don’t know I  J
Please continue with Section C
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SECTION C TRADE UNION PROCEDURES
22. Are members consulted about accepting or rejecting a pay offer?
y es  n  n o  n
If yes how do you consult them?
a) members meeting show of hands □
b) secret ballot (postal) 1 I
c) delegate conference □
d) secret ballot (workplace) n
e) stewards’ committees c n  
f) feedback from activists □  
f) different methods in different circumstances □
23. Have there been any changes in the way you consult members over pay offers in
recent years? ,---- , ,—
YES □  NO L_J
If yes, please give brief details:
24. How do you normally consult members about taking industrial action?
a) members meeting show of hands □
b) secret ballot (postal or semi-postal) □
c) secret ballot (workplace) □
25. In the last 3 years have your members taken any industrial action without a ballot 
being held?
YES m NO m
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26. In the last 3 years how many ballots have been held on taking industrial action (even
if no action actually took place)? 
How many were:
in favour of industrial action? _
against industrial action? ----
27. If you have used ballots to consult members about taking industrial action, please give 
your reasons for choosing a ballot, rather than other methods, below. Please list your 
reasons in order of importance from 1-7 with the most important as number 1.
Members expect to be balloted 1 1
Required by employer I I
Strengthen hand of negotiator 1 1
Requirement of law v,,,,,]
Provide information about the views of members I_____ I
Give a breathing space in negotiations I 1
Union policy _____
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28. Are you responsible for organising ballots on industrial action?
YES □  NO □
If yes, who, if anyone, provides you with advice/assistance most frequently?
Trade union legal officer □
Full Time Officer (Head Office) I I
Outside solicitors □
Other 1 i
No one □
If other please specify:
Have you made use of this advice:
Never Seldom Sometimes Often Always
□  n  □  n  n
Please continue with section D
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SECTION D PICTURE OF THE 1980s
29. Would you agree or disagree with the following statements
about how things have changed in the 1980s:
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly Don’t 
agree disagree know
in negotiations with □  e  ma □
trade unions, employers 
are more hardline
members are more reluctant □  □  □  □  □
to take industrial action
the most important factor 1__ 1 I  I \ ....1 1 J i I
affecting industrial action 
has been the law
more industrial action is □  □  □  □  □
now unofficial
industrial action ballots □  □  n  n  n
have been a good thing for 
trade unions
union officials are now □  D  1=1 E l □
more accountable to their members 
than they used to be
30. In your experience has the law been an important weapon for employers in the 
negotiations you conduct?
Not at all Fairly Important Very Don’t know
important important important
□  11 EH El □
Please make any further comments that you may have on the following page.
Thank you for your help.
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ANNEX B
UNIONS WITH RULE BOOK PROVISION FOR BALLOTS ON INDUSTRIAL 
ACTION
Source: Undy and Martin Ballots and Trade Union Democracy (1984)
Summary
25 unions out of 103 surveyed specified the procedure to be followed before undertaking 
national industrial action, in most cases involving some form of ballot. A further 41 
expressly permitted the discretionary use of ballots.
In the case of local industrial action 17 rule books required members to be consulted. A 
further 43 made specific provision for discretionary consultation.
Mandatory ballots
BIFU - since 1980
FDA - since 1982. For all disputes lasting longer than 24 hours.
TGWU - in national disputes involving more than one trade group
Textiles: NUTGW, Felt Hatters, Power Loom Carpet Weavers and Card Setting Machine 
Tenters
Coal mining: NUM, NACODS, BACM
Transport: TGWU, NUS, URTU, Radio, Electronic and Officers Union
Engineering and metal working: Boilermakers, AUEW(F), AUEW (TASS), Associated 
Metalworkers Union, National Union of Scalemakers, EMA, National Union of Gold and 
Silver and Allied Trades.
NATFHE
Communications: NATTKE, ACTT
GMWU - in a dispute involving more than 300 members
Just two of these - BIFU and NUS - require full postal ballots.
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Discretionary ballots
Unions with provision for discretionary ballots in the rules include:
Postal ballots - BALPA, AUEW(E), EETPU, HVA, Equity
Semi postal ballots - AUT, Bakers, NACO, NALHM, NALGO, Rossendale Union of 
Boot, Shoe and Slipper Operatives.
NB. AUEW(E) - is a provision for a ballot where a dispute involves a whole district. 
De facto practices
BIFU, NALGO, NGA ’82, NUS, SOGAT ’82 routinely balloted members over industrial 
action [NOTE conversely those mentioned as not using ballots were CPSA, EETPU, 
Equity, NUR, POEU, UCATT].
POEU annual conference 1979 rejected a proposal that ballots should be held before 
strikes.
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